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INTRODUCTION 
This work aims at establishing Jung' s importance as a 
Nietzsche commentator. Although his work is generally 
unacknowledged by the mainstream of Nietzsche scholarship, Jung 
deserves greater respect than he has heretofore received. Many 
subsequent commentators have joined him in his insistence on 
the relevance of Iranian religious lore to Nietzsche; on the 
visionary mystical nature of Nietzsche's Zarathustra; or on the 
link between Nietzsche's ethical critique and this visionary 
mystical aspect which seeks to transcend good and evil through 
a form of nonduality. Jung however enjoys both temporal 
priority and superiority of detail over his thankless 
successors. 
Nietzsche and Jung both speak of going "beyond good and 
evil" (jenseits von Gut und Bose) as an integral part of their 
respective conceptions of human fulfillment. On the surface, 
they appear to disagree as to what sort of ethic ought to be 
adopted in its place, with Nietzsche in effect favoring an 
alternative set of attitudes whose application would normally 
be regarded as morally wrong, and Jung advocating some sort of 
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nondual consciousness while simultaneously affirming basic 
moral values. On examination, not only did Nietzsche far 
surpass Jung in his willingness to take real-world moral 
stands, but there are good reasons to believe that Nietzsche 
meant something close to Jungian nonduality rather than the 
·mere substitution of one set of values for another. 
The notion that we ought to try to transcend the 
distinction between good and evil, rather than obstinately 
cling to the good, potentially constitutes an immense, 
fundamental challenge to our ordinary beliefs about ethics. 
Indeed, this accounts for much of the appeal of these thinkers, 
although this is more true of Nietzsche than of Jung. Ideas 
about nonduality (including the nonduality of good and evil) 
are present in many of the world's cultures, and are often 
presented as the summit of spiritual attainment. At the same 
time most religions strongly encourage or require the practice 
of morality, compassion, and similarly lofty ideals rather than 
their opposites. Are these two directives consistent? The 
question has come up from time to time within the various 
religious traditions, where the correct answer is generally 
held to be "yes." Nietzsche and Jung have no visible 
allegiance to any of these traditions, and their own views on 
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the subject are not immediately apparent. 
While Nietzsche scholars perpetually debate just what it 
is that makes Nietzsche important, his critique of ethics 
surely constitutes one of his most interesting and influential 
contributions to the history of philosophy. It is unclear 
however whether Nietzsche means to criticize ethical systems in 
general, or whether he advocates some alternative ethical 
system. Nietzsche heaps bombastic praise upon at least some 
(usually hypothetical) moral agents who scoff at ordinary 
ethical standards, and academics have long sought to exonerate 
him from the charge of advocating such things as the Nazi 
holocaust. On the other hand, numerous passages in his 
writings find some reason to denounce violators of ordinary 
ethical standards, including several real-world social 
movements (e. g. Aryan racism, anti-Semitism, German 
nationalism, Christianity, the Wagner cult) which ultimately 
coalesced into the Nazi ideology. Unfortunately Nietzsche does 
not give us a clear, unambiguous description of his ethical 
beliefs; moreover, we cannot even have confidence that he 
intends his writings to be coherent or consistent. Many deeper 
readings have been proposed, including Jung' s; and although 
these tend to be the products of creativity rather than sober 
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scholarship, some deeper reading is probably correct. 
A work that is not normally cited in connection with 
Nietzsche's rejection of "good and evil" (except to the extent 
that its characters may exerrplify it) is his Also sprach 
Zarathustra (1883-1885). Zarathustra is a strange book, as 
philosophy texts go. The most noticeable thing about it is 
that it is written as fiction rather than in the essay style. 
Furthermore, the fiction is not the relatively straightforward 
variety found in Kierkegaard or Sartre, but consists mainly of 
a series of sermons or speeches, written in a quasi -biblical 
style and organized around an . overarching (if disjointed) 
narrative. Although the book has characters and a plot, these 
serve primarily as symbolic vehicles for a philosophy which may 
or may not correspond to Nietzsche's at any given point. The 
second most noticeable thing about Zarathustra is that for some 
reason the book's titular prophet has been given the same name 
as the Zoroastrian founder, although neither the philosophy nor 
the narrative bears much of a resemblance to the career of the 
historical Zarathustra. Other prominent issues that have 
surfaced with respect to Nietzsche's Zarathustra revolve around 
the nature of the Uber.mensch; the interpretation of such 
quintessential themes of the Nachlass as the eternal return 
4 
(Ewige Wiederkehr) and the will to power (die Wille zur Macht); 
and the relationship of Part Four to the remaining parts. The 
book's symbolism and peculiar narrative structure remain 
ongoing topics of discussion as well. 
Jung, inspired by ideas from Eastern religions and 
Weste~p esotericCi,_ ___ seesgS'qci_?:nd evil in much the same way that 
11-~---~~~~ _an.:y pair of opposites, or named characteristics in 
general--as products of dualistic thinking which lead us away 
from wholeness. In order to go "beyond good and evil" in the 
Jungian sense, it is necessary to learn to identify with both 
light and darkness. The dark side or "Shadow" is desirable not 
S_~~!- w~~-C:::l1L 1-~-~e_!:he fabled Philosophers' Stone, blends all its 
disparate ingredients into a harmonious and potent whole. For 
Jung, the dichotomy of good and evil is but one of several 
d:!:_c;hoto~ies_ of rough~x__equal stature, others including that of 
male and female, or the external and the internal. For all 
such OP1::J9Sites, the _poir1t of Jung' s system is to Jnter::I1a,lize 
them until the experience is transmuted into an awareness of 
the reality behind them, namely the Self. As with Nietzsche, 
it is unclear to what extent the goal of balancing good and 
evil--or transcending the concepts altogether--would be 
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compatible with the recognition of moral limits. As a 
psychologist intent on treating real-life patients, Jung 
naturally assumes a life consistent with at least minimal 
ethical standards to be inherently desirable, although he 
admits the compelling power of evil. Even his famous 
acknowledgement of the Shadow appears to be motivated primarily 
by his desire to keep the Shadow from getting out of control. 
Other archetypes, though, are said to be just as dangerous, 
even those which appear pure and luminous. For Jung, human 
fulfillment is more easily achieved when conceived as~ a 
balancing act than as an explicit allegiance to the side of 
good. 
Jung, who saw Nietzsche as something of a kindred spirit, 
refers to that philosopher again and again throughout his 
writings. Jung' s emphasis is on the medium rather than the 
message, so that Nietzsche is invoked primarily as a source of 
unconscious imagery rather than (for example) as an important 
philosopher. Given Jung's particular hermeneutic approach it 
was perhaps inevitable that he would have been attracted 
especially to Zarathustra. Between 1934 and 1939 Jung 
conducted a seminar on Zarathustra under the auspices of the 
Zurich Psychological Club, a group of psychology students 
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including his wife Emma, his mistress Toni Wolff, and several 
other early Jung commentators such as Marie-Louise Von Franz, 
Anielia Jaffe, Barbara Hannah, and Erich Neumann. Previous 
seminars (whose notes have likewise found their way into 
publication without Jung 1 s imprimatur) had dealt with dream 
interpretation and the visionary paintings of Christiana 
Morgan. In this seminar, Jung leads his class in reading 
Zarathustra chapter by chapter as far as Part III, ch. 56, 
analyzing the contents much as he would a patient 1 s dream. 
Besides Zarathustra, Jung in the seminar also cites Die Geburt 
der Tragodie, Unzeitgemasse Betrachtungen, Jenseits von Gut und 
Bose, Der Antichrist (the last two being mentioned only to the 
extent that Jung discusses the themes suggested by their 
titles), Der Fall Wagner (for its connection with the Parsifal 
myth) , and Ecce Homo. The aphoristic works are dismissed as 
"damned nonsense" (ZS: 827). In addition Jung devotes much 
attention to Nietzsche 1 s personal exarrple, which blurs into 
what we would call his legend due to Jung 1 s failure to 
critically evaluate his sources. Jun~ ___ l::)~~~s h~-~ reconstructioE 
o_f_~~-~tzsche 1 s life and psycholO<;JY primarily on Ecce HomQ, 
Elizabeth For_s_-t::~r-:~i<:t:.~~che 1 s biogr::aphy, __ _smd a __ }_C3_Ege dose of 
intuition. 
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Jung's fascination with Nietzsche cannot be entirely 
explained in terms of Nietzsche being just another great writer 
like Kant or Goethe, whose works would have been familiar to 
any educated German speaker of the time. For one thing, Jung 
never has much to say about Kant, despite that philosopher's 
obvious influence on the intellectual climate (including Jung's 
own theory of the archetypes). As for Goethe, although Jung 
alludes to him frequently enough, he is mainly interested in 
Faust II, which is full of arcane symbolism and strikes the 
average reader as hopelessly bewildering. Meanwhile, other, 
more popular works like Die Leiden des jungen Werthers or 
Wilhelm Meisters Lehrjahre fail to catch his attention. While 
Nietzsche and Jung never met, their lives in Basel overlapped 
to the extent that Professor Nietzsche and the adolescent Jung 
had many mutual acquaintances. More significant than their 
temporal and geographic proximity is the fact that Jung's life 
parallels that of Nietzsche in so many respects. Both were the 
sons and grandsons of Protestant ministers (Lutheran for 
Nietzsche, Calvinist for Jung), but grew dissatisfied with 
conventional Christianity. Nietzsche was a classical 
philologist by training; Jung knew Greek and Latin, although he 
focused more on the gnostic, patristic, and medieval Christian 
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writers. Both initiated a traumatic break with an older 
contemporary (Wagner, Freud) who had profoundly influenced him. 
Nietzsche thought of himself as a great psychologist, though 
not in the modern scientific sense; Jung thought of himself as 
a great scientific psychologist, although the scientific 
quality of his work is debatable and in case less 
influential than the ideas themselves. Both wrestled with 
insanity, a struggle which many readers find reflected in the 
unusual tone and content of their writings. (In the case of 
Nietzsche, whose insanity developed towards the end of his 
life, this is controversial.) While it is admittedly hazardous 
to read too much into such parallels, it is ~~-~C:~_::_rwugh that 
.Jung read Nietzsche in light of his own ex:r;:>eriences. In his 
autobiography, for example, Jung confesses that he had at first 
been afraid to read Nietzsche because he saw in him a kindred 
spirit, albeit one who had unfortunately succumbed to the 
terrible forces of the unconscious (ETG, ch. 3) . Jung's 
writings even parallel Nietzsche's to a large extent: Both 
wrote early works connecting ancient mythology with unconscious 
phenomena; both penned visionary revelations during a crucial 
transformati ve period, followed by a series of more academic 
formulations of the resulting insights; both embarked upon a 
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style .of biblical exegesis emphasizing the dark side of 
Christianity. 
Jung' s analysis results in a reading o~~ l\J'~~~'t~sch~---~[lich 
looks beyond the good/evil dichotomy, toward a new perspective 
,.~.-'""·--~-~·~~--~" ~--· --··"~-·-------
based on nonduality in general. Jung's perspective has much to 
recormnend it as an elucidation of Nietzsche's thought, quite 
apart from the question of its accuracy as a description of the 
human consciousness. Furthermore, Jung's interpretation 
preserves the link between Nietzsche's criticism of ethics and 
his visions of Zarathustra. Why should this be of interest to 
those academic philosophers who are disinterested in visions? 
Because while one aspect of Nietzsche and Jung follows a 
tradition of challenges to ethics, Jung's reading of Nietzsche 
suggests another aspect--a theory of nondual ethics--which 
contains within it the key to answering these challenges, and 
is intimately connected with the visions. This is quite an 
accomplishment, given that it addresses what is arguably the 
most basic problem ever to face the field of ethics, namely the 
problem of whether there is any truth to the subject apart from 
our own opinions about it. 
Iri cold reality, no philosophically_ satisf_a_c::~ory 
justification of even very minimal ethical principles has been 
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This is true not 
only of our ordinary, intuitive moral notions, but also of 
other types of ethical propositions as well. Since 
philosophical ethics cannot tell us much of anything about this 
most basic issue--namely whether there is any such thing as 
right or wrong--the field's utility is essentially limited to 
examining proposed ethical beliefs and systems for internal 
consistency, or consistency with our ordinary, intuitive 
beliefs about morality; or to passing on the lineage of great 
books and philosophers whose failures are nevertheless 
. instructive. Nietzsche was, if not the first philosopher to 
point out the fundamental impotence of philosophical ethics, 
then the first to force his successors in the field to face up 
to this "ethical horror" (to adapt an expression from Leszek 
Kolakowski) . Yet there is another side of Nietzsche, a side 
which Jung brings out in his commentary, in which an answer may 
be found--not an outright justification of ethics, but a path 
through which a foundation for ethics is rendered conceivable 
once again. 
In order to appreciate 
Nietzsche's Zarathustra and 
Jung' s interpretation 
its implications for 
of 
the 
justification of ethics, one must grasp the several levels of 
11 

Jung cormnenting on Nietzsche cormnenting (in part) on Iranian 
lore. Just as Nietzsche appropriates Iranian imagery as a 
vehicle for his own ideas, so does Jung project his own views 
onto Nietzsche. At the same time, despite their failure to 
attempt anything like a sober scholarly analysis of Nietzsche 
or Iranian lore, respectively, in both cases they seem to have 
nevertheless arrived at important insights by virtue of their 
cormnon visionary perspective. Chapter five takes up the 
ethical consequences of nonduali ty, placing Nietzsche in the 
context: ___ Q~---~ke_p_!_i~_a~_ Ch.':l_!!~~ges to ethics (his traditional 
role) as well as that of possible answers to them (which is not 
a traditional role for him at all). Here I become a fourth-
level interpreter who makes use of Jung' s reading of 
Nietzsche's reading of Iranian lore in order to draw out 
consequences which surely never occurred to Jung and perhaps 
not even to Nietzsche. As it turns out, "nonduality" could 
mean a number of things, both in regard to the dualism (or 
pluralism) to be transcended, and the nature of the 
transcendence itself; these various meanings will be sorted out 
in an appendix. 
Unless otherwise noted, all Nietzsche translations are by 
Walter Kaufmann, and all Jung translations are by R.F.C. Hull. 
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I. JUNG AND THE PATH TO INDIVIDUATION 
Jung' s concept of what it means to go "beyond good and 
evil" is inseparable from his advocacy of nonduality in 
general. For Jung, nonduality represents not only the 
·---···-·-·--·---" ~--· -···--·- ·-- -· ·- -~---·-·--·-----------·----------------~-----~-· 
culminatin9~-~-~~~ght of his analytical :e_~ychol()W , __ but also the 
/_ .. 
essentie3_J.:_~9_<?_~~~~-~~ of the uncoD:~cig_l1_~ __ as reveal§d through such 
cross-cultural phenomena as myths, dreams, and visions. 
Altogether these aspects are so central to Jung's work that any 
summa.ry of them will begin to look like a summa.ry of Jung, 
albeit a very selective one that focuses on a few of his most 
important concepts. (I will not be discussing, for exarrple, 
the issue of the transference/counter-transference, or for that 
matter any other subject that mainly relates to clinical 
practice rather than the underlying theoretical assumptions.) 
Since Jung's ideas evolved considerably over the course of his 
life and are found presented in several equally noteworthy 
formulations, for this chapter I have divided his life into 
three basic phases corresponding, I suppose, to stages of the 
alchemical opus. 
Jung' s writings have inspired quite a large commentarial 
literature, with his popular influence easily outracing his 
importance to date for the field of psychology. Here is my 
brash, quirky attempt to categorize the most commonly-
encountered Jung commentaries: 
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(1) Books which regurgitate or summarize Jung's ideas, 
as if introducing them to people who have not yet read 
Jung himself. 
of this type, 
published. 
Most of Jung's early followers wrote books 
and many similar works continue to be 
(2) Books which expand the basic line of Jung's research 
into other areas, 
Interpretation of 
as Marie-Louise von Franz does in her 
fai~ tales (1975). In books like 
these, Jung's system provides the methodology as opposed 
to merely the subject matter. 
( 3) Books which explain to a general 
audience how to apply Jungian ideas in 
but receptive 
their lives. 
Examples would be Thomas Moore's Care of the soul (1992) 
or Clarissa Pinkola Estes' Women who run with the wolves 
(1992). 
(4) Books written by and for psychologists, which deal 
primarily with issues arising from clinical practice. An 
example would be Andrew Samuels' Jung and the post-
Jungians (1985), which proposes a typology of "Jungians" 
but limits consideration to Jungian analysts who write 
books. 
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( 5) Books by Jungians who intentionally charrpion 
controversial interpretations of Jung' s theories. For 
exarrple, Edward Edinger's Ego and archetype ( 1972) sees 
the Self and the ego as twin loci of the psyche; while 
-~-()E_l?-_ _?~nf~~<i' s _ _§__?_~~j_c:U.rney ( 1971) treats the archetypes 
9-S spiritual realities whose existence lS more than 
mer~~Y psychological. 
(6) Books which assume that Jungian theories are 
basically correct, but give them some crucial twist for 
which the authors make no at tempt to trace to Jung · 
himself. For exarrple, Erich Neumann's 
Ursprungsgeschichte des BewuEtseins (Origin and history 
of consciousness, 1962) sees the historical evolution of 
consciousness reflected 1n mythical archetypes; while 
James Hillman's The myth of analysis ( 1972) goes so far 
as to reject clinical practice as an institution. 
( 7) Team-up books which compare Jung with somebody or 
something else, such as Coward's Jung and Eastern thought 
' 
(1985). In this category, Jung is an object of study 
rather than a methodology. 
( 8) Books which condemn or disparage Jung, notably 
Richard Noll's The Jung cult (1994) and The Aryan Christ 
(1997), and volume three of Walter Kaufmann's Discovering 
16 
the mind ( 1980) . 1 
There also exists a large body of writings which are 
loosely inspired by Jung, at least in part, but which make no 
claim to be particularly Jungian. In essence Jung's popularity 
among spiritual-seeker types has led to the adoption and 
subsequent transformation of his theories by subcultures other 
than that of analytical psychology. For example, followers of 
Wicca (a twentieth-century Anglo-American witchcraft revival 
with ties to environmentalism and goddess spirituality) have 
found Jung's archetypal psychology to be congenial with their 
own emphasis on ritual, symbolism, and myth-making. In 
California one may attend services of the Gnostic Society in 
Los Angeles or the Ecclesia Gnostica Mysteriorum in Palo Alto, 
whose respective operating theologies arguably owe as much to 
Jung as to the texts of ancient gnosticism. 2 Meanwhile, 
practitioners of Eastern religions have sought out~p~E_allels 
between Jung's collective unconscious and similar concepts from 
~.~~--~~ -.. ----···---~~- .~. 
their own sys tern~_! ___ !2otably that of 
("Consciousness Only") school of Indian Buddhism. 3 Several 
1 Both Noll and Kaufmann discuss Jung in the context of 
Nietzsche. Noll sees the Jungian movement as a religious cult 
similar to the Nietzsche movement of a century ago (1994: 1-6). 
Kaufmann, meanwhile, treats Nietzsche and Jung as two great 
thinkers in a common German intellectual history. (He tends to 
ignore thinkers who are not so great). 
2 Jungian author Stephen Hoeller is a leader of the Los 
Angeles society. 
3 It is unclear whether Asanga or Vasubandhu meant their 
critique of experience as a metaphysical claim that the world 
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well-known writers on mythology and religion (e.g. Mircea 
Eliade, Joseph Campbell) have taken a quasi-Jungian approach to 
their subject which has proven enormously influential. All 
this cross-cultural pollination has not resulted in a more 
critical approach to Jung and analytical psychology, so much as 
a flowering of theories which resemble Jung' s in certain· key 
respects. An extreme example of this tendency would be James 
Redfield's Celestine prophecy (1993). 
Two observations may be made of the dominant Jungian 
literature: One is that for better or worse, there is wide 
agreement among Jung commentators as to fundamental issues of 
interpretation. Another is that the most influential books on 
Jung are rarely those with the greatest academic merit. 
Indeed, his most widely-cited commentators often do not think 
critically or creatively, and in many cases it would be 
difficult to point to anything about their works which is 
un1que or distinctive. I submit that these two observations 
are related, and ultimately stem from the popular nature of the 
Jung movement . From the demand side, Jungian literature is 
generally oriented toward a popular readership which is more 
is reducable to thought, or as an epistemological claim that we 
can never know anything apart from our thoughts about them, or 
as an epistemological claim that we can never attain 
trustworthy knowledge of the world until we become enlightened · 
(Buddhas being omniscient). Dharmapala and Hsuan Tsang took 
the more metaphysical, idealist interpretation; and their views 
on Cittamatra became widely accepted throughout East Asia. 
D.T. Suzuki appears to have taken them for granted. 
Consequently, when he encountered Jung's theory of the 
collective unconscious, he saw a parallel with the Cittamatrin 
alayavijfiana. On this basis, Jung wrote a foreword for 
Suzuki's Introduction to Zen Buddhism (1939). 
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willing to purchase the work of a believer than a skeptic. 
From the supply side, the fact that most of the writers on Jung 
are Jungians--and that the most influential ones are Jungian 
analysts--has steered discussions about him in directions which 
are not always salutary. Noll entitled his book The Jung cult 
(ostensibly intending the academic, Weberian sense of the word) 
primarily in order to indicate the degree to which Jungian 
ideology and therapeutic practice have taken on quasi-religious 
trappings, an accusation which has also been levelled at 
psychoanalysis. Finally, Jung 1 S heirs have been credibly 
accused of using their influence to suppress a considerable 
amount of research, presumably out of fear that it would 
reflect poorly on their patriarch. 4 
For my part, I see nothing substantially wrong with the 
dominant interpretation so long as we compensate for its 
tendency to force Jung 1 S writings into a spurious transtemporal 
coherence. Kaufmann (1980: 291) and Noll (1994: 18) both 
complain that the topical organization of Jung 1 s Gesammelte 
4 The most recent flap has centered around Noll, a former 
Jungian analyst whose book The Jung cult (1994) earned him the 
enmity of Jungl s heirs. According to the preface to the 
paperback edition of that work, at first the Jung family tried 
to persuade the publisher, Princeton University Press (which 
publishes the English edition of Jung 1 s collected works), to 
withdraw Noll 1 s book from bookstores. While that attempt was 
unsuccessful, they were able to convince the director to cancel 
another book edited by Noll which the press had planned on 
publishing. In yet another clash, the Jung family refused Noll 
access to the copies of the papers of Jungl s assistant J. J. 
Honegger, on file at the Library of (the United States) 
Congress. Noll suspects that Honegger 1 s notes would disprove 
Jungl s story of the Solar Phallus Man, and accuses the Jung 
family of covering up fraud on the part of Jung out of concern 
for their own financial interests. 
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Werke (rather than chronological, as is usual for such 
collections) has served to obscure the evolution of Jung' s 
thought. Noll (1994: 273-274) attributes a common Jungian 
failure to understand Jung's early work to the fact that Jung's 
most influential early commentators joined him only after World 
War II was already well underway. As a consequence of the war 
Jung felt obliged to distance himself from volkisch neo-pagan 
ideas which he had earlier favored, but whose adoption by the 
Nazis had brought them into disrepute. Thus, his later 
-~-·-.---·~--·---~--~-~·---
teachings took on alchemical tr2l:PI2iE9.::3_~ ~-!:1:~-!:~.~~---)§.ading his 
i!lflu~ti.9:_L§~:;:-J.:y co~~!_~!_:g_:;:-s tc) ~?:~§ the alchemic_,~) m§l;.E!2hor 
( ra!:!:-er --~ha?_ th_at_~_<:)f the Mi thraic m¥::3.!:_~-~ie_s, for exa:rrq?le) as 
the definitive model for Jung' s theories. I would add to 
Noll's account that over·the same period Jung's account of the 
collective unconscious appears to have be cane more 
"spiritualized," i.e. no longer explicitly a function of race, 
culture, biology, or geography. A similar explanation 
immediately suggests itself. 
With these basic hermeneutic prefatory remarks out of the 
way, I will now turn to Jung's view of nonduality as reflected 
in three stages of his career. 
A. Jung's early career 
Jung' s first publication was his doctoral thesis, "Zur 
Psychologie und Pathologie sogenannter okkulter Phanomene" ("On 
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the psychology and pathology of so-called occult phenomena", 
1902), written for a medical degree in psychiatry under the 
auspices of the Burgholzli Clinic in Zurich. On one hand, it 
reveals what was to became his lifelong interest in spiritual 
and occult subjects; on the other hand, his dismissive tone 
reflects an insecurity and ambivalence with respect to these 
interests which were to also become an ongoing theme in Jung's 
career. The word sogenannter ("so-called") in Jung' s title is 
not just tongue-in-cheek. Despite his lifelong fascination 
with spiritual subjects, Jung rarely if ever took their claims 
at face value, preferring instead to interpret their 
psychological significance. 
The idea of a medical student writing his thesis on the 
psychology of psychic mediumship would not have been so 
startling then as it might appear today--in fact, one of Jung's 
mentors was Theodore Flournoy, the author of a well-known study 
of a spiritualist medium entitled Des Indes a la Planete Mars 
(From India to the planet Mars, 1895). At the time, psychiatry 
and clinical psychology had not yet became distinct, although 
neurology was generally considered a separate discipline; and 
scientific psychology had yet to eclipse its philosophical and 
spiritualist forebearers, as exemplified by the work of William 
James. Noll (1994: 28-32, also 40 ff) points out that as a 
Swiss medical student Jung inherited the German psychiatric 
tradition's obsession with dementia praecox, conceived as a 
progressive psychic degeneration leading to death (as theorized 
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originally by Emil Krapelin) . This was a medical application 
of a wider fin-de-siecle perception that civilization was 
steadily degenerating, which in turn was inspired by pre-
Darwinian conceptions of biological variation as the result of 
deviation from ideal types or Urtypen in a principle known as 
morphological idealism. At the same time, writes Noll, Jung 
was also deeply influenced by the emphasis of French 
psychopathologists such as J .M. Charcot, Pierre Janet, and 
Flournoy on dissociation and polypsychism. Polypsychism, the 
theory that the ego shares the mind with other, equally 
autonomous loci of identity (called "co:rrplexes" in 
acknowledgement of their plurality), was suspected to be 
capable of explaining such "dissociative" phenomena as 
epilepsy, hysteria, hypnosis, somnabulism, autanatic writing, 
and glossalalia (all of which involve involuntary behavior 
during changes in the state of consciousness). The possibility 
that psychic abilities might be related to altered states of 
consciousness had been raised by a number of writers, and seems 
to have been inspired by the popularity of hypnosis in 
spiritualist circles during the nineteenth century. At the fin 
de siecle, this hypothetical connection between hypnosis and 
psychic phenomena had many cha:rrpions in French psychiatric 
departments (Noll: 325 n. 18). 
The bulk of Jung' s paper consists of a case study" __ o_~ 
fifteen-year-old girl (actually his C()lJ.Sin, HEHene Preiswerk) 
wh<2_~§!~!]-_g~_~ted a wide variety of psychic phenomena. Early on 
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she served as a spiritualist medium, purporting to speak with 
the voices of dead family members, and afterwards claiming 
amnesia. During these seances, her language sometimes lapsed 
into a literary German, indicating a higher level of education 
than she actually possessed. Later she took to describing 
others' past lives, filling them with such lurid romantic 
details (says Jung) as an adolescent girl might be expected to 
invent. Finally, before giving up psychic practices 
altogether, she outlined a bewilderingly intricate metaphysical 
system, in which Jung recognizes traces of certain unspecified 
gnostic teachings, although he concedes the unlikelihood of her 
ever having learned about them on her own. 
Jung concludes that the unconscious, being more sensitive 
-----"---~-----~----- ----.-~--~-----··- ·-------~ -~-~- ------ -·---
th_~_!l:--~-!!~-~()nscious mind, often retains information which _is 
unknown to consciousness. He finds a parallel with his 
cousin's experience in Nietzsche's Zarathustra (regarded by 
Jung as the expression of Nietzsche's unconscious), which shows 
signs of having been influenced by the dim memories of another 
book (Blatter aus Prevost) which Nietzsche had read as a child. 
According to Jung the unconscious functions autonomously from 
the conscious mind, arid is capable of developing a personality 
and agenda of its own. Its typical role is to compensate for 
shortcomings in the conscious mind. For example, the fact that 
his subject's psychic tendencies chose to manifest themselves 
during adolescence suggests to Jung that they ought to be seen 
as an attempt on the part of her unconscious to lend her the 
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strength to cope with puberty-related stresses. (As we will 
see, Jung envisions a similar compensatory role for the figure 
of Zarathustra in Nietzsche's life.) 
Given Jung's obvious fascination with the unconscious, it 
was only natural that he should have joined many of his 
colleagues in gravitating to the ground-breaking work of Freud, 
who was already famous for his clinical study of dreams and 
associations; the sexual theory; an original model of the 
psyche (including the id, ego, and superego) and mental 
illness; and a new therapeutic method, psychoanalysis. In 
contrast to earlier psychiatric writers who souQ"h:t:_}::)j.._S)lO~Jt~al 
explanations for mental illness, Freud emphasized psychodynamic 
~:>:r~~~---~~-~~9 could potentially be directly accessed by the 
patient's own consciousness. Noll suggests that Jung and many 
others were initially attracted to Freud because his system 
offered more hope to those who feared degeneration, especially 
Jews but also insecure gentiles. Jung first heard of Freud 
through his Traumdeutung (The interpretation of dreams, 1900). 
Freud learned of Jung' s existence in 1906, through Jung 's 
research on word-association testing; and the two met later 
that year. It was as Freud's disciple and heir-apparent that 
Jung initially built his career. Although this was clearly a 
formative period for him, his writings from this period tend to 
be derivative than creative, and fail to reflect his particular 
strengths. 
Desp~t_e_ their corrunon interest in the unconscious, Freud 
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never ___ s. __ h __ a __ r ____ e __ d ______________ c:__' __ s _____ e __ n_t_ .. h_usiasm fo~-- ~_pi_~~~ual and P~2'.<::0ic 
subjects, although he seems to have enjoyed writing about 
religion. In Totem und Tabu ( 1913), Freud traces the origins 
of the religion in general to the guilt of some hypothetical 
brothers in some archaic age who killed and ate their father, 
thereby giving rise to such myths as that of Zeus and Kronos. 
In Der Mann Moses und die monotheistische Religion ( 1939) , 
Freud traces Judaism to a set of decidedly nonmetaphysical 
societal and psychological factors arising out of the ancient 
Israelites' guilt at the murder of a father-figure, Moses. The 
religious urge itself turns out to be a neurosis, with its 
origins in repressed childhood incest fantasies. Freud's 
conviction that religion is something to be overcome is also 
found in Die Zukunft einer Illusion (The future of an illusion, 
1927) . Needless to say, his rejection of religion as a 
neurosis has won more serious support than any of his rather 
quixotic attempts to trace its precise historical origins. 
Jung recollects in his autobiography that Freud strongly 
disapproved of his interest in spiritual subjects, on the 
grounds that he was in danger of crossing the line from science 
to occultism. Jung for his part char.ges Freud with 
overemphasizing the sexual theory as an explanatio:r:: _ _!or _J:.he 
//,,.-•••·--------·-- ~----·-··--•-•••' •• ••-•• o><.-•~ 
co~t:f2I1t::~ _ _of ____ -t:__}1e unconscious; and contends that ot:her ___ .:?:EiJeS, 
StJ.Ch _?-S tl::~.s~arch for deeper meaning in our li":~~'---~E'_e eg;1:1:ally 
_R~-~Jc __ 9,Q9: mc;ty e'Z~I1--~~J2lain much of our attraction to sex. In 
chapter five of Erinnerungen Traume Gedanken (Memories, dreams, 
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reflections) Jung--or rather, Jaffe--cites this theoretical 
difference as one of the principal reasons for his celebrated 
break with Freud, which occurred around 1912-1913. While such 
differences should not in themselves bar scholarly 
collaboration, Jung/Jaffe also accuses Freud of trying to turn 
his own theory into a dogma of the new science out of excessive 
concern for maintaining his authority, an accusation which is 
hotly contested by Freud's defenders. 5 
Kaufmann (1980: 387-394) and Noll (1994: 132) both lay a 
large part of the blame for the break on Jung' s alleged 
flirtation with anti-Semitism. In 1934 we find Jung welcoming 
the rise of Nazi Germany as an opportunity for the infant 
science of psychology to divest itself of those assumptions 
(e.g. the sexual theory) whose application is supposedly 
limited to Jews, in favor of principles more appropriate to the 
Aryan consciousness (Kaufmann 1980: 389). While this period is 
of obvious interest to Jung' s attackers and defenders, it 
unfortunately tells us little about his break with Freud, which 
occurred twenty years earlier. Whatever the truth about the 
anti-Semitic component of their disagreement, it seems likely 
5 In Discovering the mind Kaufmann (1980: 381) challenges 
Jung's recollection of events in his autobiography: "I dare 
say that what we have here are not memories but dreams and 
reflections." He argues that the "black mud-tide" dialogue 
never took place, since there is no evidence that Freud ever 
met with Jung at this late date. Kaufmann (1980: 341) 
ultimately attributes the break to Jung' s unresolved Oedipal 
conflict with respect to Freud, and to his understandable 
desire to establish a reputation for himself independent of his 
teacher. While it is true that Jung was only one of a long 
line of former Freudians, he says, those who remained within 
the fold did not by any means all agree with Freud, or each 
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that their split was as much a personal falling-out as a clash 
between incompatible theoretical principles. For example, the 
proximate cause of the break was a certain perceived social 
snub ("the Kreuzlingen gesture") on the part of Freud, which 
Kaufmann (1980: 328-37) discusses at great length. 
Jung's last publication before the break, Wandlungen und 
S~le der Libido (Transformations and symbols of the libido, 
1912, published 1n English as Symbols of transformation), 
constitutes a significant departure from psychoanalysis--not 
because it tries to interpret a patient's fantasies in light of 
world mythology (Freud, after all, had proposed the Oedipus 
complex), but because of its abandonment of certain key 
Freudian hermeneutic principles. Most of the book is devoted 
to analyzing the published fantasies of one of Flournoy's 
psychiatric patients, "Frank Miller" (wham Jung never actually 
met). Using clues found in various myths and literary works 
from around the world (including Nietzsche's Zarathustra), Jung 
explains elements from these fantasies in terms of the activity 
of Miller's libido, which appeared to her in various autonomous 
forms (e.g. as a serpent, mother-figure, etc.) consistent with 
the theory of polypsychism. Jung like Freud treats the libido 
as a kind of 
rooted; Jung 
life-force in which all mental 
however distances himself 




transforming the libido concept into something closer to the 
"psychic energy" of occultist and vitalistic theories--in any 
other; nor did Freud discourage this dissent in any way. 27 
case, as a metaphor or allegory of deeper processes than 
sexuality. For example, in the book's final chapter Miller's 
vision of an Aztec being swallowed by the earth becomes 
interpreted not as a sublimated incestuous fantasy of being 
engulfed or devoured by one's mother, but as a symbol of the 
ego losing itself in the vastness of the unconscious. This 
surrendering of oneself into a larger whole is the "sacrifice" 
of the chapter's title. Not so incidentally, Jung regarded 
this final chapter as a reflection of the sacrifice his own 
psyche was calling on him to make, namely that of his 
relationship with Freud. 
Based on his view of the compensatory nature of the 
unconscious, Jung determines that rather than posing an 
obstacle to healing, Miller's so-called mental illness was 
really an att~:pt on the part of heE~~E~X"~C::~-~---t:_~-~~~r:_g __ c:l.J?out this 
v:ery __ h~9:!~!:!_g ·~--'l:'~_was _ _!~ became a key principle of analytical 
psy~EJ.:.<?g(_ (which was the desi~r:ation Jl.l_!?-g ev~ntually ad_opted 
in place of "psychoanalysis"). 
,_ . -' ' ~- ·~-~- - -- - -~·-- "--" -~ 
Similarly, instead of treating 
myths and religious images as neuroses writ large, as Freud 
does, Jung regards them as possessing a certain healing power 
in their own right. 
Unfortunately, no summary of Wandlung und Syml:xJle that 
makes the book appear comprehensible can do it justice, since 
one of its most noteworthy characteristics is its bewildering 
profusion of mythological and religious themes, somewhat in the 
style of Madame Blavatsky's Secret doctrine. Noll (1994: 118) 
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stresses that the bulk of the mythological material chosen by 
Jung for inclusion relate to the myth of the hero, sacrifice, 
or sun-worship--themes which would have been immediately 
recognized by Jung' s readers as those of fin-de-siecle pan-
German volkisch neo-paganism. Such movements overlapped to a 
large extent with racist and anti-Semitic ones, and Noll (1994: 
132) points out that Jung quotes passages from several racist 
and anti-Semitic authors including Houston Stewart Chamberlain, 
a key member of the post-Wagner Bayreuth cult along with 
Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche. Noll then invites his readers to 
picture the reaction of Freud to Jung's increasing involvement 
in all this; and sure enough, some of Freud's correspondence 
with other Jewish psychoanalysts reveals their mutual concern 
about Jung' s anti-Semitic tendencies, the existence of which 
they appear to have taken for granted. There is much to be 
said against Noll's picture of Jung as an anti-Semitic dabbler, 
beginning with his close relationship with many Jewish 
analysts. It is easy for those of his readers who understand 
the seriousness of the political situation in retrospect to 
condemn elements of his behavior. For Jung however the choices 
before him could not have been nearly so clear-cut. As the 
situation in Germany became more obvious Jung did deliberately 
distance himself both from volkisch culture in general and from 
Nazism in particular. 
B. The breakdown 
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As __ h~ ____ _?ri~ted ____ away fr?~- --~}1e Fr_E?\l:<liC3:_l! ___ c_amp, _____ ~un_g 
experienced a period of mental instability lasting from aro~d 
~91} __ ~<:?_J_~~7, which threatened to escalate into a full-fledged 
schizophrenic breakdown. By way of compensation he began what 
he describes as a long-term dialogue with his unconscious 
conducted through dream analysis, further explorations into 
mythology and religion, and "active imagination" (a kind of 
waking reverie). Jung was quite a talented painter, so he was 
able to record some of these visions through this ~~dium. The 
Rotes Buch (Red book, 1912-1917 so named for the color of its 
binding. ___ }n this work, Jung anticipates many important 
concepts of 
• < " •• ,..._. ·--··----,.~ ~ 
his analytical :r;>sychology--in _1:?.~-~~J-fully 
i,lluminated qerrnan _calligraphy to boot. 6 
For exarrple, page 154 of Jung' s Rotes Buch (Jaffe 1979: 
67) depicts a mysterious gnostic-type figure of a wise old man 
called "Philemon," who appeared to Jung in one of his visions. 
The name "Philemon" may come from the eponymous New Testament 
epistle, in which Paul advises his Philemon to accept the 
return of a certain runaway slave. Kaufmann (1980: 361) 
suggests that Jung chose this figure to represent his 
relationship with Freud (making Jung the "runaway slave") which 
would explain why Jung's painting of Philemon looks like Freud 
6 While Jung' s Rates Buch has never been published in 
full, five or six of its most important 
Jaffe's C.G. Jung: word and image (1979) 
other books (though Jaffe's has the 
pages may be found in 
as well as in several 
highest reproduction 
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wearing angel wings. Kaufmann finds support for this theory in 
the fact that before settling on "Philemon" as the name for his 
mysterious visitor, Jung also referred to him as "Elijah" (i.e. 
a Jewish prophet), and saw him accompanied by a blind woman 
named "Salome" and a black snake. Besides the biblical 
character who dances for Herod and asks for the head of John 
the Baptist, there was an even closer Salome in the person of 
Nietzsche's one-time friend Lou Andreas-Salome, who by this 
time had become a friend of Freud's. 7 
On the other hand, the name "Philemon" is also found in 
Act 5 of Faust II, where it alludes to a classical myth of an 
old couple (Philemon and Baucis) who gave hospitality to 
Mercury and Zeus. Faust, however, mistreats the old couple in 
the process of building his castle. Some of Jung' s letters 
indicate that Jung felt some sort of connection with Faust, 
perhaps as a kindred spirit, and consequently felt the need to 
right some of Faust's wrongs. 8 In the process of building a 
small castle-like structure of his own called Bollingen Tower, 
Jung added the inscription, Philemonis sacrum I Fausti 
poenitentia ("Philemon's shrine 1 Faust's penance"; Jaffe 1979: 
188-189). It is possible that the "Philemon" of Jung's visions 
conflates the biblical and Faustian references. Since Jung was 
quality). 
7 This does not mean that Lou Andreas-Salome is the only 
possible identification for Jung' s visionary Salome, or even 
the most important (his patient and longtime lover Spielrein 
being another obvious candidate) . 
8 Citing an improbable family tradition, Jung sometimes 
claimed descent from an illegitimate child fathered by Goethe 
(Noll 1994: 20), which I suppose must have some bearing on all 
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a great fan of patristic and medieval Christian literature, he 
might also have encountered in the Philokalia (the standard 
Eastern Orthodox anthology of such writings) the exhortations 
of Abba Philemon to cling to spiritual concerns rather than 
worldly ones. 
Whatever his ancestry, Jung's Philemon convinced him that 
we do not create our own thoughts (ETG ch. 6). When we observe 
external objects, Philemon argues, we do not jump to the 
conclusion that we have somehow created them. On what grounds, 
then, do we believe this about our thoughts? This line of 
reasoning was to eventually lead to Jung's mature theory of the 
archetypes and the collective unconscious. The idea appears to 
be an extent ion of the relatively weaker claim that some 
psychic events are autonomous (i.e. not under conscious 
control), into a view that they and the conscious mind are 
equally "real." Jung' s model of the mind-body relationship is 
difficult to pin down since it variously resembles physical 
reductionism or epiphenomenalism on one hand (for denying that 
"we" generate our own thoughts) and idealism or mentalism on 
the other (because Jung sees thought as determining our 
experience of reality, at least in large measure). The crucial 
issue is that of personal identity, which we normally take to 
provide a boundary between the inner and outer worlds. When 
the concept of the self is denied (as in Buddhism) or expanded 
to infinity (as in Advaita Vedanta), the boundary between 
thought and reality breaks down. Jung blurs this boundary by 
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making the macrocosm of the infinite outer world and the 
microcosm of the infinite inner world reflections of one 
another--in line with the Hermetic slogan, "As above, so 
below" --so that distinctions between subjective and objective 
experience are untenable. From one perspective, we create the 
external world (in large measure, anyway) through our 
projections; from another perspective, these projections create 
us, because our thoughts are not truly our own. One important 
practical consequence of all this is the reality of 
synchronicity ("meaningful coincidences" in which events in the 
__ ()~~-s~9e ___ ~c:>_rl_~-~~_lll_~~\\7~:trn~~~-~ or ___Eeflect ol1_~ _ tho~ght:e1. as 
well psychic phenomena of various kinds. 
Another important painting, on page 115 of Rotes Buch 
depicts Jung's encounter with the Shadow (Jaffe 1979: 70). In 
it, a small glowing orb 1s hovering in the middle of a small 
room covered with golden tiles, which it illuminates. A 
swarthy foreign-looking figure wearing a dark top-hat and cloak 
stands in the corner, as if backing away from the light. Over 
the course of his 
sources for his idea of the Shadow. In his autobiography (ETG 
ch. 6), he writes that it was inspired by a dream of his, in 
which he found himself walking through a foggy night, with his 
hands cupped around a small lamp (symbolizing consciousness, he 
explains). It was very important to keep the flame from going 
out. Glancing furtively over his shoulder, he spied a dark 
figure following him, and felt a wave of fear--until he 
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realized that the dark figure was really the shadow cast by his 
lamp. Elsewhere, however, Jung mentions a 1913 horror movie 
called The student of Prague, in which a student sells his 
reflection to the devil, only to later discover that the 
reflection has taken on a murderous life of its own (ZS: 122). 
Jung would of course have been familiar with Nietzsche's use of 
the shadow-image in Der Wanderer und sein Schatten and again in 
Zarathustra (especially IV" 9) . In the latter, Zarathustra 
tri~~----:t-~---~-1J.?~~~~X: !Eoi!l_his f;;hadow, but finds that t.l1~ ___ S.hc:tdow 
not only has been able to follow him, but has also grown. 9 
Page 125 of Jung' s Rates Buch (Jaffe 1979: 73) shows a 
cross-legged male figure in strange attire (like a medieval 
juggler?) sitting on the horizon between the sky and a bustling 
city. He holds aloft a large cross inscribed within a circle, 
like a sun shining down on the bustling industrialized city 
- --- -- - ... 
below. In Jung' s mature theory, the cross-and-circle shei~-- ~s 
-~--t:¥12~ __ _<?_!_~~-~~-~ im~_g~9'. Another mandala-image is found on 
page 163 of Rates Buch (Jaffe 1979: 93), which depicts a 
bird's-eye view of a gold-colored castle on an island 
surrounded by symmetrical, maze-like red walls in a jagged 
9 Despite the superficial visual similarity between Jung's 
painting and the fictional character created by Walter Gibson 
(pen name: Maxwell Grant) and made famous by pulp novels and 
radio, the latter "Shadow" did not appear until 1931, in The 
Shadow detective magazine. Nevertheless, the resemblance is 
remarkable. Fans of popular culture may recall that the 
distinguishing characteristic of Gibson's Shadow was his 
control over the evil side of himself, which he then turned 
against criminals. A better slogan for Jung' s Shadow could 
hardly be imagined apart from the familiar radio line, "Who 
knows what evil lurks in the hearts of men? The Shadow 
knows ... " 
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pattern characteristic of coastal artillery batteries. When 
------' 
Jung eventually showed the painting to the Germa~ _____ sig<:>:L_<:>gJst 
Richard Wilhelm in the late 1920's, Wilhelm respogd_~<:l- by 
s!!:?Y::T~~q Jun~-- striking~Y similar imagery in an obscure syncretic 
Taoist/Buddhist he had been 
translating, entitled T'ai I Chin Hua Tsung Chih *B~ 
·---·-·-·-·---"-
."i. ~~;-~--_(Secr-et <:!_ __ ~J:e golden flower) . Wilhelm published 
the translation, with a foreword by Jung, as Das Geheimnis der 
goldenen Bliite (1928). Jung would later look back on this 
foray into Chinese internal alchemy not only as dramatic 
/ -~~--~--- ----~·---~--.,---"'·· ----·- .. -~~---~.,-.. ·-. 
confirmation of his theory of the collective unconscious, but 
al~9 af:) ____ c:_~:?t~v~~-~~g--~-~~ce behind his subsequent exploration of 
the corresponding Western alchemical traditions. 
That many of the paintings in Jung' s Rotes Buch 
anticipate elements of his mature theory seems clear. Whether 
other paintings allude to teachings which were downplayed by 
Jung's mature theory, will not be known until such time as the 
work is published in full. 
reason the work has never _}:)_~~!1: ... P'l1Elish~_c:"!, ___ ~~ that some of __ _its 
p~i~!:_~~gs_~-~~_\ls_!:E_~!:_e ~~!1:9:~ __ :=; __ l~~-~~9:~~L ___ E£.~~~E: belief th<=l:t:. he 
h_c;t_<:i succeeded ___ ~I1:. illuminating his ui1_<?~!1:.:=.;~-~o~_f:>~.r:rt~n~ ~n<:I thereby 
e2Cp_anC!i,p_g_ ___ hi§ ___ _£_<;?.I}§_g__i()l:!§Q~_s_s to th_~ ___ l;?gin_! __ ~E~Ee he could 
tr\!thf~_~l:( __ <:.?~P3:re himself to q<2g., --~hr.ist, ?-nd other: ... <:l~~-!:i-_es. 
According to Noll (1994: 366 n.15)) the Jung family considered 
this claim embarrassing enough to warrant their suppressing 
publication of the work. While Jung's alleged self-deification 
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may scandalize some people, we should note that the idea is 
perfectly respectable in any number of religious traditions and 
need not imply any particular megalomania on his part. 
During the same interlude between his openly-published 
works, Jung also penned his pseudonymous VII Sermones ad 
Mortuos (Seven sermons to the dead) , which he attributes to 
"Basilides" of Alexandria, presumably intending the second-
century gnostic writer. To falsely credit some ancient worthy 
with the authorship of a religious text was a practice which 
would have been familiar to Jung from the gnostic, patristic, 
apocryphal, and kabbalistic literature, and we may regard Jung 
as identifying with these traditions to some extent. In one of 
his lectures Jung claims that the true author was none other 
than the entity which he called Philemon (Noll 1994: 243). Of 
all his works, Septum Sermones is the strangest. It begins: 
Die Toten kamen zuruck von Jerusalem, wo sie nicht 
fanden, was sie suchten. Sie begehrten bei mir Einlass 
und verlangten bei mir Lehre und so lehrte ich sie: 
Horet: ich beginne beim Nichts, das nichts ist 
dasselbe wie die fulle. In der Unendlichkeit ist voll so 
gut wie leer. Das Nichts ist leer und voll. Ihr konnt 
auch ebenso gut etwas anderes vom Nichts sagen, z .b. es 
sei weiss oder schwarz oder es sei nicht, oder es sei. 
Ein unendliches und ewiges hat keine Eigenschaften, weil 
es alle Eigenschaften hat ... [ETG: 389-393] 
[The dead came back from Jerusalem, where they found 
not what they sought. They prayed me let them in and 
besought my word, and thus I began my teaching. 
Harken: I begin with nothingness. Nothingness is 
the same as fullness. In infinity full is no better than 
empty. Nothingness is both empty and full. As well ye 
might say anything else of nothingness, as for instance, 
white is it, or black, or again, it is not, or it is. A 
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thing that is infinite and ete:mal hath no qualities, 
since it hath all qualities.] [H.G. Baynes translation] 
According to Jung' s autobiography, the writing of Septum 
Sermones was prorrpted by a vision of spirits who really did 
appear to him more or less as described here. As for more 
terrestrial influences, the unusual format may have been 
inspired by Nietzsche's Zarathustra, or perhaps the Stanzas of 
Dzyan recorded by Blavatsky. As usual various influences from 
Asian religions and Western mysticism can be discerned. The 
word "empty" recalls the sunya of Mahayana Buddhism, although 
Jung does not seem to have absorbed any of that term's 
teclmical meanings. A word corresponding to "emptiness" (Greek 
kenosis) is also employed by Christian negative theologians. 
· The Pleroma (which the quoted passage is describing) takes its 
name from a Greek word meaning "fullness" which is used in 
several Gnostic systems (including the Valentinian) as a term 
for the supreme spiritual realm. Jung probably encountered it 
in the Pistis Sophia, one of the few such works then available 
to him. His idea of the Pleroma bears more than a passing 
resemblance to Sankara's nirguna Brahman (i.e. Brahman without 
gunas or attributes) as popularized by various neo-Vedantins, 
as well as to the apophatic system of Dionysius the Areopagite. 
Jung's Pleroma has no qualities, because it is all qualities; 
thus it is useless to talk about it. Differentiation of 
qualities occurs at the level of the created world, which the 
Pleroma pervades. As created beings we must discriminate 
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between qualities, or else risk submerging into the 
undifferentiated, deathlike sameness of the Pleroma. The 
qualities of the Pleroma are perceived as pairs of opposites. 10 
The universal human tendency to see the world in terms of 
paired opposites is called the principium individuationis. 11 
The concept of "individuation" in Jung 
Sc)1~J?enha1J.rian twist on a Freudian term, referring at once to 
the "individuality" that arises out of the faculty of 
~--------~-·-·--~------·"·------~·-··------
discrimination, and also to the word's strict etymological 
meaning of "not being divided." That is to say, the consc~<::ms 
mind distinguishes between opposites, but the psyche as a whole 
contains all opposites together. 
- - . - . ·-·~··· -· . 
In Sermo II the dead want to know about God, and inquire 
(obviously with Nietzsche in mind) whether he is dead. 
Basilides answers in the negative; however, the word "God" has 
several possible referents in the universe of the Sermones. 
10 Incidentally, in light of my remarks in the appendix, 
note Jung's curious choice of "opposites" in the first Sermon. 
Besides those mentioned in the passage above (black and white, 
existence and nonexistence, emptiness and fullness), he also 
lists the effective and ineffective, the living and the dead, 
difference and sameness, light and dark, hot and cold, energy 
and matter, time and space, good and evil, the beautiful and 
the ugly, the one and the many, "etc." While these "opposites" 
are by no means logically similar, there is no reason to 
believe that our everyday dualistic habits are particularly 
concerned with logical rigor. 
11 This term was coined by Schopenhauer (in Die Welt als 
Wille und Vorstellun~, who used it to refer to the ego-sense 
which gives us our feeling of separateness. Being Buddhist-
inspired, he was against it, on the grounds that it leads to 
suffering; and being Advaitin-inspired as well, he preferred to 
merge, Brahman-and-atman-like, into univerality. Nietzsche 
also makes use of the term in Die Geburt der Trag6die, where he 
identifies this principle with Apollo (and· also with 
Vorstellung; Dionysius stands for Wille) . 
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The Pleroma itself might be called "God," provided we think of 
God as containing all opposites within him/her. Then there is 
the concept of a God with qualities--called "Helios" 12 in order 
to avoid confusion--who like the Devil is a part of the created 
world, the world of qualities. Finally, there is the principle 
of activity which is shared by both God and the Devil, the 
principium individuationis itself, which is the highest God. 
This principle Jung names "Abraxas" after the chicken-headed 
gnostic deity associated with the system of the historical 
Basil ides. Sermo III is a hymn to Abraxas, in which he is 
described as (among other dualistic images) a hermaphrodite, 
and the heiros gamos ("sacred marriage"), both of which figure 
prominently in Jung' s alchemical writings. In these later 
works, however, this language is used of Mercurius rather than 
Abraxas. 
Now how are we to interpret all this? Does Jung really 
believe in the Pleroma and Abraxas, God and the Devil? Is it 
all just poetry, or does it perhaps symbolize some more down-
to-earth psychological principle? Since Jung believes that 
ideas qua ideas are just as real as physical facts, the 
12 In Greek mythology, Helios is one of several sun-gods 
who are often conflated. Jung probably latched onto the name 
because Helios is featured prominently in Mithraic iconography, 
and is invoked along with Mithras in the Mithraic Liturgy 
(Ulansey 1989: 44, 107-111). J1J.I_l_g f§lt a particular at:tract:i,Qn 
to the Mithraic mysteries, and once had a dream in which. he. saw 
himself transformed- In-to-the -iion=headed -goer-fr-om that. reilg.ion 
( Noii--i9-94-;-216T~----As--Noi 1._ .. ( 1994 ;··7-;f) :P9~l}ts __ Q1lt-:~-rl}i~~st __ in 
Mithr._aJ?!ll was parf·-·ar· a --thr1v1ng f:in-de-siecle Germanic 
alt.§:r:J:l.Cl.ti ve" cuiture···which 1ncluded vegetarianism, ·. polygamy 1 
sun-worship,. nudism, .. hiking I and -a:-· fas-cTnation wiE:h-· Aryan 
_ myt:hOIOgy:-·· ----------·-··-··········~·-········--·-·-·-····· ······- ----···· · ·· ...... 
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question might be better rephrased: if there were no humans , 
would there be a Pleroma? On this point the Sermones are 
ambiguous--it is simply not clear how Jung intended them to be 
read. (This fundamental ambiguity plagues his mature theory as 
well.) However, in Sermo II Basil ides suggests that the 
question of the existence of God or the Devil is not nearly so 
important as the fact that we must always talk about them. 
This refers to what Jung calls the objectivity of thought, by 
which he means that, for example, my idea of God has objective 
existence as an idea--regardless of the truth about God, or 
whether I actually believe in him. 
Many lesser deities might be described (and Jung 
describes them) , but I would like to skip ahead to Sermo V, 
which contains some interesting remarks about men and women. 
Men's sexuality, says Jung, is more earthy; women's sexuality, 
more heavenly. (I am reminded of a more recent piece of 
dubious conventional wisdom which has it that women give sex to 
get love, while men give love to get sex.) At the same time, 
men's spirituality is more heavenly, whereas women's 
spirituality is more earthy. If men and women do not remember 
this, we are told, we became devils to each other. This idea 
contains the germ of Jung' s later theory of the Syzygy. It 
also suggests a serious criticism of his system which will come 
up again in that context, namely that it assumes the truth of 
certain pernicious stereotypes. 
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C. Jung's mature theory 
Jung's first publication after his recovery was 
Psychologische Typen ( 1921) . The core idea of the work is 
found in chapter ten, where Jung categorizes human 
consciousness into two types (introversion and extraversion) 
and then four functions, arranged like so: 
sensation 
( das Empfinden) 
thinking 





" T~~I1~~~-I1g_" __ re ~-~~~--to _ ~-_E~1=:~~<?!:1_~-~------•=m~~y~~~~ ;_ .... ··-· ~" ~f_~~!J!:J:g~:__ to 
evalu~~i_c)n~ _ _:_~e_r:sation" to sense percer::t~on while "intuition" 
searches for the origins of things. 
"ratic:>I1~~: .. functions in that they represent things done by llB, 
when~.~§_ __ !:.he_last two are "irrational" in that they represent 
influences which seem to come from outside us. The psyche, 
being whole and complete, 
functions. However, the conscious mind tends to be either 
the other aspect 
becanes a part of the unconscious and is projected outward 
---
(i.e. the mind perceives these qualities as if they were 
already present in the outside world). --·-~-~II1-~1~~!¥_!:'it:}:~_!!:l~ four 
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f~nctions -'---c~~c~t: __ !E:~_t: -~~ ___ te!"l:~!:.? .. ~~P~-~l:_ze ___ ~_~o of them (one 
from each pair) , one primarily and the other s~~<?nc:J:~:r-~~y. 13 
While there are ---~_?(cept:ions to this patt~:r-n, at least one 
·---·--·-------
function will always be submerged and relatively uncon~cJ()l1_S. 
Such typologies are often criticized as being too 
procrustean to account for the complexities of human nature. 
On the other hand, the very simplicity of Jung's system has the 
si_9n~ficant .l2~actical advantage of being easy to incorporate 
into standardized tests, most notably the Gray-Wheelwright test 
~ ......... ~ ·------· - .. . . . 
and the Myers-Briggs Type Indicator. As a result its practical 
influence <:?.n the discipline of psychology h~s C1r:£rlli~l¥-_ ____ been 
greater than that of Jung' s more visionary writings. 
Unfortunately, just because a test is easy to administer is no 
guarantee that it will provide useful information. If Jung' s 
-----··~---~~·- ··--
assumptions about typology are wrong--and there are ~~od 
empirical reasons to think they are--then any test results 
based on them will be so much garbage. Some Jungians have 
proposed modifications to both the tests and the theory in the 
face of real-world clinical needs (Samuels 1985: 84-88). The 
bulk of Jung's book is devoted to arranging various writers and 
philosophers according to type. Nietzsche, for example, is an 
13 Jung' s scheme appears to have been inspired by Western 
astrology, which divides the twelve zodiacal signs among the 
four elements (fire, earth, air, water), and emphasizes the 
geometrical relationships (conjunction, square, trine, 
opposition) between planets on a horoscope. Although the 
concept of astrology is quite ancient, and the familiar Western 
system of it dates back to the Italian Renaissance, the subject 
had been largely forgotten prior to its popular revival in the 
early decades of the twentieth century. For example, the now-
ubiquitous newspaper horoscopes did not begin to appear until 
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introverted intuitive. Now those aspects which are left to the 
unconscious do not thereby disappear, but became autonomous of 
our conscious will. Thus, Nietzsche's unconscious (in the form 
of Zarathustra) speaks with the voice of an extroverted 
sensitive type. This tendency of the unconscious to turn 
everything in the conscious mind into its opposite, Jung names 
enantiodromia ("going the other way"), after a term from 
Heraclitus. Psychological wholeness_,.~-~--J::'ealized by becCl!Tl~l29" 
ones. 
~UJ!.g~ _l11~ture t:?_e.ory com]:)_~?_~-~~-~--~'::II1~~-<?.!, __ ~<::!~~~--~0ich he 
ha,Q, ___ g~veloJ2.~9 __ _g_f~_dua1_:J:y_g:y:e_:r:_t_h§ __ C::()lJ.r~e of his career( into a 
single grand framework centered around alchemy. Unfortunately, 
Jung does not clearly set forth the basics of this theory in 
any one place, but has left crucial details scattered 
throughout a large number of writings. The basic idea of 
archetypes and the collective unconscious is set forth most 
coherently in "Die Beziehungen zwischen dem Ich und dem 
UnbewuJSten" ("The relations between the 
unconscious," 1928) in volume 7, and "Uber die Archetypen des 
kollektiven UnbewuJSten" ( "Archetypes of the collective 
unconscious, " 1934) in volume 9-I. The first four chapters of 
-·-·•~·-·-~~-~--·--~-~-·"•--~--·-"~-·- ·-r•"'~·~· ,--·-·---~---~ ··--·~-- _____ _, • '~"';;.._ 
Aion~_E_~_?.~) contain the most extended discussions of --~-~-~--~~<?, 
Shado~-~--?¥.~¥.9X.~.-~!2~ _ _§,~lf. As for the connection with alchemy, 
Jung filled several volumes (GW 12-14) on the subject, from 
which the most suitable introduction to his views would be his 
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"Einleitung in die religionspsychologische Problematik der 
Alchemie" ("Introduction to the religious and psychological 
problems of alchemy, " 1944) in volume 12. The next piece in 
that volume, "Traumsymbole des Individuationsprozesses" 
("Individual dream sym.J::olism in relation to alchemy," 1936), is 
a revealing look at how Jung interprets a patient 1 s dreams in 
the light of alchemy. "Der Geist Mercurius" ("The spirit 
Mercurius," 1943/1948) in volume 13 is particularly relevent to 
the subject of nonduality and the unity of opposites, as is the 
whole of volume 14, Mysterium coniunctionis (1955-1956), which 
most students of Jung would name as the most sustained and 
intricate of Jungl s alchemical wr~t:_i_I1_g~~~ 
_ JuEg~-~---rn?_~~~-~-~- ~}2_~_psyche (.?:~ __ ambi~f1::!'?_~s -~ord_~bich __ could 
either mean "mind" or "soul") makes use of lan~Cl.g~ ___ and 
concepts similar to Freud Is. The ego is the part of us of 
. -- -~- '-~·--·>·~-~------,--.-.' '' ··---~-""--"~"·~- '"~ ··~-~~·-·--·~·~----. -·-~·>·~-~- "~..-----~""""-""~·--""'---"·-'---··--... -.--....... ,_ ............ ...._,., 
which we are conscious, while the persona (or "mask") is the 
side of us which we present to the outside world. However, 
- •--~•-- ""--~~-~~-... =-'-"-•• • •~- .. u .•• • -"- ·-~··•=-•···...._._.. ___ • __ _,_,,_ ~._,.,,.~,._~,~~,_._,,~,...,,_-.--....__,,,,, .. _,,o",,...-'".~-""~ .....,.,..,_.,_.,,~,--......_ _ _..,_~..----·••---~- ''"---~-
there 1s much more to us than that--like Freud, Jungls 
g_g§gr~p_t;J<::>n of th~ £~¥~he includes not only_ these, but a 
generous unconscious as well. 
unlike Freud, distinguishes between a personal and a collective 
unconscious: 
~ ~ -- -~-~~-~--..,-~--"-
Eine gewissenermagen oberflacherliche Schicht des 
Unbewugten ist zweifellos pers6nlich. Wir nennen sie das 
pers6nliche UnbewuEte. Dies ruht aber auf einer tieferen 
Schicht, welche nicht mehr pers6nlicher Erfahrung und 
Erwerbung entstammt, sondern angeboren ist. Diese 
tiefere Schicht ist das sogenannte kollektive UnbewuEte. 
Ich habe den Ausdruck «kollekti v» gewahlt, weil dieses 
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UnbewuJSte nicht individueller, sondern allgemeiner Natur 
ist, das heiJSt es hat im Gegensatz zur personlichen 
Psyche Inhalt und Verhaltensweisen, welche uberall und in 
allen Individuen cum grano salis die gleichen sind. Es 
ist, mit anderen Worten, in allen Menschen sich selbst 
identisch und bildet damit eine in jedermann vorhandene, 
allgemeine seelische Grundlage uberpersonlicher Natur. 
[GW 9-I, 3] 
[A more _?F _less superficial layer of the unconsciou::; 
is undoubtedly ~ersonal. I call it the ~rsonal 
l.liwo!lsclous-:--- But this--personaT--uncorisc:i.ous --rest-s upona 
-de~P§)::' __ Jay§i-, ____ which does nof -- derive- -- from" persona]::-
experier;tc~ _ and. Ts ___ not ·a: person<if ___ acquisTtion but---18 
inborn. - --Thls ___ deeper level" :r·--- c"a1T ---tfie- collective 
.Yllf~c::ious. I have chosen th-e term "coliective11 --because 
this part of the unconscious is not individual but 
universal; in contrast to the personal psyche it has 
contents and modes of behaviour that are more or less the 
same everywhere and in all individuals. It is, in other 
words, identical in all men and thus constitutes a common 
p_sycl!~ c_~_ -~l!:J2§£i=~ te~~-9I _a ----~p-rai?_E~};:§Q_I}cl) ----r1at ure _ wlii eli is 
prese!:lt in eye_:ry _one of us.] 
Whereas the contents of the personal unconscious stem from the 
experiences of an individual's lifetime, the contents of the 
collective unconscious did not need to enter through the 
conscious mind, but were present "from the beginning" (GW 9-II, 
13) . or thought-patterns which inhabit the 
--"-~----·~--"-------------·------
from Hermetic, nee-Platonic, ~iterature. 
According to his reading of Philo and Irenaeus, for exarrple, 
they are the ideas in the mind of God from which physical 
objects were created (GW 9-I, 5). On the basis of Jung' s 
earlier writings (in which Jung uses the term Urbild or 
"primordial image"), Noll sees a connection between the 
archetypes and the concept of morphological idealism charrpioned 
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most famously by Goethe and Haeckel (Noll 1994: 40). The 
a~chetypes are also closely related to instincts, since both 
are unconscious phenomena known only through t:;heir results, the 
difference being that archetypes present themselves as images 
(cf. "Instinkt und UnbewuJStes" in GW 8: 263 ff.). They are 
described as complexes, and therefore autonomous. 
It is unclear whether the existence of archetypes is 
limited to our minds (like instincts, or a priori synthetic 
judgements), or whether they may have some other, more 
universal existence as well (like Platonic Forms, at least 
according to some of the neo-Platonic traditions). On one 
hand, J':lng repeatedly characterizes the exist~nce~-<?~~--~r~h:_~types 
as an empirical question about human psychology, and tries to 
----- ---····----------· .. __ _____c. 
answer it by establishing patterns of myths, dreams, and 
VlSlons for which diffusion is excluded as an explanation. 
This leads him to take an agnostic stance on the nature of 
their existence: 
Psychology accordingly treats all metaphysical 
claims and assertions as mental phenomena, and regards 
them as statements about the mind and its structure that 
derive ultimately from certain unconscious dispositions. 
It does not consider them to be absolutely valid, or even 
capable of establishing a metaphysical truth. We have no 
intellectual means of ascertaining whether this attitude 
is right or wrong. We only know that there is no 
evidence for, and no possibility of proving, the 
possibility of a metaphysical postulate such as 
"Universal Mind." [GW 11, 759-760] 
On the other hand, Jung lS here discussing the assumptions of 
the psychological field, and considers that religious faith has 
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a psychological value quite apart from the issue of whether its 
contents are true. Some of his other remarks might be 
interpreted as statements of belief (or rather, claims of 
knowledge), such as his famous answer to the BBC's John Freeman 
in the "Face to Face" interview: "I don't need to believe [in 
God]. I know" (C.G. Jung speaking: 428). Unfortunately, Jung 
does not make clear either here or elsewhere what kind of 
existence he intends to ascribe to archetypes. One possibility 
lS that his views evolved from a I?J:lX~~-cal or biol~ical 
explanation of archetypes found in Goethe and Haeckel to a more 
"spiritual" one similar to Plato's forms. Another is that Jung 
always held to the more "spiritual" interpretation, but 
concealed his beliefs in the early years of his career so that 
his theory would appear more scientifically respectable. A 
third is that just as emotions may be described either in terms 
of physiological changes or phenomenological experiences, so 
might archetypes be usefully viewed from more than one 
perspective. A fourth is that Jung neither makes nor rules out 
__ !:_1.1_~ -~~9- ir_tl ___ th~t:-----~~~!::~ZP~~-_1:1:0.~~--'::lJ:~¥- -~:X:~_::;_t:_~nc ~--~-CiP_c;trt from the 
human mind. In favor of the less metaphysical interpretations, 
when Jung says that he knows that God exists, he is probably 
not really talking about God per se, but about his idea of God 
(which is indubitable) . Remember however that Jung recounts 
many instances of synchronicity and psychic phenomena, which 
suggest that at some level our innermost thoughts exist as 
events in the external world, and vice versa. 
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It is also unclear whether the contents of the collective 
unconscious are shared by all humanity by virtue of our 
membership in the species--as would seem to be implied by the 
concept of a "collective" unconscious--or whether they may also 
dwell at the subsidiary levels of race or culture. Jung' s 
remarks in connection with Nazi Germany suggest just such an 
intermediate level. For example, during the Nazi period Jung 
sometimes distinguished between Jewish and Aryan consciousness 
(e.g. GW 10, 191); while after the war he told the BBC that, 
"In Hitler every German should have seen his own shadow" (GW 
10, 455). In addition, Jung cautions Westerners against 
abandoning our cultural roots to follow Asian religions, but 
instead recanmends that we explore the mystical side of the 
"our own" tradition (GW 11, 773). To most Westerners, 
gnosticism and alchemy are at least as foreign as Hinduism or 
Buddhism, in the sense that Hinduism and Buddhism are generally 
more familiar and better understood. On what basis, then, 
might Jung believe that Westerners have a deep psychological 
connection with Western esoteric subjects, but not with Eastern 
religions? Noll ( 1994: 93-106; illustration on p. 100) sees 
Jung' s theory of the collective unconscious as showing some 
dependence on nineteenth-century geology, in the sense that 
both divide the objects of their stuqy (the human psyche, the 
earth) into strata whose deeper structures tend to be 
progressively larger. If my individual consciousness 
corresponds to a rock on the surface of the earth, for example, 
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then something must correspond to the continental plates, which 
underlie many surface rocks; as well as the earth itself, which 
underlies all surface rocks. So what is this intermediate 
level? Noll sometimes sees Jung as claiming race or culture as 
the intermediate level, but also suggests that Jung, following 
Haeckel and others, sometimes named geography as the 
intermediate level. That is, on this reading archetypes would 
dwell in the soil rather than in the blood, or in some kind of 
spiritual Twilight Zone. For example, Noll (1994: 96) cites an 
observation by Jung to the effect that as a result of their 
physical location, Americans of European descent were starting 
to behave less like Europeans and more like American Indians. 
__ ~ __ p_<::>ssi})~~-~9!:..-l:'acial, non-geographical explanation as to ho~ 
archetypes can be simultaneously universal and culture-bound 
~-- ---~"- - .. ,- "'--~-~-"'·~--"·-,~-_,,,..~-----..··"'""~- - ·'><·~-~-
might be that the same universal archetypes can have cultural 
variations. Alternatively, a particular culture migh! 
encoura_g~ __ jJ:.~~embers t~--~~plore certain archetypes rather than 
others. 
Particularly relevant to psychology are those archetypes 
"welche am haufigsten und intensi vsten das Ich beeinflussen 
respekti ve storen" ("which have the most frequent and most 
disturbing influence on the ego"; GW 9-II, 13) . After the 
person~ -~.::_~<:>~ _ _!:he. __ :r::_e.xt_:-: innermo~!-_3ide of ourselves is the 
Shadow ( der Schatten) , which contains everything rejectec1 J::>Y 
the con~c:;_:i:_?.~::'- .. ~ind as not being a part of ~!......:_ In expounding 
the standard Jungian interpretation, (1993: 80) 
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describes the Shadow as encompassing anything that is "QQP_Qsed 
-~"·~·- ·-·-. --•"•' -~~-----~------~~"----."'-~"-"-" ------ ~-,·~·-··-·· -~-· -""-"""' __ ,., _________ .,_ ~------- ~ 
to ego--threat, disequilibrium, 
order to maintain stabil 
_.§:t1a<:"J:<?~---~~- an exarrple of the tendency of the unconscious to 
mirror conscious values in reverse. For ex~~~~-~__!_j-_9-_~r:-~-~fy 
hate must arise as well. Although I 
may succeed in banishing hate from my conscious mind, it will 
still exist in my personal unconscious, and I will tend to 
perceive others as being full of hate. Psychological growth_ 
occurs when I realize that ~:11.-~_§ __ I,:latred doe~_ not exist_ in 
others, but is a projection of my own dark side. I then no 
longer think of myself as good or honest, but as their 
opposites as well. By failing to acknowledge the Shadow, we 
drive it to find expression outside of our conscious control, 
even to the point where it is forced to develop a will of its 
own in order to manifest itself. Jung does not mean that we 
ought to be sure to commit a few sins for the sake of achieving 
psychological balance, only that we should be careful to remain 
conscious of our own evil inclinations. Indeed, the very fact 
that he is worried about the Shadow becoming:_ . too 
2~~9.:~~~~--_t::hat he sees it as a necessary evil to be propitiated 
rathe~--~t~?-n a vital part of our souls to be celebrated: 
Das pathologische Element liegt nicht in der 
Existenz dieser Vorstellungen, sondern in der 
Dissoziation des BewuEtseins, welches das Unbewugte nicht 
mehr beherrschen kann. In allen Fallen von Dissoziation 
erhebt sich deshalb die Notwendigkeit der Integration des 
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Unbewu:fSten in Bewu:!Stsein. Es handel t sich urn einen 
synthetischen Vorgang, den ich als «Individuationsproze:fS» 
bezeichnet habe. [GW 9-I, 83] 
[The pathological element does not lie in the 
existence of these ideas, but in the dissociq.tion of 
consciousness that can no longer control the unconscious. 
I_n all cases of dissociation it is therefore n~_ce.$._§c:l,ry __ to 
integrate the unconscious into the consciousness. Thi_s 
~E) _ C1 __ .. ?YI1th~_tic pr_ocess which I have termed the 
·:individuation process II • 
Here, identification with the Shadow does not entail the 
adoption of its goals, only the recognition of its existence as 
a part of ourselves. 
_After t_b:~ __ e_b.~_gow ,__ _ _!_h_~_next-inner~~t: __ ':l-E.S:h~~z:e_~ ~s .. that __<2_f 
the Syzygy (an astronomical term re~~r:ii1g ___ tQ_two h~_q_venly 
bodies in a~~~ent: wit]} a t:hird, _§i._tl!:E?r:. j_g _CQDJ1:!J:1Ction or 
opposition) <:;on::;Jsting of the ego ar1<i Anima or_ AnJintl§ ._ The 
psyche, ~~ir1g whole and completE2, contains wi_t::hlrL_it .. ___ both 
side of a man, while the Animus is the hidde_B~~-masculine side 
of a woman. 14 According to Jung, although I may think of 
myself as male rather than female, my image of women does not 
come from somewhere outside myself (i.e. from real women) ; 
instead, I unconsciously project this image from within, onto 
such women as I may encounter. Whereas the Shadow is projected 
-- - ~ " '' ' __ , ~· ,.~~-·w¥--~-·-
the Anima/Animus is 
projected only onto members of the opposite sex. In alchemy, 
14 In medieval Latin, the word anima is a feminine nou_n 
meanii_1g -"-soul' II whereas . -the .. mascullne ___ --Iorm,. animus I means 
"spirit. II Jung assocTaFe-s the two terms -with the trinity of 
body, soul and spirit from I Thessalonians 5:23, and also as a 
sort of wordplay based on the scholastic question, Habet mulier 
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this stage is generally represented by the coniunctio, i.e. 
some sort of male-female pair (e.g. Rex and Regina, Adam and 
Eve), represented either in sexual union or in the later stages 
as a hermaphroditic composite character. As with the Shadow, 
Jung claims to have arrived at his theory of the Syzygy on the 
basis of empirical observations, some of which he shares with 
us in chapter three of Aion. 
tends to emphasize connectiveness and relCl.tionships ("Eros"), 
whereas men's consciousness sees discursiv~~ thought ("Logos") 
as authoritative. At the level of the Anima or Animus, this 
(Jung does 
not intend the word "irrational" as a pejorative, but uses it 
to refer to functions of the psyche other than reason.) This 
difference is particularly evident during an argument between a 
man and a woman, when "animosity" holds sway. The suspicion 
may arise that while Jung as a man could base his description 
of the Anima on his own 1nner experience, he could have only 
encountered the Animus second-hand, i . e. through women' s 
behavior or by analogy with the male experience. Whatever his 
t_9Tge_! -~()-~. feminist criticism. Demaris s. Wehr (1987: x), 
after summarizing a number of famous feminists' comments on 
Jung, points out that "liberation thought," including feminism, 
"starts with the context and experience of a particular group, 
not with universal forms or ideas." The problem with the 
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latter is that "universal categories function 
imperialistically; that they replicate the worldview and 
situation of the person or persons to whom they are 'revealed,' 
or who are reflecting upon them." For those_ feminists who are 
not moved to abandon Jungian thought altogether, one 
alternative course is to identify (or create) new, women-
oriented archetypes, as in the case of Estes (1992). A related 
objection has to do with Jung's assumption of heterosexuality 
as an operative principle of the unconscious mind. Would it 
not be natural to imagine, for exarrple, a male homosexual 
projecting his anima onto other men? Unfortunately, Jung never 
proposes a single, coherent view of homosexuality, and none of 
the various models which he proposes are terribly convincing. 
For exarrple, in the third chapter of Aion he repeats the old 
myth in which boys with domineering mothers grow up to be gay. 
In this view, male homosexuality results from a man's 
identifying with his own Anima while projecting his persona. 
For a fuller discussion, as well as a survey of gay and lesbian 
attempts to rework Jung's theory, see Hopcke (1958). 
J_l:l_!"l:~ ____ _g:ives several different versions of a Fourfold 
Marriage (Heiratsquaternio) . Although none of these appear to 
~ ·~ --··--- ·- ~--·-·-----~"--~-~~·- . ' -· ·-----·----~------·--·---~-----~~---··'"······--------"'·--------- ------ ......... -----
-~~~~-C:~-1.~:5J.l::J-! on among Jungians, I see this as a crucial element 
:hn ___ .:[l,.l}:19:~_scheme of individuation, since its cross-shape. __ and 
_l1~e o-~~~~-: ___ fou_:_ represent an iJ:l.~~~~diate s_!:~g:e between 
__ tl}._~_~_e:r::~ __ _union of binary opposites and the complexio 
oppositorum of the Self. In Aion (GW 9-II, 42 ff), the 
. ___ ......_ ---·--.--~~¥··------------------~---
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Fourfold Marriage is diagrammed as follows: 
Animus I Old Wise Man Anima I Chthonic Mother 
1>-<::1 
Male subject Female subject 
Whereas a man perceives his Anima only through female 
intermediaries in the outside world, he may relate directly to 
his Animus, which in this case takes the archetypal form of the 
Old Wise Man. (Nietzsche's Zarathustra is an exarrple of this 
archetype.) Women, meanwhile, conceive of their own Anima in 
the form of the Chthonic Mother, or Earth Mother. Jung 
explains: 
Ich mochte zusammenfassend hervorheben, dag die 
Integration des Schattens, das heigt die Bewugtmachung 
des personlichen Unbewugten, die erste Etappe im 
analytischen Prozess bedeutet, ohne welche eine 
Erkenntnis von Anima und Animus unm6glich ist. Der 
Schatten kann nur durch die Beziehung zu einem Gegenuber 
realisiert werden, und Animus und Anima nur durch die 
Beziehung zum Gegengeschlecht, weil ihre Projektionen nur 
dort wirksam sind. Durch letztere Erkenntnis entsteht 
beim Manne eine Triade, die zu einem Drittel transzendent 
ist: nahmlich das mannliche Subjekt, das 
gegenuberstehende weibliche Subjekt und die transzendente 
Anima. Bei der Frau verhalt es sich entsprechend 
umgekehrt. Das der Triade zur Ganzheit fehlende vierte 
ist beim Manne jener Archetypus des alten Weisen ... bei 
der Frau die chthonische Mutter .... [GW 9-II, 42] 
}~;~ii;R~~!:J¥~;i!a:~:~~~~~~~~~~~i~~n t::t ~~; ~ 
analytig_p_:J:'_Qces§, and that without it a recognition of 
anima and animus is impossible. The_ shadow can be 
re~lized only through a relation to a partner, ---and -ani~ 
, a_nd_anj.mus only_ through a rel.§:1::i_2I1_ to· the_ ()pposite sexJ 
Q_~_gau_§_~ _only ___ in such a relation do their projections 
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qegQitl~ ___ _<?J2e~§.!i:_~~. The _recs:gnition of ani!l]9_~~llifT!llS 
gives rise, in a man, to a triad, one-third of which is 
"j~i:~uls_~~nd§nt·:·--- tne ___ -masculTne s-ubje-ct·;· -- -E:he opposing 
feminine subject, and -the transcendent ·-anima·~------wTE:h- -a 
woman the. situation is reverse<.L . -~_::rh§=-!!!i§ __ ~:tgg: __ ~C:mrth 
~Iem~r1E--Tnar· ~§:lgo ·mal<e tne frii:i.9 .. a CIL1~t~rni ty is ( .~r:L g, 
man, the archetype of the Wise Old Man, which I have not 
_g_i _eeus se(j'_:her§_! ___ ~!?:£J.n.·a-worriai1the···chfhonTc .. Moth~ :I:"~~~: ·:-~T~~ 
Jun~Lc;riv~s. _a different account of the 
Fou::!~l:.<? .. ~~Er~~_?!-~-~-~-~E~?~- the t()p_:r:()"\_'V_E~C:~_':_~9~t" C:.I1.9 ... ::_§9ror 
M~-~!i:.S:B::.~.-~l:lJ:.~~-t..J:le bott.~l!l __ ~01,\7~ reads "Anima" and "Animus" ~GW 
161 422 ff) • I have no idea as to whether or how these two 
models might be reconciled; my impression is that the structure 
...----·"""' .-~'~ _.._, ___ ," '~--~· .. ,- ,_.~. •"'<'*'~~,-~ '-~----· 
of the Heiratsquaternio is more important than the content. 
In fact, throughout his writings Jung shows a tendency to 
construct quaternities of one variety or another. For example 
Psychologishe ~pen resembles Jung's alchemistic psychology in 
that both propose a duality followed by a quaternity. 
Furthermore, Jung associates thinking primarily with men and 
~'··------~-~----~-~-"· ··--. 
these two quaternities. And what about the quaternity of 
Helios, Eros, the Tree of Life, and the Devil from Sermo IV of 
Septum Sermones? Or "Versuch einer psychologischen Deutung des 
Trinitatsdogmas" ("A psychological approach to the dogma of the 
Trinity," 1942/1948), in which Jung, after recounting the 
heretical Bogamil teaching of Satanael as the elder brother of 
Christ t...l:rl9:15es_ the Dey_~! .. !:l:1:~--l:1:~?:~~-~-~-?..1?-.J:th_~~~E __ 9!._ the __'!'rini t;:t: 
(GW 11, 254-258)? Is the position of the Devil analogous to 
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the "suhnerged" member of the four functions? I doubt it. 
While certain features of some of Jung's quaternities may have 
b~e~~~~~~~ed over into others, the fact is that they illustrate 
different concepts altogether. The four functions constitute a 
model of the mind; the four-member Trinity and the 
Heiratsquaternio depict particular ideas or ways of thi~ing; 
~-----·-~--~-------··-"---··-·~'""·--"·"~.,-.-·-··-""-"""--•·---~- ·~· "-·-·-~·-·--~··•---------- •-~~-·-·- ··•-···~---
// 
and the four deities from Septum Sermones seem to represent 
four stages of life--birth and creation, love and sex, 
procreation, and death. It may be that Jung had the image of 
quaternity in his mind throughout his career, like an 
, ,,,,...-.o+d ·--•••- --~• •-·•-••-• ••••••• ··-···~ •- ••- ~- L-~--
a~c::t-l~~~p~~ ~~~~--t,_9~~-_l'le_ filled it with different content§_, just 
as different religions may employ the same symbols. This would 
_,,_.,._,~,.,.~,-.~~·--'-"...,.."'--~~·-·"- ,__ ·•·--·~-------·-.. ,~,.._..~...,._-•~v-c~"·- ·•--~ • • • .""-<..• 
go a long way in explaining why the final chapter of Aion 
contains illustrations of more than a dozen variations on the 
quaternio, some in three dimensions, and none of them terribly 
comprehensible. 
wholeness 
psychology is the Self, which contains all opposites within it. 
"~··•-->•·----------~-------------- .. -·~--~ .. -----
01JX __ j,mage_o( __ _Gg_g __ ~s i~i§ip~_:r::E::.Ci.~.£~-~!E_~ ___ !:ll1minou::;_, __ ~~----~ransc_e~s1ent 
nature of the Self: 
Das Selbst ist andererseits ein Gottesbild, 
respektive lagt sich von einem solchen nicht 
unterscheiden. Das wugte der fruhchristliche Geist, 
sonst hatte ein CLEMENS VON ALEXANDRIEN nie sagen konnen, 
dag, wer sich selbst erkenne, Gott erkenne. 
[GW 9-II, 42] 
15 The word was coined by Rudolf Otto for Das Heilige (The 
Idea of the Holy, 1917), and means something like "transcendent 
and compelling." 
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[The self, on the other hand, is a God-image, or at 
least cannot be distinguishecf .from 'one. -~of· this the 
'ear1y .. ·cFi.r1sTia:n·· Splrff-···wa.·sn6t. ignorant I otherwise 
Clement of Alexandria could never have said that he who 
knows himself knows God.] 
Conscj,.ous realization of the Self is the goal of 9:na~ytical 
psychology. In alchemy, this stage is sym:bolized by the 
" _,_,,' , ~---" ~-" __ .,,, .. 
product of the 
philosophorum, the elixir vitae, the diamond body, or whatnot. 
T[lts stage may also be found s:ym:bolized in mandalas. Mandala 
is Sanskrit for "circle," and refers to a genre of religious 
--·~ -~ ~ ... ~--~------,-----··---.-----~ .. -~ . •., 
art (usu~·}-._ly-_painted or sand-painted) found most notably in 
Hinduism and Tibetan Buddhism. A typical mandala (Kalachakra, 
for example) shows a birds-eye view of a squarish palace with 
four gates, which is meant to house the deity whose mandala it 
is. Various auspicious offerings and sym:bols are drawn in the 
courtyard, along with plenty of geometric frills; and the whole 
structure is nested within a series of concentric circles 
representing the rest of the universe. 16 
are not limited to shapes that are actl.l§llly called _}nandalas, 
but may also be seen in such diverse settings as medieval 
Christian woodcuts, flying saucer sightings, and in our dreams. 
Although there are many variations (e.g. the swastikCi) ·'· _t_pe 
... -~-
16 Another familiar mandala image comes from the (chanted) 
mandala offering, in which one visualizes a flat, disk-shaped 
world with Mount Meru at the center and the four traditional 
continents occupying each of the four directions, together with 
such things as the precious elephant or the wish-fulfilling cow 
on each continent. The idea is to mentally offer all this to 
the Three Jewels in order to accumulate merit. Incidentally, a 
common tantric exercise is to visualize oneself as ·a:· deit:Y~--~and 
the world as one's mandala. 
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oy_~I'~!-~_sha~-~E !!lotion is always circular, with usually four 
elements within the circle. 
circle" __ <::~P~::::_~~th~~ssence of the path to wholeness, _l?~<::~l!§e 
th~-- quat~:J::'l)i tr~-~ol ves the tension inherent in dualitY, 
In each 
case, the mandala is the voice of the unconscious calli~g us to 
wholeness. 
The -~!:_ure __ Jung 1 s sym1:xJl of choice for the path to 
_Y"h<::>_!.~~:::;s is t_b:~!--~~- t-~~- alchemical:_opus. Jung claims to have 
been propelled into the study of Western alchemy after being 
introduced to Wilhelm 1 s translation of the T 'ai I Chin Hua 
Tsung Chih. Like their Chinese counterparts, western 
alchemists are famous for their search for the secret of 
longevity, as well as for their attanpts to transmute base 
metals into gold. Jung_ came tg see both J?E9)_~_£!:s __ as, ~ll_egoE_~-~-§ 
_J<::>:J::' __ :t:he process of individuation; hence the alchemists 1 motto, 
Aurum nostrum non aurum vulgi. Although the debt is not 
commonly acknowledged or appreciated, Jungls basic views about 
alchemy appear to have been drawn from the writings of his 
older contemporary and one-time fellow Freudian, Herbert 
Silberer. J!ln_g ___ salutes Silb::E~E ___ ':l:S. the first writer to attanp!:_ 
_9-_psyc£1~1-_()g_i_C:c.tl interpretation of alchemy, although he laments 
the inadequacies of his Freudian psychological assumptions 
which supposedly led to corresponding deficiencies in his 
interpretation of alchemy (GW 14: xiv; also GW 14, 792). In 
his Probleme der Mystik und ihere Symbolik (Problems of 
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mysticism and its syml:olism; 1914), Silberer finds clues in 
Western alchemical writings to the effect that alchemical 
symbolism is meant to be interpreted psychologically. Alchemy, 
says Silberer ( 1971: 150), was "not limited to gold-making, or 
even primitive chemistry. Instead, the wisdom which the 
alchemists intended to convey had something to do with self-
knowledge (Silberer 1971: 153). Man is the real prima materia 
(i.e. the basic matter which the alchemists works upon). Like 
Jung, Silberer regarded the Roman Catholic mass as an 
alchemical rite, and alchemy itself as disguising strange, 
heretical Christian teachings. If "the making of the 
Philosopher's Stone is, so to speak, the imitation of Christ," 
( Silberer 1971: 166), then the alchemist is in effect serving 
as savior as well as the one in need of salvation. 17 Silberer 
even compares the relationship between the alchemical opus and 
the perspective of "Vedanta" (specifically Advaita, which was 
then in vogue in the West) identifying Brahman and atman, the 
"soul" with the "All-soul"; and like Jung, links the latter 
with the vision of the New Jerusalem from the Book of 
Revelation. Finally, Silberer (1971: 121) anticipates Jung in 
identifying the coniunctio as the central image of the 
alchemical opus. 
From the basic perspective of Silberer, Jung ~LC!bc:>:rCl.t_es 
-- "------------~·-~··-,~-'"-'•<-<·----~~ ~,..,_,.,.,_,_ -.~--.~~~-~-~--·--•<-" -~- ----· ~-- ·-·-~~~'•'AAw~+~ ••"--•-•-- -- -• • 
~11:_ _ _!_~~--~~<:::t:~mical r:rta_~"~ial considerably, and discovers in it 
symbolism suggestive of his own theory of individuation. 
17 This theme of the "saved savior" is associated with 
gnosticism, e.g. the Hymn of the Pearl from the Actae Thomas 
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J~n.:g:.'.s main. __ ~!l!"l<?:':~~-~9Il: ... -1:~ .. J:o ~:}{~!~--.!!:~- .~9.~c:t. of th~-- un_i tz ___ <::lf 
<?.I>l2<::l.~_i_t:~~ into. __ th_~---~e!lt:E?.:~~-t:J::l:§m~-- q_:t alchemy in gena::~) . The 
task of alchemy, as well as of analytical psychology, is to 
----"' ·-- --~------·--- ------~"--~~---
/§yo_l5~.}~-~E~J:1Y ... o:ut of the disparate antinomies of the P~!:_c:;0-e. 
The prima materia of the alchemists stands for the (pre-
individuated) psyche, while the product of the alchemical opus 
represents individuation. In between, any number of stages 
with ponderous-sounding Latin names may be identified. They 
essentially describe the dissolution or purification of the 
prima materia, followed by its reintegration based on some type 
of coniunctio. While I have never been able to discover any 
whitening, 
and reddening) on one hand, 
... ----~----~-~--.. ·-···--····-----"---~-- -·· "" .. 
and the stages of Jun~'s 
ir:~.9:~'!J:<:Iuation theory on the ()ther, that Jung intends the two to 
run roughly parallel to one anothel:'.-~~-~~--c;le~ enol12._h. 
Jung's interpretation of alchemy, though 
~--~ ·-----~--·--~,--~----·-'·<-··--·~~~--_,.,.., ___________ .,~-~~-----.~--~--~~---~--------~-~----· ,_ . ...._, __ 
surely 
insightful, is methodologically problematic since it is based 
.....-- ----"'---~"'----- --------- -· ·-· -- ---------" .... --
upQ[l __ g_ __ nU,~J::' ... <::>J._dt~J2.iC>':l~ ___ <:l._§S1JI!lPti?r:!_§_:_ that on SO!Il~ __ ba?:!-_<: ___ level 
th_~rE;! __ i_~---~Uf!:¢lamental aQ:r~ment across alchemical tex~s despite 
tl!~ir ~~-'!~se __ cul tl.lral origins_, h~~~-<?.E~cei~ ___ }2eri<?<:1s, _ If!§thods, 
anq __ CiPf>_ct:r:§_nt goals; that the essential meaning of alchemy is 
_': __ sp~_ri_t:~-~-~:· __ _<:>r psychological, ancl_ _sp~~i~-~-~al~y --~-1]~?1 ye§___the 
UI1.:!-.1::Y of opposites; that alchemy when understo()_?: __ ~!"!; __ t:!:!.~s sense 
__ __:h§__!_~ue; and that analytical psychology does the same thing 
today that alchemy did formerly, which is why people ought to 
(Barnstone:308-313). 60 
support it and undergo it for themselves. To the extent that 
Jung' s account is meant to be descriptive, it is surely guilty 
to be 
evaluative, i.e. an attempt to desribe only the "best" sort of /------"' ""'·--"'---··--····---"'. .. . 
alchemy, it is vulnerable to the objection that such a 
-·-'""' •"•>M•'" ····-~C·~'-·•-"-·<~---••'>< ~~~-..-'>- < 
udgement cannot avoid being arbitrary. 
-··~ . - ~--·--..-
To begin with, there is the problem of deciding what we 
mean by "alchemy." A danger facing interpreters is that they 
might find themselves using the term "alchemy" in such a way as 
to assume what they hope to prove (as would happen, for 
exarrple, if someone stipulated that by "alchemy" they did not 
intend to include those who sought only material gold; and then 
after surveying the various "alchemists" meeting this 
criterion, concluded that all alchemists had spiritual aims) . 
Unfortunately, the problem of defining "alchemy" --or at least 
of delimiting the field which the term is meant to encompass--
is unbelievably vexing. For exarrple, how is one to distinguish 
between "alchemical" attempts to create artificial gold, and 
the (successful) attempts by modern physicists to do the same 
thing? What is the difference between an "alchemical" panacea, 
longevity pill, or elixir of immortality on one hand; and 
products from the pharmacologies of China, India, the 
Hellenistic world, and scientific medicine on the other? If 
"alchemy" can include psychological or spiritual practices as 
well, can this kind of "alchemy" be distinguished from the 
broader categories of yoga, theology, and magic? I do not 
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think we can identify any essence of alchemy which all 
alchemists and only alchemists possess, and by virtue of which 
they are alchemists. Nor is Wittgenstein Is concept of n family 
resemblancen sufficient to distinguish alchemy from its sister 
disciplines of metallurgy, medicine, thaumaturgy, and the 
decorative arts with any clarity. 
In the case of alchemy, such traditions can be identified in 
!?dia, China, ~:r!.9~--~~~ West:: (inc::ludi~q Hell~~~~!:.~S:' Islamic, and 
European alchemy) . These traditions are in turn similar enough 
--~-·----------., .. ~ .. ·~·'""""'' ___ <> 
to e~ch_ ()ther ~()·~~~EE<:t.~_!:-~_()_~:t::--.~~~-~~h~ same t:~<::__f o~!:t_~m. 
<Iunq~_!:l~-P~~-?.~~P~-~----t::~a t a 1 chemy __ ought t ()_ }::)§ ___ Jn.t_erQr.~_t;:_~d 
psychologi<:;ally ~aJ::h~r::. __ t::_~c:m pJ:1:ysically i::=;_ cont:t:'adict_ed by _the 
fact that early alchemy in China, India, and the Mediterranean 
----~--........._.~--~~·~-~---·~~---,-......... ·-~·~--.· ~~"-~-·---·~-·------~----~· 
V.:_<?E~~--'t:.~:?-_?8 to be .<?E.~~ted toward ph~~~-<?-~~--I2~ocess~~-~n~. q-()ais. 
Even though some philosophical system is usually assumed, this 
does not indicate that anything other than a physical 
interpretation is meant, since philosophy can concern itself 
with physical as well as spiritual matters. In the Hellenistic 
world, for example, the theoretical basis of alchemy took the 
form of Aristotle 1 s conception of matter as an underlying 
hypostasis or substance, imbued with attributes. Since 
substance is what is left when the attributes are removed, it 
stands to reason that by changing the attributes of lead into 
those of gold, the lead really has become gold, since there is 
nothing inherently gold-like about the substance of gold. 
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Aristotle also provided an influential theory of four elements 
(fire, water, air, earth) and four qualities (hot, cold, moist, 
dry) which determine the attributes of matter, and suggest ways 
in which one kind of matter may be changed into another (Couder 
1980: 19). The philosophical assumptions on which Indian 
alchemy was based prlor to the rise of tantric interpretations 
were drawn from Sankhya philosophy, which held matter (prakrti) 
to be naturally homogeneous and uniform. Diversity arises from 
the evolution of matter under the influence of consciousness 
(purusa) , which occurs through varying combinations of the 
three gunas, or characteristics. In China, the theoretical 
basis for effecting changes in matter, whether alchemical or 
medicinal, was drawn from the interplay of yin, yang and the 
five elements. Of course each of these culture-areas also 
developed nonphysical versions of alchemy, typically as 
interpretations of physically-oriented predecessors. 
Jung uses several strategies i:J?-__ ?r~~ to ~~plc.tin a~?:Y 
this apparent physical orientation. In the case of earlier 
alchemists who write with straightforwardly physical goals in 
mind, Jung finds his views reflected in their unconscious 
thought processes. In the case of alchemists from the 
sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth, Jung 
thinks that they came to see the truth of something like his 
own theory, which they attempted to communicate in baroque, 
psychedelic form. Writers from later periods who fail to refer 
to the coniunctio are not considered real alchemists at all. 
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Ostensibly this is because they no longer worked in 
laboratories; however, Jung violates this principle with his 
identification of Faust II as the last great alchemical work; 
or of the T 'ai I Chin Hua Tsung Chih as a text of 11 internal 
alchemy. 11 Jung, it seems, is willing to relax his principles 
in order to admit those alchemical works which he finds 
agreeable. It is unclear what led Jung to conclude that post-
chemical alchemy is less archetypally-inspired than pre-
chemical alchemy. Did his research into the collective 
unconsciou~--~!-~a?:J?:im to deri~-~- ~--~er_!:~in theory of archetypes, 
against which particular alchemical texts were evaluated? Or 
---·-·-··-~-----~"---~-- . ··- .<o--~···-· ,_ ·"'~--~-~·---~-
~~-~--I:e --~r:~~--~r:_~:9_~he study of alchemy already assuming that 
~llE: __ J::~?:<:!=:§_?_ught __ t:;~-- be inter:QE_eted psy<::~()~()_9i<::9:!_~y, and that no 
genuinely archetypal material could be derived from books 
... ,. --·-·-~·~·-··------·-----~~-
wEi!!=:~I)--~}J__y _p_~?P~e.- w}1_() did not_ think __ what; ___ t::_Q.§y __ ~§E_E?__ gg):n~as 
g~J~t:i vel:y_1::E.':l~ (so the historical circumstances of alchemical 
texts, rather than their content, would determine their 
genuineness)? Regardless of which horn of the dilerruna one 
favors, it seems clear that the truth of Jung' s alchemical 
theory pr~-~~J22()_~es the truth of his psychological theory, which 
of course is far from established. 
Even if a text 1s admitted to be symbolic, not all 
symbolism is religious (a counterexa:rrple would be national 
flags), and not all religious symbolism is psychological (a 
counterexa:rrple would be religious symbolism whose primary 
meaning is institutional, such as the keys of Saint Peter). 
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This reality would have been particularly evident to Europeans 
of the medieval, Renaissance, and Enlightenment periods. 
Frances Yates (1972) has pointed out the political imagery of 
one well-known alchemical text, Die Chymishe Hochzeit 
Christiani Rosencreutz ( 1616) . Even if a case for a 
psychological or religious interpretation can be made, it would · 
remain to be seen whether something like Jung' s system lS 
meant, there being a great many competing systems in the world. 
For example, the late eighteenth- or early nineteenth-century 
text entitled La tn2s sainte Trinosophie and attribu._t_§Q __ tQ_the 
Comt:.e de Saipt~.G~rmain. appears to conta~~- ~~--:L~~-~e_l1<:!_~-~ to_ !:he 
unity of oppo~:;~_t:es whatsoever, although it is replete with 
alchemical and initiatory imagery (Hall 1983) . Jung wants to. 
",,- -·- ·-~-"' 
dismiss this sort of ~lchemy out of hand, as a late corruption 
~nworthy of the name. For Jung, genuine alchemy flourished 
from the sixteenth century until the middle of the seventeenth 
century (GW 12, 557), when the rise of scientific chemistry 
meant that alchemists could no longer seriously suppose that 
what they were doing was objective or factual (GW 12, 405). 
Also, without the physical process to ground them, Jung 
observes that alchemy became lost ln a confused mass of 
Hermetic allegory (GW 12, 332). Thus, in order to prop up his 
---···--····-> . 
interpretative scheme for alchemy, Jung is forced to privilege 
a certain period of alchemy as being somehow more definitively 
alchemical than other periods. 
,---·--
More generally, how are we to evaluate Jung' s mature 
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theory? If by~ this we mean to determine whether Jung is ~-right 
about human psychology, I cannot imagine how even the most 
basic ~-~~errlEmts _ C:~---~~----theory could be meaningfully tested. 
Even if · Jung' s chronic tendency toward vagueness can be 
( ~-· q~_.~-- the cross-cultural recurrence of a particular dream 
image) 
-- ·-· - ·------ " 
could be e){:plained in any number of ways (e.g. 
coincidence, diffusion) without invoking archetypes or the 
collec,:tive unc_9E_§~~9~· In part four of "Uber den Begriff des 
kollekti ven UnbewuiSten" ("The concept of the collective 
unconscious," 1936, in GW 9-1), Jung gives us an exarrple of the 
kind of evidence he finds convincing, in the form of a 
patient's delusion that the wind is caused by the swinging 
penis of the sun. To Jung, this image recalls a certain 
passage from the Mithraic Liturgy which the patient could not 
have read (Jung claims) because it had not yet been published 
even in the original Greek. A skeptic might quibble about the 
actual degree of similarity (in the Mithraic Liturgy it is not 
a penis but a kind of hose); or like Noll (1994: 181-187), who 
accuses Jung of falsifying the dates, suspect the patient of 
having been previously exposed to the image after all. 
Furthermore, we may well wonder whether some ancient mythical 
I?~ralle~-~~g}lt not be found for any fantasy, or a fantasy for 
agy_ myth, no matter how imaginative. In addition, there is the 
--~~F··• --•·>~ ·~· -• oO • -
question of replicability--not that anyone would expect to find 
other patients with the same delusion, but it does begin to 
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look suspicious if only Jung is capable of getting results like 
this. _X~nally, even if we somehow manage to exclude all 
conventional explanations, this still would 
existence of archetypes. Similar evidence has in fact been 
used to argue for other theories such as telepathy or past life 
memory. Whether Jung's theory is clinically effective might be 
somewhat easier to determine than whether its underlying theory 
is true, but these are logically separate questions. 
Jl!:~g·_~ "-~~~():r:¥. __ ~ay lack the scientific status he claimed 
for __ j."t:L_5l:t least presently, but c1oes it have philosopl:J.ical 
valu~.:?-~-~though Jung is not a t!:~dit_igEal _figure in academtc 
W§,§ t~ED-_QQ.U:_osophy LiP. cor1~rast: .. to Freud, ... y.rl}gse ~!IlR<?J:'t:a.I"lC:~ __ ?-.§ a 
pl].~losopher is widely recognized), a number of Jung 
commentators have approached Jung from a philosophical 
-· ·--- ·----~~~--~- .. 
perspective (e.g. Nagy 1991; Pauson 1988) and at least one 
·- .. ·---·- -------------~--~ ---~--~---- . ------ --~ ----·----~~----~-· 
.. '::l:J:l_iy-~rsity (tb_(2 __ Un~yersit:y of Hawaii at Manoa) offers a 
phi~()S_~-~ course on Jung. What do all these philosophers see 
in him? The answer varies widely, sometimes even within the 
remarks of a single commentator. 
meaning with respect to 
,<"""-·---·------------- -~ .v<-- ~-----------------------~-------~---- --- --···- -~----·--~-~· 
such notions as the collective 
),:tn~gJ]scious_~~~-_£OJ2~~C::E~-- tf:t()t:l9"J:: __ probabl:y ____ _9:()()med to remain 
-~te_rl:l9;~_l¥ unres()ly~?_:_ Jung' s writings are sometimes combed for 
arguments about various aspects of his theories, and his 
interpretations and assumptions with respect to other texts and 
systems (such as those of Eastern religions) may be evaluated. 
Jung' s theories, insofar as these can be reconstructed, are 
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often examined in the same spirit as typically prevails in 
courses on the philosophy of religion, so that the implications 
of a certain idea (e.g. a model of cosmology) may be examined 
apart from the issues of whether the exponent of that idea 
described or defended it adequately. Finally, some 
commentators (e.g. Nagy) follow a history-of-ideas approach, 
explicating Jung in light of those aspects of his system which 
he appears to have borrowed from other sources. 
While few would seriously propose that Jung belongs in 
.!:.b~ __ Ianks of great philosophers on the basis of the compelling 
nature of his arguments or the clarity of his thought, quite a 
f~~__j)_l'l~~9-~?Pl:r¥._PJ::'Ofessors and students have an interest in his 
ideas, probably ~~~~q ___ to his popularity within certain 
Jung is one of a number of 
-----~~------~------------
thinkers whose main contribution seems to be or 
evocative vision of the universe and/or human nature, which if 
'.. _. __ ~··--·--·- •" --- "-....,....,..,.~,.,..,,._,_-...- .. -,.,_,. ···=----~-· ~~c••• 
re~E?r _ tg _9-s "th~--Ill~~D:i.-!1:9: of life. " While this visionary aspect 
of philosophy has a venerable history, such visions are too 
plentiful for philosophers to consider very many of them. The 
choice of which visions to consider is largely a function of 
arbitrary personal t.aste and/or social and political accident; 
so it would be difficult to argue for Jung' s philosophical 
legitimacy on this basis. Perhaps the quest for agreement on 
the question of what is philosophically important is misguided. 
Given the· vast number of works with some philosophical merit, 
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coupled with their tendency to be found organized into 
independent literary lineages (texts commenting on other texts, 
and so forth), it is simply unrealistic to expect any one 
person to even be aware of the entire corpus. 18 
18 In the United States some educators have been quite 
vocal in supporting a rev1s1on of the Western "canon" in 
directions which not-so-coincidentally match the present racial 
breakdown of the U.S. population (with additional corrections 
for gender imbalance) . I am sympathetic to arguments on both 
sides, though mistrustful of the literary tastes of the 
multicultural camp, and see this conflict as a reflection of a 
fundamental tension between two equally desirable aspects of 
education: breadth and depth. Meanwhile exiled Tibetan monks 
in India have made modest rev1s1ons to their traditional 
monastic curriculum over the last few decades, in an attempt to 
incorporate Western perspectives. I submit that the field of 
philosophy is better served not by continuing the process until 
Americans, Tibetans, and miscellaneous others find themselves 
studying the same things, but by maintaining autonomous (yet 
communicative) institutions responsible for particular 
philosophical lineages. In this respect Jungian philosophy 
might follow the path already taken by Thomistic studies. 
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II. NIETZSCHE AND THE "FAITH IN OPPOSITE VALUES" 
Having surveyed the crucial elements of Jung' s theory 
which touch on nonduality, I will now do the same with respect 
to Nietzsche's view of transcending good and evil. Nietzsche's 
dichotomy is not normally thought to resemble Jung's; yet as we 
shall see there are good reasons for making a connection 
between them. At the same time I will also indicate Jung' s 
interpretation of the various Nietzschean texts cited here, 
insofar as this can be determined. For pur:r;:x:?_~~~_<:)_f __ ~~rizing 
Nietzsche I have selected three crucial antinomies drawn from 
}2ie Gebur_t__c:l_~:r:__Tragodie, Jensei ts von Gut und Bose and Zur 
In each case 
Nietzsche introduces a fundamental dualism with relevance to 
the g-_oo§f_evil . dichotomy, most 
This tendency of Nietzsche's is 
in -~act:: .. _2_J:"!~-()~- th~ __ most <::~~-rCi.C:~_:=r~s~_iC::~_and _notewor:~l1¥ .. -~.§p_ects 
__ ()t_.Qi§_ writings. 
Given the absence of even a remote scholarly consensus as 
to how Nietzsche's philosophy ought to be understood, any 
attempt to provide a reasonably straightforward, noncontentious 
description of it must see~ hopelessly audacious. However, we 
may be aided by the fact that just because a given 
interpretation has been influential among Nietzsche 
commentators, this does not necessarily mean that its influence 
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is deserved. Much of the spectacularly uneven quality of 
Nietzsche commentary can be attributed to a social reality in 
which academic writers find themselves torn between a desire 
for historical accuracy, and a competing ambition do something 
clever and original. Unfortunately these objectives often work 
at cross-purposes, and in any case merit entirely different 
standards of evaluation . 19 Nietzsche scholars have tended to 
err on the side of creativity, with even very bizarre readings 
accorded equal academic recognition with the more sober ones. 
Aided by the ill-defined 
Nietzsche has been drafted as a spokesman for a bewildering 
~ ~-···-- .. ~··-·-·-----------
va:r.ietl:'~~,·--~·~ade_~i.-~.--~~_9s since his death. The classic exarrples 
would be the Nazi-oriented commentaries of people like 
Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche or Alfred Baumler. Although these 
writings are no longer taken seriously as works of scholarship, 
other equally questionable interpretations continue to be 
accorded academic recognition. As is oft6.1. !l;Oted, __ F_~adeEs of 
_!:I_~:h<:1egg~-~-·-~--~cmr-volume Nietzsche will learn a great ds=a,l qbout 
.Ii~~,9~_29:_~~~~-J)~~los.ophy but little about Nietzsch~' s, apart 
19 Consider the range of questions a commentator might 
bring to a text such as one of Jung' s writings. "What is Jung 
saying?" or "What did Jung really believe?" are historical 
questions, and ought to be addressed through appropriate 
methodologies. "Are Jung's ideas coherent?" or "What is the 
truth about the topics which he discusses?" are very different 
kinds of questions, and the answers to them ought to have 
little bearing on the historical issue of what his ideas were. 
Just as our understanding of the historical Jesus has benefited 
from the distancing of Jesus studies from the field of 
Christian theology, so does our understanding of Nietzsche 
benefit from a similar distinction. This principle need not 
rule out more creative treatments, only prevent them from 
masquerading as something they are not. 
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from some highly idiosyncratic discussions of nihilism, eternal 
recurrence, the Ubermensch, and the will to power. On the 
o~.!?:~ ...... ~i~~-~~-~-~_ar, ... 13Cl:t:c:l_~ll~~ comr~.e..~t:arx_ .<?!l __ !'!i~tz_sche 
(~99~)! -~~~-t::te_~~E:._~~~:':~ .. J~I.:~~~! lacks academic ~~.~:!:_~_x but 
curiously anticipates the tone of modern commentators such as 
Derrida, who straddle the disciplinary bound2l::r:y. between 
literary criticism and philosophical deconstructivism. 
More Nietzsche has been adopted by 
postmodernists, deconstructivists, 
//·~--- "•--~- •-•~--·-"•-··-~'--·•-" ••• .............._~~.~·--""..._,.,.__...,..,.,.,. __ '>--- ••• ~· ·- • ,.,,,, • 
and critical theorists of 
~~_:2:_~~~- st~~p-~_~_: _T_E_~.J?~blication o_f~I-1~~<?_!1.' s anthol<:)_~-.'!~e 
n~w Nietzs_c:.l:l.e ~~~.~21._ began a wave of articles which abandon the 
attanpt to equate Nietzsche's stated beliefs with his actual 
ones, let alone derive a system out of his various statements. 
sug_g§_§..t: ... !:h9:~ .. _he 9o~~ ___ not mean to suggest a coherent philosgyhy 
at all, but wishes his readers to transcend any views which he 
may seem to propound. In that case his genuine philosophy 
could not be expected to be found plainly stated in his 
writings, if it is subject to being expressed at all. Writers 
who understand Nietzsche to be intentionally ambiguous and 
self-negating generally also admire what they believe him to be 
saying, or rather implying. Allison in his introduction goes 
so far as to declare, "What is at stake in deciding these 
claims is ... not merely the nature of one somewhat enigmatic 
thinker, Friedrich Nietzsche, but the viability of conventional 
thought itself," as if discursive thought would break down if 
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Nietzsche turns out to be a proto-deconstructi vist. A few 
contemporary writers have taken this critique of philosophy so 
seriously that they appear to have abandoned the at tempt to 
express their own critique of Nietzsche in a coherent or 
comprehensible manner. 
So far I have been describing the history of Nietzsche 
scholarship in terms of its broad trends, the drawback of this 
approach being that such trendiness rarely reflects the best 
achievements in a field. Behind the scenes, as it were, one 
finds any number of academic types producing more sensible, 
less flashy, and usually more narrowly-targeted Nietzsche 
commentaries; and this seems to have been true since the work 
of Brandes and Salome at the turn of the century. While the 
task of reconstructing Nietzsche's thought ought to be 
approached with due humility, we learn little by abandoning the 
effort altogether, or by continuing the project using wishful 
methodology. 
c~!?-tat"or~- who are more interested in -·~!]:terpretations than 
f~ct_::; __ q~?:~~~~~Y turn out commentaries which are only. ~di~~a.:ntly 
related to Nietzsche. 
It may be objected that I am assuming the existence of 
some objective truth about Nietzsche, while Nietzsche (in part 
one of JGB and elsewhere) expresses great suspicion of this 
notion. However, the distinction needs to be made between 
Nietzsche's ideas as the object of scholarship, and Nietzsche's 
ideas as a scholarly methodology. It is quite possible (and 
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indeed often desirable) to reject Nietzsche's suggestions while 
recognizing that he did suggest them. In this case, although 
different perspectives may turn out to be equally worthwhile, 
the idea that all perspectives are equally worthwhile (or 
worthwhile at all) is absurd. Followers of such a methodology 
would have little basis for preferring Kaufmann's 
interpretation of Nietzsche over Baumler's, for example. At 
the same time, a more restricted form of perspecti vism may 
usefully counteract the temptation to essentialize across the 
various components of the Nietzschean corpus, or to privilege 
certain Nietzschean ideas (including perspectivism) over 
others. Multiple perspectives may well be useful, but not 
every perspective is legitimate. 
Nietzsche interpreters does Jung 
belong? Generally I am forced to nominate him for the overly-
---~~-~-~-------------------~--~-~--·~ .. --~~- -- --~--~-~---·--'··~----·-- ----------·----·-··-~· ~--~-~ .. ~ 
creative wing due to his habit of uncritically projecting his 
-------·- --·- ___ _.. ____ ~~~·--. ---- --~--
own system onto Nietzsche. Just as I reject Nietzschean 
PEi~~-~1?~-~~--~s __ ~--Il_l-~~?()~ology for .. ~~~-~~~9: .~i.-~~-~-~ch~L .. ~?_.?o I 
also reject the general Jungian perspective for the most part, 
---·-·-•--•~··-~-.,...._. __ "- "• '"~'~"-•·•~ -•~·-- ~·-~-- --~ ' -~-.__... .. .- """"~"-~' "' '"~*""""""' ·•w~·-•···•~•~-·--" ~~-·~ • - •- --~ ••• "•' ,~ m 
at least as a mode of textual exegesis. Occasionally we run 
-----~---------··-------· ..... -~-------------~--------
across Nietzsche's dissenting opinion on subjects which turn 
out to be of central importance to Jung. In one place 
Nietzsche appears to deny Jung's concept of the Anima in favor 
of a proto-Freudian view in which the image of one's mother 
provides the blueprint of femininity ( Menschl i ches 
Allzumenschliches 380). · Similarly Nietzsche attributes the 
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content of dreams to events in the physical world (ibid., 13), 
although he agrees with Jung that dreams have a compensatory 
function (Morgenrote 119). ----~~!:--~~~_pit~_ Jung' s characteristic 
tendency to discover his own theories reflected in everything 
--·"'"'' ___ ,__, ' ·~·----r.__... _________ , __ __..__,..,_.._.~,-~ .. ~--~--~--·'-'-'""~-~'-'~·-·-·~-·"''~-----
he analyzes, he is nevertheless able to bring out what I 
~--·-~·~--~---~""' -~-·-·-·-·· -----·---------
C<?~~:n tat o:r:~_! ai l _ _!_::>_C:~£!1:1~-~~ --~~-~~~X----~~~ s ic:l~-~l:t-~_<;_l:l _ _llin ts at 
nonduality and is intimately related to the visionary aspect. 
____ __::;; ____________________ ~---------··"·····-···· ·--------------------~---~-------
On that note I now turn to three crucial stages in 
Nietzsche's analysis of the good/evil relationship. 
A. The Apollinian versus the Dionysian 
Nietzsche's first book, Die Geburt der Tragodie aus dem 
Geist der Musik (The birth of tragedy out of the spirit of 
music, 1872, retitled Die Geburt der Tragodie, Oder: 
Griechentum und Pessimismus in 1886) , may be described as a 
cultural-historical analysis of Greek tragedy. Although in 
later writings Nietzsche makes significant changes to the 
terminology as well as the opinions which the book introduces, 
Die Geburt der Tragodie remains required reading for many a 
humanities student, often quite apart from Nietzsche's 
importance as a philosopher. The book as a whole can be viewed 
as a reaction to the views of Winckelmann and his heirs, ·which 
were then very much in vogue in the German-speaking lands and 
whose research had led to the establishment of Nietzsche's 
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academic field of philology. Winckelmann started many ideas 
about ancient Greek culture that by now have became our 
"default values," namely that Western civilization began with 
Greece; that Roman culture was less creative than the Greek 
culture which it adopted wholesale; and that ancient Greece 
emphasized such cultural ideals as reason, harmony, symmetry, 
and self-control. 
convincingly argues that the prevailing view gives us a 
-------------------------- ---- ---------------------- --- --------- --
distorted, one-sided picture of ancient Greece. Besides this 
set of values (which Nietzsche calls "Apolli~~~-11' " after the 
sun god who ruled the muses), there is also a darker side of 
----·- -~----~·-·--····~•·-~-~-- ·------~---· -e •• ·- - « --~ 
Greek culture characterized by -their opposites (called 
"-!?I_o_n~_s_i_a_n ~~-~a_l_~~~! __ ~-ft~- t_I:_l~ __ god of wine ar1~:t:_~e_seasonal 
cycle, whose mysteries were associated with violent, drunken 
______________ .__....,_ 
orgies) . Indeed, the Apollinian aspect of Greek culture 
Founded on madness 
-~--------------------
-·--···" -"--------------~----~ .. ·-··-
instead of reason, this alternative strain of Western 
civilization continued into the Roman and medieval periods in 
th~ __ f()_~_ ()f _§~t:~!:_~lic:_, __ <;<3E~~\,T~~--~nd the like. 
Nietzsche links Apollinian values with dreams (since 
--·--~---"·-------------·-"--.___~-----------·-~----~----- ·---------------------~--------~------
dreC3I!l_s_, like the visual arts, consist of ima<;t~S,) --or rather to 
the recognition that one is dreaming, and the sense of 
individuality (being separate from the dream) that this 
entails. Here Nietzsche's ideas are heavily indebted to the 
writings of Schopenhauer, who also discusses the role of the 
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ego-sense 1n a dreamlike universe. __ p~<:)_nyl:)_~us on the other hand 
is associated with drunkenness, which e~~..<::>"l:l::J?C1Q"eS hi_s 9_§~2~..§:eS 
to lose their inhibitions and becane psychologically sue~rged 
~--.. -,.~~--·-- ~-·---··--~-~--~-,·"--
into the group. (The opposition of these two states suggests 
~-------·- ···------·,···-~" '"•·<>~-~-·< 
another Schopenhauer parallel, i.e. with Representation and 
Will, respectively.) Ar!_~~ says Nietzsche, is inspired }:)Y one 
or both of these states. Whereas Greek statuary -~~~ 
quintessential Apollinian art form, the tragic chorus is the 
-· .... ~ ... ~--.. --.- -------~~-~--" ·--··--~------~-~~-~--
]2~(?_!o/S_ian equiv~-~~~!:~-~-~~_:-lce music is capable of submerging the 
l~§l_t_e!ler' s emotions -~-!:l_to _ _it_ in a __ ~C1X_.~-~~t __ !=.l1ev~~~~-_ar~-~ are 
not. Greek tr~g~?Y i:~-~-~!.':<:lly~ ____ bl.~n<:1_, ___ 9E_ Hegelian synthesi~! 
of Apollinian and Dionysian elements (which Nietzsche very much 
_9P21:~t19.§.2_L __ ~i:__I]-~~ it_ co~i_!"l:~l3 _ -~II1_<?_ti <:)Da 1 __ C::.C1!_har sis _wit h _ __!_?_En_ and 
however, its roots in fact lie in the Bachic chorus 
____ (__~:=~ce __ _!:1l~ ()_:Z:_~gina~_ve_::__~ion of __ ~h-~ title~ .. 
For Nietzsche, the tragic chorus is not incidental to 
Greek drama (as the classicists of his day tended to treat it) 
but its very source, as well as the key to its nature and 
~--·----___,..-, .. ----------·-'•" ,-~ 'oo< >--~__...,. • ..,..~.-,-...., • ..,.,.,,_.~'>'•P ,......._, __ .~ -~~-~-~- •• •. -~-··· ·~''"<"'"~ 
development. -~--. . ........._._ __________ _ The effect of Nietzsche's view is to downplay the 
achievements of individual dramas and dramatis~s, or such 
details as plot or characterization, in favor of an approach 
which centers on Greek drama as a collective social phenomenon. 
Nietzsche suggests a history of the tragic chorus originating 
with Archilochus, who is chiefly remembered for his frequently 
vulgar dithyrambs satirizing Spartan militaristic virtues, and 
whose poetry Nietzsche believes to have evolved into folk-songs 
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which were later incorporated into the Dionysian rites. Such 
than listeners--and encourage celebrants to 
emotions into those of the group. Similarly, members of the 
tragic chorus temporarily set their identities as individuals. 
Greek drama arose when Dionysian celebrants began to wear masks 
and take on separate roles, corresponding to the tearing of 
Dionysius into pieces, the pain of which expresses itself as 
the suffering of the hero. The audience's catharsis at the 
death of the hero, and the reabsorbing of his identity into the 
collectivity of the chorus, corresponds to the resurrection of 
Dionysius. 
Nietzsche blames the death of Greek tragedy on the 
influence of Euripides, whose dramas are known for their 
realistic, non-mythological themes (with one significant 
exception, The Bachae), and for their emphasis on the concerns 
of ordinary humans, as opposed to matters exclusively of 
interest to gods or royalty. One of his changes was to 
downgrade the chorus from an actual participant' in the play 
into a mere interlude. Where another critic might regard such 
innovations as refreshingly original, Nietzsche faults 
Euripides for his shameless appeal to the masses (shameless 
because he flatters them by pretending that they are no less 
worthy dramatic subjects than gods or kings), and for replacing 
the sense of mystery which characterizes earlier plays with the 
brash insistence that the universe can be fathomed. The latter 
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charge leads Nietzsche to speculate that Euripides made these 
changes at the urging of Socrates. As for The Bachae, in which 
Dionysius exacts a gruesome revenge on a law-and-order king who 
has impiously banned his rites, Nietzsche sees this anomalous 
work as penance of the part of the elderly Euripides for having 
"killed" Dionysius through his dramatic career. 
Written while Nietzsche was just beginning his 
professorial career at Basel, Die Geburt der Tragodie conforms 
only partially to the prevailing academic custom. On one hand 
philologists were expected to write about things like Greek 
drama; on the other hand they were also expected to use 
footnotes, and specific linguistic issues were favored over 
sweeping psycho-historical conjecture. Modern readers are 
likely to agree with Nietzsche's mature analysis of it in his 
"Versuch einer Selbstkritik" ("Attempt at a Self-Criticism", 
1886) , in which he admits that it is too full of insufficiently 
supported opinions to pass scholarly muster, but still finds 
many of its ideas to be worthwhile. At the time of 
------· -·---·-----·-·-----_c___-
publication, the most noticeable thing about 1?~.~---GeJ::.LJ:F:t _ _Q_er 
-··•-·•-• •' "''~-~--~··-~"-,~••¥»~->,..._, ___ ,,... ~~""-"-''-v--~'~·~--··-••- -~"· •• 
~£§g6die was its enthusiastic identification of Wagner--who ~n 
----. . --. -~---- "". ---~---"'----------~ ·~~-- ·-·. ----~·------,.,...y·----~-"-""~-------
ht~ C>PeE~.§ __ tries to combine all known art forms into a single 
medium--with the modern rebirth of Greek tragedy in all_its 
I?E~:=_~ur~pidean spendor. 
Nietzsche of course was to eventually revise his opinion 
"------· ··--··-----.-·--·~--·>•• .. ---· -~---
of Wagner. A number of reasons for this have been suggested, 
among them Wagner's glorification of Christianity in Parsifal, 
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his identification with pan-German nationalism and anti-
Semitism, his shameless appeal to bourgeois tastes, and 
Nietzsche's presumed discomfort with being seen merely as a 
Wagnerian disciple. I see them as more closely related than is 
generally recognized. After all, the same people tended to 
support pan-German nationalism and anti-Semitism. 
Identification with Christianity was often a part of this same 
brew, however much modern Christians may repudiate the 
prejudices of their forebears; and many representatives of the 
state churches were actively involved in anti-Semitic 
agitation. Wagner appealed to an upscale element of this 
culture, and it is easy to imagine Nietzsche's unease with his 
involvement in it. For a revealing historical moment in their 
break, I would point to Nietzsche's attempt to introduce his 
Jewish friend Paul Ree to Wagner, who refused to meet him 
(Santaniello 1994: 161 n. 57). Nietzsche never went back. On 
the contrary, he spent the rest of his life writing against 
anti-Semitism, Aryan racial theories, pan-German nationalism, 
Christianity, and Wagner. At the same time, his language and 
thought-processes were forever molded by his Wagnerian 
heritage, much as Catholicism frequently remains a living 
influence on former Catholics. Nietzsche's distinction between 
_!::_!:le~~~P~~~-~Ei~r1. __ C:r13~ Dioi¥sian aspects likewise evolv~?, ~2_J_hat 
rather than aiming at a balance between them, Nietzsche came to 
. ~-~--~-~0-"""~---~-.......___._~~ 
regel!_9:~-~~h~ ___ l2_iC:J:1YSiC3:~.-~:=' being. gC:<:?.~ 2:.~-~.t:~.~~.f...:.. ___ Dionysius comes 
to stand for all life-affirming values, as opposed to the life-
-------~~~""---'--~-·_,,_,___, __ ,~-·---,"~~---~-~--~ "_,._.,-.-··· ···-···--~---"~~'"---~'"~--~---~"'*'->-·~··-·---
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In the concluding sentence of 
Ecce Homo Nietzsche demands, "--Hat man mich verstanden?--
Dionysos gegen den Gekreuzigten ... " ("Have I been understood? -
- Dionysius versus the Crucified .... "). 20 Whereas Apollo and 
Dionysius are not only compatible but compliment each other 
___ .,,, .. __ "-- .,, •<·~···- ·---~~--·-----~~--------~--·~-~---~-·--~-- ----~---~-~---------~-~--_......,~-~~-""·""'-~--~ 
the Crucified 
are fundamentally opposed. 
---"""''~'"'-·"""""'"'"'~ ._, .•. ,,.>=·······"'""''"""·'-·"'•"• 
J~I?:9.~S:l1~r-?-cteristi~ally finds in_ .. EL~-!:!.l!Yt der_ .!~_c:_godie 
a description of his own theories of the relationship between 
th.:=_.2:5:~:;;_cious and unconscious minds, and Nietzsche ~-~ .. 2:-~.~~~EJ:C~s 
t~~_El~rq~~~---~-~I'lto collectivit:y fit well with ... ~.1!~9~ s 
conception of the collective unconscious. In his Zarathustra 
seminar Jung likens this experience to the 
Nietzsche/Zarathustra relationship: 
Of course such a feeling [of absorption into an 
archetype] is most uplifting to an individual; no wonder 
then that Zarathustra was the Dionysian experience par 
excellence. In the latter part, that Dionysian ekstasis 
comes in. Zarathustra really led him up to a full 
realization of the mysteries of the cult of Dionysos: he 
had already ideas about it, but Zarathustra was the 
experience which made the whole thing real. [ZS: 10] 
Jung is surely right in discovering some of Nietzsche's later 
ideas prefigured in Die Geburt der Tragodie. In section five 
of "Versuch einer Selbstkritik" Nietzsche links Dionysius with 
20 To add to the confusion, during his madness Nietzsche 
would sometimes sign his letters as "Dionysius," sometimes--in 
a rather striking enantiodromia--as "the Crucified" (Kaufmann 
1956: 67; cf. Die Wille zur Macht 1052). 
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:p_~§_§.~!tlJ_§I!l._,_g:oin<;rJ:?.~Z_<?~d go99 §l:E:.~ evil~- and the Antichrist and 
he concludes that work with an anthem taken from Part f_Q}:l_f_ of 
Zarathustra. To what extent these are based on psychological 
experiences (and if so, of what kind), is more difficult to 
evaluate, but as we shall see there is much to be said in 
Jung' s favor. 
_.Tt~n.SL_also devotes a chapter of P_~ychologische 7)rp~--~to 
Nietzsche (Chapter Three, "Das Apollinische und das 
,..-----.-·---·---------
Dionysische"), focusing on Die Geburt der Trag6die. In it, he 
~--"'"~---·---.---------·- -- --·---~·--
faults Nietzsche for failing to appreciate the religious (as 
opposed to merely hedonistic) character of the orgiastic 
Dionysian rites. Niet:~~_<:~e, __ ~ay~-~~l1g~2~~ror:~!.? ___ ~E~C:~ _ _!_!;e 
Apollinian/Dionysian distinction as primarily an issue in 
former asks why the ugly is sometimes beautiful. The latter 
demands to know how we can call God good, when the concept of 
good is inseparable from that of evil. In Die Geburt der 
Trag6die, Nietzsche has not quite yet became conscious of the 
religious dimension of the Dionysian attitude. By Zarathustra, 
however, his unconscious (which, being compensatory, is well 
aware of the religious dimension) has taken over the writing 
process, and so the work takes on its bombastic, revelatory 
flavor. _ '!'h~_§ __ c~c:tpter marks a crucial point in Pf:!:z~rlOlogisc_he 
~ffi,__ since ____ ~t is_:t-,J_~-~t:zsche who inspires Jung to_ expand his 
typology of functions from a simple duality (thinking and 
-~-~-- ----~---- ~----- ------""-----~---·-
fe~:l.:i-Jlg_) to a qu~_!:::_rnity (including sensation and int:~~!J:gn). 
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The former are "rational" func;ti()D_S 1 __ mea:rl:hng t:J:lat __ t:J1~Y :i,]Jlply 
The latter, "irrational" (or "aesthetic") 
functions, are passive and receptive. Since Nietzsche's 
writing was accomplished not on his own initiative, but under 
the direction of the unconscious, he belongs under the 
"irrational" category. It is certainly noteworthy that in spite 
of his stated opposition to religion, Nietzsche remains 
fascinated with the subject and goes out of his way to employ 
religious symbolism--often in a satirical manner, as in 
Zarathustra; sometimes not, as in Die Geburt der Tragodie. 
B. Master morality versus slave morality 
In his two ethical books Nietzsche introduc~s h:hl3~ __ fcgnotl.J3 
contrast between master 
mainly in parts five and nine of Jenseits 'Y_C!_I]_g_':}_!_ __ _E!l!L . .J22Ee 
(Beyond Good and Evi 1, 1886) and the first ess~y__ Jrom Zur 
Geneolof!ie.. der Moral (On the Genealogy of Morals (1887). Many 
commentators prefer the latter work because it is a more 
sustained ar1d detailed treatment of the topic of ethics. I 
pr~fer the former because it places Nietzsche's denial 
According to the usual understanding, Nietzsche urges a 
reversal of what he calls Christianity's "transvaluation of all 
values" ( Umwertung aller Werte) in which "base" values, such as 
weakness and humility, came to be preferred over "noble" ones, 
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such as strength and pride. Contrasting the concept of good-
as-opposed-to-evil with that of good-as-opposed-to-bad, he 
called "evil" is often 
admiration what is call~~"-"5~:oc:d" is often bad (in the 
"Master morality" and "slave 
morality" are another set of phrases that Nietzsche uses to 
distinguish between these two attitudes: 
Es gibt Herren-Moral und Sklaven-Moral [ ... ] Im ersten 
Fall, wenn die Herrschenden es sind, die den Begriff 
»gut« bestimmen, sind es die erhobenen stolzen Zustande 
der Seele, welche als das Auszeichnende und die 
Rangordnung Bestimmen empfunden werden. Der vornehme 
Mensch trennt die Wesen von sich ab, an denen das 
Gegenteil solcher gehobener stolzer Zustande zum Ausdruck 
kommt: er verachtet sie. Man bemerke so fort, daJS in 
dieser ersten Art Moral der Gegensatz »gut« und 
»schlecht« so viel bedeutet wie »vornehm« und 
»verachtlich«--der Gegensatz »gut« und »bose« ist anderer 
Herk:unft. 
[ ... ] --Es steht anders mit dem zweiten Typus der 
Moral, der Sklaven-Moral. Gesetzt, daJS die 
Vergewaltigten, Gedrlickten, Leidenden, Unfreien, ihrer 
selbst ungewissen und muden moralizieren: was wird das 
Gleichartige ihrer moralischen Wertschatzungen sein? 
Wahrscheinlich wird ein pessimisticher Argwohn gegen die 
ganze Lage zum Ausdruck kommen, vielleicht eine 
Verurteilung des Menschen mitsamt seiner Lage [ ... ] Hier 
ist der Herd fur die Entstehung j enes berUhmten 
Gegensatzes »gut« und »bose«--ins Bose wird die Macht und 
Gefahrlichkeit hineinempfunden, eine gewisse 
Furchtbarkeit, Feinheit und Starke, welche die Verachtung 
nicht aufkommen laJSt. Nach der Sklaven-Moral erregt also 
der »Bose« Furcht; nach der Herren-Moral ist est gerade 
der »Gute«, der Furcht erregt und erregen will, wahrend 
der »schlechte« Mensch als der verachtliche empfunden 
wird. [JGB, sec. 260] 
[There are master morality and slave morality ( ... ) In 
the first case, when the ruling group determines what is 
"good," the exalted, proud states of the soul are 
experienced as conferring distinction and determining the 
order of rank. The noble human being separates himself 
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from those in whom the opposite of such exalted, proud 
states finds expression: he despises them. __ :r:t_._§_}J._ould __ be 
noted immediately that in this first type of morality the 
OJ2PO~~EI2n""·or·-~.:9-:<?cX1~'·. and•---~:§9:--means···a.pproxima'tery···the 
s C?-_!Il§ _____ 9:§ "!12Pl:~ " ___ .Ci!lSL__:_c:; or1tempt ibl e . " ____ t'!'.l}§ __ ,_QJ2P<21:lit~---Q f 
"good" and "evil" has a different origin.) {. .. ) -~iF is · differeiiF-·~wi th ___ ilie second type of 
morality, slave morality. Suppose the violated, 
oppressed, suffering, unfree, who are uncertain of 
themselves and weary, moralize: what will their moral 
valuations have in common? Probably, a pessimistic 
suspicion about the whole condition of man will find 
expression, perhaps a condemnation of man along with his 
condition. ( ... ) Here is the place for that famous 
opposition of "good" and "evil": into evil one's feelings 
project power and dangerousness 1 ·a.--certain'-ierr:n;-leness": 
subtlety,' and streng-th "'Ehaf doe's no'E''-permit contempt ·~to 
develop. According to slave morality I those who ·a.re ... evil 
thus~-Insp1re ·-·fe<iri according t:.o master moraiit:Y-·It is 
=.2reciseli-those-who are ''gocx:l'' thaf inspire, and wish to 
~ Inspire, ·- lear, --·-while the "bad" are felt to be 
contemptible.] 
As in Die Geburt der Trag6die, Nietzsche praises certain 
characteristics which are often thought to be blameworthy 
(particularly according to Christian tradition) and vice versa. 
However, in his two ethical books different sets of 
characteristics are given and a different mode of 
justification/condemnation is proposed for them. In Zur 
G_e[.l_eQl()gic; der M_~r:c.t~. we ___ ~ind a -~~-~E<:!_ __ ~~Er.!l!_ _____ _!i~~-~ep:M_~~al or 
~-·h~rd_!fiorality," which may or may not_ be id~ntical w~~? ... ~sl~~~--
I_£ __ ~1::. is considered as Ci __ ~_l:l~_:r:-d k_i.f!-_<::! __ C?.f . morali_ty:.l 
ro~g:~.!¥ ___ ):':1~~-~~:Y .... .!J~.t~een slave ~c:r~~--~!-X ... and ma.ster morality, 
then it would represent a level where people are satisfied with 
---· '-·- ·- - ----~--~ ---~--'·--~ -'~~~-·-----... ·-- . "" ,._ --~----~ 
the status quo but do not enjoy the individual fulfillment that 
- ·-··~··-·--~-·----~~~--·"-'"""-· 
the masters do. As we shall see in the next chapter, 
Zoroastrian lore turns out to be highly relevant to the 
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interpretation of these three forms of morality. 
Based on certain etymological and historical 
speculations, Nietzsche concludes that there was a time in 
which master morality prevailed. In chapter 32 of Jenseits von 
Gut und Bose Nietzsche explains that prehistoric humans judged 
actions according to their consequences (for themselves, one 
assumes), but that later generations took to superstitiously 
judging actions according to their origin. ..!.!:1 . . Z'!lr Geneolo_f[ie 
der Moral (I, 5) Nietzsche seems to be thinking of archaic 
__ "'_ .. __ ·---~-~-'"-·~~·--~ ·~-·-·~ ---·-~ .. ~ .. ~·- . -~-- ·-~ 
Europ~ __ !?_~-~-~::r:e the great Volkerwanderung, a time which he says 
was characterized by aristocratic warrior ideals. Alas, the 
moral assumptions of modern societies (at least in the West) no 
longer encourage such nobility. Instead of an ethic suited to 
the strong, we have somehow adopted one which serves the 
interests of the weak. 
Who benefits from a culture which values humility? The 
weak, says Nietzsche--those lacking in pride, who have little 
to be proud of. Who benefits from the widespread 
acknowledgement of a moral rule against adultery? Mediocre 
lovers, who might otherwise be cheated upon. The chief of all 
sins against nobility is that of spArituality, which appeases 
them here on those who hC:~~----_r:ot_~:r?:~-- ~<:)_~ng for 
conseque~tly_··-~~~?g for somewhere else. 
earth and 
toward the world Nietzsche gives the term ressentiment.) Those 
···<-----·---~--~"• ,,___ --
who a_!:_e_~~!?le, by contrast, are satisfied with their lives 
embrace this world. 
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~~-!: __ ~_<?.:Ul9 ___ h~~:=:_e.~ought about our _f~~!_ X~£J:[l __ §lU.C::h __ ~<~}?le 
ideal~--~_2) the_p:::~-~~nt climate of slave morality, as reflected 
in Christianity and modern philosophy? Nietzsche's perplexing 
~-sw~! , __ !:~::~.~<:;ul<:~.~~-i_n ~~g~!.~L .. ~is of!:_-_~?.CR~~~~ed di~gu~_t_21i th 
anti-s.~~~!:"i:~!!:L .. ~~-thc:t_t the Jews were responsible: 
Die Juden--ein Volk, »geboren zur Sklaverei«, wie Tacitus 
und die ganze antike Welt sagt, »das auserwahlte Volk 
unter den Volkern«, wie sie selbst sagen und glauben--die 
Juden haben jenes Wunderstuck von Umkehrung der Werte 
zustande gebracht, dank welchem das Leben auf der Erde 
fur ein paar Jahrtausende einen neuen und Gefahrlichen 
Reiz erhalten hat--ihre Propheten haben »reich«, 
»gottlos«, »bose«, »gewalttatig«, »sinnlich« in eins 
geschmolzen und zum ersten Male das Wort »Welt« zum 
Schandwort gemllnzt. In dieser Umkehrung der Werte ( zu 
der es gehort, das Wort fur »A~< als Synonym mit 
»Heilig« und »Freund« zu brauchen) liegt die Bedeutung 
des judischen Volks: mit ihm beginnt der Sklaven-Aufstand 
in derMoral. [JGB, 195] 
[The Jews--a people "born for slavery, " as Tacitus and 
the whole ancient world say; "the chosen people among the 
peoples," as they themselves say and believe--the Jews 
have brought off that miraculous feat of an inversion of 
values, thanks to which life on earth has acquired a 
novel and dangerous attraction for a couple of millennia: 
their prophets have fused "rich", "godless", "evil", 
"violent", and "sensual" into one and were the first to 
use the word "world" as an opprobrium. This inversion of 
values (which includes using the word "poor" as 
synonymous with "holy" and "friend") constitutes the 
significance of the Jewish people: they mark the 
beginning of the slave rebellion in morals.] 
The same account is repeated in more detail in Zur Geneologie 
der Moral (I, 7). The setting, we gather, is Palestine of the 
Second Temple period. Jewish morality was a slave ____ E~~_<::;E~lity_!..._ 
nearly so. While it would have been impractical for them to 
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adopt master morality or to prevail over their occupiers 
through force (there were a number of attempts), subversion 
succeeded where revolution failed. What Nietzsche's theory 
boils down to is that the Jews started a new religion, 
Christianity, with the idea of converting the Romans and 
the_E~Qy_ P~!'_l§:'J:a<:l~ngt}lem to abandon master morality in favor of 
__ s_l~ave morali~x.~~ This slave morality finds expression in the 
exhortations of Jesus (at least as he is recorded in the 
' ,-...-....-~--,.--,~--"~ . 
canonical 9ospels) to love one's enemies and turn the other 
cheek ( GM I , 8 ) . It is unclear whether there may yet remain 
(outside of Christendom, of course) other cultures whose 
nobility has been spared, or whether similar upheavals may have 
occurred outside of Christianity. 
The most plausible and coherent explanation I have come 
across is from Santaniello (1994: 23, 108), who contrasts the 
prevailing anti-Semitic Christianity as cha:rrpioned by Wagner, 
with Nietzsche's brand of anti-anti-Semitic anti-Christianity. 
In attempting to reconcile Nietzsche's various statements on 
Jews and Judaism, she argues, the distinction needs to be made 
between Nietzsche's attitudes toward (a) the ancient 
Israelites, (b) the prophetic and priestly strains of Judaism 
whose special characteristics Nietzsche and his contemporaries 
associated with Christianity, and (c) modern Jews. The 
Wagnerians disliked (a), liked (b), and disliked (c). 
Nietzsche therefore reverses their preferences, praising (a), 
heaping condemnation upon (b), and praising (c). Thus, his 
88 
treatment of Second Temple Judaism does not reflect any 
wavering on Nietzsche's part with respect to anti-Semitism, but 
represents a calculated rhetorical attack on what he saw as 
anti-Semitism's Christian base. In order to vilify his 
Christia~-~ontemporaries, Nietzsche could either condemn Jesus 
along with Christianity, or praise Jesus but deny the 
~/-~---... ~-""""-"-·~----"·'"~-~--~·-·-··--·~···---·--~- .. 
connection bet~een Jesus and modern Christianity (or between 
Jesus and the prophetic 
----~--- ~-~- -~~ - ~------- ----~--~-~-~-- • ~~"""~- ----K·-~ 
and priestly Judaism 
---------- ----
which his 
Christian enemies admired) . Here Nietzsche adopts the former 
.---------·-···"" "'"" ~ . ·~· 
strategy, while Der Antichrist--where Jesus is praised for 
almost exactly the same behavior for which he is damned in Zur 
Genealogie der Moral--incorporates the latter strategy. If 
------------- ----~- " .. ·--·-"·····---~-
Santaniello is wrong, perhaps Nietzsche's remarks about Second 
Temple Judaism genuinely contradict other passages which 
condemn anti-Semitism. Perhaps Nietzsche intended to attack 
both Jews and anti-Semites. Perhaps his attitude toward Jews 
and Judaism was something of a love/hate relationship, which 
led him to waver between praise and condemnation in his 
writings. Perhaps, as Jaspers suggests, Nietzsche's peculiar 
methodology led him to intentionally embrace two contradictory 
opinions at once. 
Whatever his motivation 
v:i:_§_~~l]--~.b:~st.ory h~~ not met with widesr:lJ::_~~sl acs:~J21:_9-ll.G.§L .. to 
put it mildly. Without considering the etymological issues, or 
the rank absurdity of his notion that ancient Jews created the 
Christian religion as a kind of plot to brainwash the Romans, 
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his account in the ethical books is still incoherent. A basic 
;erob!~:rn is_ ~!?:at ___ N~~t~_§>~!?:~ sees _<::_~:t:'-~.§.:t::.:h.2l:£1.~-~¥ on one haD:?. a_~ _an 
extension of Judaism, and on the other as an attempt by Jews to 
subvert the character of ·palestine's Roman occupiers. 
That is, 
to the extent that we identify "Christianity" with the 
teachings of Jesus, its Jewish character becomes evident; 
however, during this period there seems to have been little 
interest 1n converting the gentiles. But if we identify 
"Christianity" with the Hellenized creedal religion which later 
spread across the Mediterranean basin, then the Christianity of 
Constantine arguably owes more to Greco-Roman ideologies and 
cultic practices than to Judaism. 
Nietzsche apparentl:y beli~ves, along with Edward Gibb::m, 
th~!_ t:_~~-C:_?option of "Christianity" had a paci~:yJnsr"'..§.ttect 
(w!:ich Niet~sc;he loathes) on the Roman ~rnpire and later on its 
barbarian invaders. In fact, the systematic application of 
'""''"-·--~-·->'- . -- ---~>•<>• , ____ • . • -· ·-···- . ----·~- ·-·-"· --- ·- --·-· ---
:t::r-i_~C:it:>~es from the Sermon on -~h~----~<?~~~- -~~§- ~~ver a central 
element in Chris~~~Y (as comparable practices have been in 
Buddhism) , with the exception of certain fringe movements such 
as the Quakers . Certainly, as is often observed, Christian 
-~-· -~· ..... ---·---···--·----··----.....·-~·~-~·-···-
And even if Christianity has had this effect, 
Kathleen Higgens (at a 1993 lecture in Lubrock, Texas) has 
wondered whether it is really true that there is too much peace 
and compassion in the world. Given that Nietzsche's account of 
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hi.Qto;ry must hay~ struc::k even its author as obviously a,nd 
ir:_redeemably ridiculous, I am inclined to r~gard it as a 
rh~torical strategy directed at his Christian opponents rather 
than an attempt to set forth a new vision of histofY.~J.£!" its 
own sake. 
A more vexing philosophical problem raised by Nietzsche Is 
ethical system is the tension between the set of values that 
Nietzsche suggests, and the set of values which I might 
otherwise be inclined to adopt. For example, suppose I wanted 
to became a monk and practice humility, celibacy, harmlessness, 
renunCiation of the world, and other values which Nietzsche 
would presumably classify under "slave morality." For me to 
deny my own ideals and follow Nietzsche 1 s wol1!<:1 ___ ~ake a m()Ekery 
~f the __ :l:'~~irement that I also b~ strong--willeg_(_Q"GB, 257). If 
my own hypothetical dilemma is irresolvable, this may simply 
mean that some people have no hope of ever becoming noble, a 
notion which Nietzsche would likely support. Perhaps strength 
of will is a necessary, but not sufficient, qualification-- I 
would still have to want the right things. Another, more 
----~--···---~--·-··-··--' 
illt::Et9".'::lill9.._P_<?_~ s~}:::>J_l ~-~j' __ _i~ ____ :t:tt_~t:: _ _!:h~ __ _?~§_ ___ a t:! i~'::lsies can be 
c:_l9:§§i.!i.<?sl_§ tth~r ____ QQQ§.E ___ -~~~~y~ __ mo~~Jit::X ____ or master morality, 
depending ()n the motivati~~- For example, both Jesus and his 
early followers taught that we should love our enemies, but 
Jesus may have been genuinely grateful to them for giving him 
the opportunity to became stronger, whereas his followers seem 
to have embraced forgiveness as a sublimated form of revenge. 
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If this interpretation is correct, then it might be possible to 
be both noble and a monk after all, provided that a suitable 
motivation could be found for such attitudes as humility and so 
on. 
Another philosophical problem is related to a question 
which Socrates raises in the course of his debate with 
Trasymachus, when he asks whether the rulers can ever make 
mistakes: Insofar as the masses--which Nietzsche despises--are 
strong (since they have managed to impose their own values onto 
society), are they noble? Again, strength is likely to be a 
necessary but not sufficient condition for nobility. And true 
nobility, despite its quality of strength, is actually quite 
fragile in that it is rare and difficult to nurture in these 
degenerate times. Another answer is that while Nietzsche 
clearly disdains slave morality, this does not mean that he 
thereupon embraces master morality. 
All this leads to a more interpretative problem, namely 
t_9:~~~!-~I:-ether Nietzsche truly belieyes in his anti-e.t:,h:i,<;:L~~Qr 
is m~:r~),YJ?ropoun<:t~I19 ~t in order to :po~nt out the flaws ___ of 
moE_~ __ _s:_2_I1~~_l:!!=:ional ethical theories, which ___ ~~-J?Eeferri~g---~~~-t~in 
values over others fail to recognize how their opposites might 
/,.....-~~----·-~-.. -~~--·-· ----~----~-·---~~------· ·-···- ---~···-·····~·--·-". ·- ----~ 
also be admirable. Based on the context in which his concepts 
-·-·~-~~-""'~-- ~-·--·----~----·~--. ••• -~-•• -~~---~ "~·---- ----·-. ' ·--------~---·"- < -· -~----·-~ -· ----------·-~----·------------------·~-----
of master morality, slave morality, and so on are introduced in 
--"---------......... ____________________ . ~~-- '" __  
;[§nse._JJ;_E3 von Gut und Bose, I see them as · an ethical 
:L1J::_1J§!:_£9et:.!.Qn of Nietzsche's wider reje<;tion . _ of t:r11.tJL in 
Although the above, naive reading has been 
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influential as a basis for further exploration into Nietzsche's 
writings, there is arguably much more to Nietzsche's views on 
transcending good and evil than crank historical theories 
pressed into the service of an alternative set of macho ethical 
values. Indeed, Nietzsche commentators ranging from Heidegger 
to Derrida have proposed deeper readings; unfortunately there 
is little agreement among them and the deeper the reading, the 
more controversial it becomes. 
Jung, one in a long line of such interpreters, describes 
the task of transcending good and evil as an aspect of a wider 
nonduality: 
You see, when you try to create the idea of a universal 
~-oeih I you must bring'"Ehe Two""lfiin 8"""inEo"' one I and "th.at -~--!9"·---·-······· ·······-···------------- " "" " " """""""" ____ g ""'""'''' .. << """ -------
.YQ.ld ___ £<~:D:D£?J:: ... ci<? _1,!!1J_§§_§ j~':OU C§l:Q_(jg it .Jn )'()lJTS~~J. You 
cannot conceive of goodness if there is not goodness in 
yourself. You cannot conceive of beauty if there is not 
beauty in yourself. You must have the experience of 
beauty. And to conceive of a being that is both good and 
evil, day and night_, __ yg_l! __ §h<?':l:~c:i ___ _b_~~~---t::.J::le exrerience __ of 
t!::J:e t~ _beings in ym1rself. ~]:1;~ __ b_Q~ __ ga_I1 ___ j::~ou arriv_g__ at 
such an ·experrence? Ol1ly-oy passing through a time when 
you --no .. Ionger-pro_]_e.ct gooci or evil,- ·w.fi-en- you no ··ranger 
- be]Jey¥~~tfi_~f _ _:!:_li_~-~-~o·oc:Cl;:; __ som~R~~r:~:.J?:§ysmci" the gaiac"t:Ic 
system and the ev1l somewhere in the center of the_ earth, 
Inthe eternar··rrre·--c;f heTL-i:iU:t:-·t:h:e~goo<:fis here-·a.:n<:c t::he 
_ __:::e,.:.v_il is here·:---In-fhat-~-wa.y:·:· you _intro-j ed:-ffie""qu-afftie"s 
you have ___ lent ··Ec;··-E:he gods:· · · ·N'aturaiiy:-····'by:"-:Lntro'Jec'i:.i-rig 
/ them you-pass-·fhrougE·a·-~time of inflation in which you 
are much too important. _:§~!___you are important just in 
the fact_ .... .th~_t_ ___ Y9_1l __ .?-I~. th~ ___ l aQQf§.j::qry..~_ ... Q:r ____ .§.YS'!IL .• J:.h5? 
_9h~~cal vessel, in which the solution is to be made, in 
.. Whi£.1)---=t}le .. two.suhsfances shoufcf.meet:. If you have--had 
that experience of "being' bo"f.E"'-'i]1e one and the other I 
neither one nor the other, you understand what the 
Indians mean by neti neti, which means literally "not 
this nor that, " as an expression of supreme wisdom, 
supreme truth. You learn to detach from the qualities, 
being this or that, being white and black. The one who 
knows that he has these two sides is no longer white and 
no longer black. You cannot get them together in some 
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absent way. You can only do it in your own life, in your 
own self. There the two cosmic "priric.i.ples come to~gether I 
unspeakable and·~--Tne:xplicable~neness--of- darkness- aqd 
light,~ goodness and badness, you get at last the idea of 
a-heTng wnTcn··-Ts neiEnei-one--n6r-the-~6Eher .·:·.arid that· is 
/' exactly -wfiat--Nletzsche-·meaiis In his--Idea of- a superior f 
-be-ing-- beyond __ good and eviL . It is a very great 
-p-sychologica1 ·intuition. [ZS: 1368-69] 
Here Jung treats Nietzsche's distinction between good and 
evil as equivalent to other pairs of opposites, all of which 
are to be transcended. Oddly enough, Jenseits von Gut und Bose 
contains some justification for this: 
Der Grundglaube der Metaphysiker ist der Glaube an die 
Gegensatze der Werte. Es ist auch den Vorsichtigsten 
unter ihn nicht eingefallen, hier an der Schwelle bereits 
zu zweifeln, wo es doch am notigsten war: selbst wenn sie 
sich gelobt hatten »de omnibus dubitandum«. Man darf 
namlich zweifeln, erstens, ob es Gegensatze uberhaupt 
gibt, und zweitens, ob jene volkstumlichen 
Wertschatzungen und Wert-Gegensatze, auf welche die 
Metaphysiker ihr Siegel gedruckt haben, nicht vielleicht 
nur Vordergrunds-Schatzungen sind, nur vorlaufige 
Perspektiven, vielleicht noch dazu aus einem Winkel 
heraus, vielleicht von unten hinauf, Frosch-Perspektiven 
gleichsam, urn einem Ausdruck zu borgen, der den Malern 
gelaufig ist? Bei allem Werte, der dem Wahren, dem 
Wahrhaftigen, dem Selbstlosen zukommen mag: es ware 
moglich, daJS dem Scheine, dem Willen zur Tauschung, dem 
Eigennutz und der Begierde ein fur alles Leben hoherer 
und grundsatzlicherer Wert zugeschreiben werden muJSte. 
Es ware sogar noch moglich, dass was den Wert jener guten 
und verehrten Dinge ausrnacht, gerade dar in bestunde, mit 
jenen schlimmen, scheinbar entgegengesetzen Dingen auf 
verfangliche Weise verwandt, verknupft, verhakelt, 
vielleicht gar wesensgleich zu sein. Vielleicht! --Aber 
wer ist willens, sich urn solche gefahrliche Vielleichts 
zu kUmmern! Man muJS dazu schon die Ankunft einer neuen 
Gattung von Philosophen abwarten, soldher, die 
irgendwelchen andern, umgekehrten Geschmack und Hang 
haben als die bisherigen--Philosophen des gefahrlichen 
Vielleicht in jedem Verstande. --Und allen Erstes 
gesprochen: ich sehe solche neue Philosophen 
heraufkommen. [JGB, sec. 2] 
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[The fundamental faith of the metaphysicians is the 
faith ln~ opposite values. It has not even occurred to 
the most caui1ous -a:rnongthem that one might have a doubt 
right here at the threshhold where it was surely most 
necessary--even if they vowed to themselves, "de omnibus 
dubitandum." 
_for~~-gne may doubt, first, whether there are any 
oppos~!=:~~s -~at all, and secondly whether these popular __ 
valuations -a:n.d.- ~---opposite ---vaTues on which the 
meEa:Ph:Ysic1ans i3uf their ·seaL- iiie not perhaps merely 
fOreground estiiri<ites, only provisional · perspectives~ 
perhaps-even Tro:m~·some ·-n:ooJ<-; -·perhaps :from below, fr-og 
perspectives, as it were, to borrow an expression 
painters use. For all the value that the true, the 
truthful, the selfless may deserve, it would still be 
possible that a higher and more fundamental value for 
life might have to be ascribed to deception, selfishness, 
and lust. It might even be possible that what 
.. C_QI1~tit.1dt.EJ?..th~ ·_value. of these good.and J.c:tVOred ~t:..hJ:!}g-§-=j~s­
precisely that they are insidiously related, tied to, and 
involved.~ with these wicked, seemingly opposite things--
ma:y:rse··eveii .. one·-·wi th them in essence. Maybe! .... ·-·· 
But who has the will to concern-himself with such 
dangerous maybes? For that, one really has to wait for 
the advent of a new species of philosophers, such as have 
somehow another and converse taste and propensity from 
those we have known so far--philosophers of the dangerous 
"maybe" in every sense. 
And in all seriousness, I see such new philosophers 
coming up.] 
l)?oth§~ .... tJ::gtJ:l ~-~.l!l:~!:~J:l~L.}tself to the simple advocacy of master 
morality over .. slave morality~... the above passage raises the 
QO.S.s.i12iJit;:.y that Niet.~sche does not really believe in master 
m()rq_:Lity either, but onl¥ introduces it in order to critique 
He links "the faith in opposite values" with 
unnamed (but presumably scorned) "metaphysicians", raises the 
question of "whether there are any opposites at all" from a 
higher perspective, and links this insight to a future breed of 
philosophers. In fact the passage makes a number of distinct 
points, not all of which belong in the same logical argument. 
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Some of these are presented in sets of alternatives to choose 
between, while others might be true simultaneously. One 
possibility is that conventional views about ethics come from a 
lower perspective than the counter-intuitive views 
corresponding to master morality. (However, this need not 
imply that master morality is the ultimate truth about ethics; 
there may be even higher kinds of morality than master 
morality.) Another is that conventional views about ethics 
come from a lower perspective than the nonduality of good and 
evil, the nature of their intimate relationship having been 
established earlier in the passage pointing out that one can 
originate out of the other. A third is that conventional views 
about ethics come from a lower perspective than the nonduality 
of good and evil, in the sense that good and evil are identical 
in essence but diverge in terms of attributes. A fourth is 
that conventional views about ethics come from a lower 
perspective than views which do not assume that there is such a 
thing as truth, but allow for epistemological and moral 
ambiguity. 
~!!:_?9"_~-t:_~~:r:'t the cumulative er~~!:_ __ <?_~_these various ____ points 
is ___ ~_9_E_r1~----t::_~~---SI.l1estion of going beyond good and evil in 
part:_~<;~-~~E_! ___ with that of 
If this is accurate, then it would 
"'"·--··----~·· -~-"""~-·-'<'- - - ' - --~- .,,_ ~--
be a mistake to see Nietzsche's critique of ethics solely as a 
critique ()~ ethics, since relatively few ~-~:':--~.~~---~:PPI?..E;it~_§ _ _hsve 
~~L_Eelevance _to ethics. Instead, ---~§:"'.must consider whether 
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Nietzsche's critique of ethics invokes some nondualistic theory 
_/ 
of metaphysics, psychology, or hermeneutics. Nietzsche himself 
---"- "- -~·-~-·~~----------------··--·-··---~"··- ·------~--.-~ 
suggests two possible ways in which the "frog' s-eye view" of 
more conventional ethical theories may be transcended. One is 
to ask whether the opposite values (evil rather than good) may 
be higher and more basic. The other is to suppose that good 
and evil, as opposites, are inexorably intertwined, so that 
neither could exist without the other. Later on Nietzsche 
follows up on this line of thought, but only very occasionally, 
vaguely, and unsystematically. For exa.IllQ~~-~---in the second part 
( "D~ ___ freie Geist" Nietzsche urges us to look beyond the 
~ichotomy of true and false, to a view which recognizes _!:fiany 
_int~mediary states (JGB, 34) . The approach of Jaspers, who 
emphasizes the contradictory nature of Nietzsche's writings, is 
interesting in this light; ~~----~_§_ ~0:-~~i~-~--()!: __ ~ ... wider school of 
Niet~sche inter..EE~~t~_t~()n emphasizing nonduality. _ 
A look at the wider context of the above passages is in 
order. In Jensei ts von Gut und Bose, Nietzsche's account of 
the nature and origins of morality occupies only parts Five 
( "Zur Naturgeschichte der Moral"; "Natural history of morals") , 
Seven ( "Unsere Tugenden"; ""Our virtues"), and Nine ("Was ist 
Vornehm?"; "What is noble") of the book. The remaining seven 
parts are devoted to a variety of other topics. Part three 
( "Das religiose Wesen"; "What is religious") condemns 
Christianity as a denial of the human will; part eight ("Volker 
und Vater lander"; "Peoples and fatherlands") derides German 
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nationalism and German culture in favor of a multicultural, 
pan....:European perspective; part six ( "Wir Gelehrten"; "We 
scholar~~~) C:l:' it:_~ q_~~.~--!:Ee sc:lJ.~~~"~ ~¥ qu~_S._t:~--~-~E -~bj ect:_~~-~-t:¥ and 
looks forward to the rise of a new social order with new 
vqJ.ues. It is instructive to consider in what sense these are 
related; i.e. why Nietzsche chose to publish them all in the 
same book. I see a uni~~!2g _pri~c::_~-2~-~--- in ___ t:~~---~~C:!_ _ __t:_~~t 
~hrq~gh<?:t:It J_ensei ~-f:! _von Gut und B_(5S§! Nietzsche portrays the 
state, the academy--as life-negating rather than life-
··-'*-·---'"----~---...,. 
affirming. The first part, "Von den Vorurteilen der 
Philosopi::en.~--"-( ·~~~-~lle prejudices of philosophers") c~sti~at~S. __ a 
w~?l~"_list of famous philosophers for p~~-~~~-~~n<L__a __ ·:~~"~1 to 
truth"_ t() (he "will t.O power" as the basis for the activityof 
philosophizing. The will to truth represents a need to have 
~------------=" ___ ,.. ______ '"*'~~ ',~ .. ---·-~-~~--~---~~ 
_?u~~_!:_t:_~_l::_udes affirmed by something outside ouE~~-~y_es, such as 
/ objectiy:§_ ... Ieality. __ The will to power is the. __ 2:-J.-nc::_~ple. __ ~b:~~~SY 
we choose the contrary course, imposing our V.Cl.Jues onto the 
------· --·-·· ····--·-····-····· ....... . 
This need not take the form of coercive 
domination, as with Napoleon, but could be something as simple 
as the resolve to maintain good cheer in a world whose 
hospitality cannot always be relied upon. Nietzsche sees the 
will to power as the essence of a life-affirming attitude. 
' ~. ~~ . ',.. - - __ ._~ 
Later (JGB, 56) Nietzsche illustrates this with the idea 
(though not the name) of eternal recurrence. That is, people 
with a healthy will to power will look on the world with the 
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exultant attitude that wishes only for everything to repeat 
itself, just as it is. Nietzsche's idea of the eternal return 
is complicated by his attempts in the Nachlass to construct 
scientific arguments in favor of the idea that the universe 
does indeed repeat every situation over and over again 
indefinitely, though he is hardly any more convincing on this 
point than he is in his description of Christian origins. 
Where Buddha and Schopenhauer failed to transcend good and evil 
and consequently adopted world-denying attitudes (says 
Nietzsche}, it is possible and desirable to take the opposite 
course. 
Much of Part Two is devoted to the condemnation of the 
widespread assumption that democratic or humanitarian movements 
will better the human species. On the contrary, Nietzsche 
thinks we are more likely to thrive when we are challenged by 
continuous dangers (JGB, 44}. His distrust of democracy is 
based not on any love of authoritarian government, but on his 
contempt for the masses who would turn such a system into a 
kind of mob rule. Later in he warns of the 
t~~rl.,cl§:r:!S:Y_,"S>L_~~ocracies to SUSf:JeC::~" and violate the ri9hts of 
1 
those who differ from the masses. Nietzsche is lik~_h9:ve 
·--~~-~---~~~' '--·~< ,_ -~ ......... ,...,,----._,~.,~~. '•"-~>-,~,..,~-<... ' •-•'•-w.,' ~-.,", ... :.. :::;:"' •'•·----··---·--·"·-·-·-- • 
associated Germanic popular movements with the nation~Jist, 
~•'''•'-•<-r--···•·-•-• ~--"-•''"~-~ •• • •" • -'-'" • 
an,_t~~--?emitic culture which Wagr:er charrpioned;·~-~.::__~~Y- ... C::.~~-~-' -~J:l 
v~~~~f_h~~~.:r:emarks in part eight his rejection of democr;~cy 
should not be read as an 
government. His readers may be left wondering just what sort 
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of political system Nietzsche advocated; and in this light it 
is amusing to note that since his death anarchists, socialists, 
Nazis, conservatives, and critical theorists have successively 
claimed him as one of their own. 
Nie!:_~sche Is critique of truth, politic§,_ __ re~~g~_S:>n_c:l:l!:cl ___ ~~~ture 
is primarily a reaction against those elements of German 
society represented by Wagner. His antipathy for them leads 
him to wage a multi-pronged attack on the basis of the beliefs 
with which they identify. Thus, for example, his critique of 
truth is inspired not by any overwhelming love of the,subject 
in the abstract, but by the utility of this doctrine in 
subverting and encouraging others to subvert these beliefs. I~ 
Ni~tz_~_<?E~ __ :_i:) __ ~~~-t.ings are inconsistent, poorly argued, and full 
of absurd historical theories, this is because Nietzsche was 
w~~-!::A:!l:g J?J::'imarily as a propagandist or a rhetorician. His aim 
was to threaten everything which Wagner and his circle 
represented, not to add to the reading pleasure of philosophy 
students. That the chief effect of his life has been the 
latter rather than the former, Nietzsche would have regarded as 
a failure on his part. 
Part six contains dark hints of future events--the coming 
of a new warlike age (JGB, 209); the future rise of 
philosophers who are more hardened and critical than those of 
Nietzsche 1 s generation (JGB, 210). This accords well with 
Nietzsche Is anticipation in Zur Geneologie der Moral of a 
second transvaluation to reverse the effects of the last one, 
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an event which we ought to desire with all our hearts (GM I, 
17). This expectation of the ascendancy of new values is also 
a central theme of Zarathustra and Der Antichrist, as well. as 
those sections of the Nachlass where Nietzsche discusses 
nihilism. 21 There he predicts that nihilism, which encourages 
us to abandon our traditional concepts of morality, will lead 
t9 a. new round of :=.C:.~~C::~t.rophic wars in which the unmitiga~ed 
will to __ po~er __ .?! ... Itl~~ses of new~y-eman<:ipated immoralists will 
be felt. His own teachings are particularly dangerous, which 
is why he begins his conclusion to Ecce Homo with the 
announcement, "Ich bin kein Mensch, ich bin Dynamit." 
Philosophically, the term "nihilism" can mean a number of 
things, 22 and Nietzsche's use of it is difficult to pin down. 
21 The word "nihilism" has a complex history, and seems to 
have originated in the context of a debate between Jacobi and 
Fichte over the relative merits of dissolving away into 
nothingness (Carr 1992: 14). As a name Jgr_~ ___ J?.~:J:'_r.~cular 
~t1~tude ~oward morality, its most noteworthy early appearances 
are in Russian literature. Dostoevsky's The possessed is about 
a group of nihilists plotting revolution, one of whom (Kirllov) 
opines that the purest exercise of free will is suicide. His 
point is that since nothing matters and we are .~J.J, .. <J2:bm. _ _to die 
anyway, we . might as . well do whatever. we .. want, an argument 
similar to the more famous one about 'the ed11cal implications 
of atheism which Dostoevsky puts into the mouth of Ivan in The 
brothers Karamazov. Turgenev uses the term "nihilism" in his 
novel, Fathers and sons, where it refers to the anti-
establishment values of a student named Yevgeny Bazarov who 
denies the legitimacy of any authority (whether religious, 
ethical, or political) and hints darkly at revolution from time 
to time. Turgenev treats him negatively, as a young man who 
attacks everything but has nothing to defend, and in general 
lives a meaningless life. These revolutionary overtones are 
continued in Nietzsche's account of nihilism. 
22 Carr ( 19 92: 17-18) distinguishes between the following 
types of nihilism: (a) epistemological nihilism (one claim as 
good as another, nothing can be known); (b) "alethiological 
nihilism" (there is no truth); (c) metaphysical or ontological 
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Sometimes it represents something which Nietzsche favors (such 
as the urge to transcend societal norms) and sometimes 
something which he opposes (such as the decadence of 
Christianity); sometimes it exhorts the reader to seek a 
certain attitude, and sometimes it serves as a diagnoses of an 
already-existing attitude. In those elements of the Nachlass 
that were reprinted as the beginning of Der Wille zur Macht, 
Nietzsche defines extreme nihilism as the belief that even the 
highest values are unjustified, that no metaphysical hinterland 
or necessary truth can save them. The origins of this belief, 
or rather doubt, are traced to Christianity, which devalues 
itself by valuing truth on one hand, and its religious 
teachings (which are incompatible with truth) on the other. It 
is unclear whether nihilism is to be a transition state en 
••>·----~----~----.--·---"~---" "" ------ ----···- ----~ --·--
route to a new set of values, or whether the new order will 
remain nihilistic. Regardless of such technical 
inconsistencies, the essential insight which unifies them is 
···- ,., . -~--~·-~ ~-------·------------- '''"--~--~---"'-•>---~-- -~-~--~--- .. --------~----~-- ----------
th~ p~rceptioD _t:j19:t:_)1umanity_ hc:t§Jgs_l:: its~11l_()Eal moorin~s in a 
new Copernican Revolution (a healthy development according to 
~------··-----·-~--~•··--·~n•--• • -~<>~--" -W~•" ~--0-4-..... ~----·-~·-•· •·--·-~---~--~•••'-'•~•••~~--"~-·--"'-----
and that we must reconcile ourselves to the prospect 
-·--~-~··~----·~-••• ,,._,, ~---·.--·••·--~v~-·'-"•"•--- """"'"""'_.,,~~---·· -~••••• ''''' ''• .,_-o,_•_,,,,_,.....,,>o,,,o,,• • ""' 0 
of d2A!:l9 ... !Vl:~_ho~!:_ ____ E)1.l~l:t: )p_ the _uns~_t::_!:_l_~_g~ par~-~§ ___ ~2!11 Die 
fr6IY.:.}:q_!]E:!_ _ _Ii:i·Ji>senscha~~-'-·-t::_f:~. madman ponders the horror of God's 
murder: 
nihilism (nothing is real); (d) ethical or moral nihilism 
(there are no genuine moral rules, ethics being merely a matter 
of opinion); and (e) existential or axiological nihilism (life 
has no meaning) . 
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Was taten wir, als wir diese Erde von ihrer Sonne 
losketteten? Wohin bewegt sie sich nun? Wohin bewegen 
wir uns? Fort von allen Sonnen? Sturzen wir nicht 
fortwahrend? Und ruckwarts, sei twarts, vorwarts, nach 
allen Seiten? Gibt es noch ein Oben und ein Unten? 
Irren wir wie durch ein unendliches Nichts? Haucht uns 
nicht der leere Raum an? Ist es nicht kalter geworden? 
[Die frohliche Wissenschaft, 125] 
[What were we doing when we unchained this earth from its 
sun?~- whither are- we movir1g? Away. from all suns? Are we 
no~f-:Piunging continually? BackwarcC sideward, foreward: 
in··-a1r-<ffrec'fions"? Is there still-any up or down? Are 
we riof-s-tray1ng through an infinite nothing? Do we not 
feel the breath of empty space? Has it not become 
colder?] 
This is wh.ere the death of God, cmd con _ _s~quent collap_s_E! of 
b~~~E;!f ~n ___ IT\_'?r~~it:y, has left us--adrift in relati-y::i._~lE.!._ beY<?_!:d 
However cold or vacuous 
than the former "heliocentric" values. Consequently, these 
developments ought not to be resisted, but rather yearned for. 
C. Christ versus Antichrist 
The name "Antichrist" can be traced to the first and 
second Johannine epistles, where it apparently refers to 
teachers of false or divisive doctrine in the early church--
"even now there are many antichrists, whereby we know that it 
is the last time" (1 John 1:18). This connection with the end 
of time encouraged the Antichrist tradition to gradually became 
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fused with events from the Book of Revelation and other 
apocalyptic texts so that the figure eventually came to suggest 
an evil ruler who will persecute Christians, a false prophet or 
messiah who will lead many astray, and/or a Satanic counterpart 
of the Incarnation. Whatever his precise nature, the 
Antichrist is expected to do battle with Christ at Armageddon. 
From time to time real people have been claimed as the long-
awaited Antichrist, among them the Prophet Muhammad and a long 
string of popes and potentates. That this dark side of 
Christian millennarianism remains very much a living tradition 
is illustrated by a thriving body of contemporary literature 
(including popular theology as well as inspirational fiction 
and horror) based on the premise that the reign of the Beast is 
nearly upon us. 
Nevertheless it 1s not so much the Antichrist myth in 
particular that concerns Nietzsche, but the more general 
problem of how to interpret the threatening, destructive 
aspects of God in the Christian Bible. Nietzsche praises these 
aspects when they appear in the Pentateuch and former prophets, 
hailing them as evidence that the ancient Israelites were 
sufficiently satisfied of their own nobility to take it for 
granted that God would be on their side. According to this 
reading, the universalizing message of the latter prophets is 
quite a step down in terms of self-assurance, and hence less 
admirable. Curiously, Nietzsche reacts to the dark side of 
Jesus by taking offense at it, refusing to believe that the 
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real Jesus could have ever been guilty of such mean-
spiritedness, and blaming his followers for the distorted 
gospel accounts. Christianity is condemned, at least in part, 
for encouraging similar pettiness among its followers. 
Nietzsche's use of the name "antichrist" reflects his 
OP£OSi tion to,_,c;I::E~~~-~-~~~-~X: .. E<?:ther than his embrace of evil .per 
se, although he does make a point of issuing his judgement in 
the most fiery possible language. 
The ection may arise that the title of Der Antichrist 
is not about the Antichrist at all, since the German title 
could also mean "The anti-Christian" (der Christ means "the 
Christian"; the word for Christ is Christus) , and would strike 
<----~---.,_..,__, H ~--.,-~-·'< • ~ •<><'~·~·~·".~"'"~ '"~"""" '"'''"~>~w•" , 
German ears as being roughly analogous with "anti-Semite." 
This would accord well with the contents of the work--after 
all, Nietzsche rails against Christianity but does not say 
anything about the Antichrist myth. 
---~-~---""""-"•"'""""-"0•,.. --~""'"·~>V .. "'- "'-"-"""-'""·""""'"'..._·--.,-._._.,,._, ··"'-'"' 
Furthermore, as Kaufmann 
( 1954) points out in the introduction to his translation, in 
two instances (sections 38 and 47) Nietzsche clearly uses the 
term in a context where it can only mean "anti-Christian." 
However, Nietzsche is nothing if not a punster, anc!._ in,_~~ case. 
th_E;! ~.J:yy~ous double-meani:t1g surel:y , could have not ~_s _ _<::~E~<::i_._the 
notice of such a master of the German language as Nietzsche. 
---·--~····''""···-.. ---·~·-·· 
Hollingdale ( 19 68) , in the foreword to his translation of Der 
Antichrist, notes two instances from other books where 
Nietzsche uses the German word in such a way that it could only 
be translated as "Antichrist." In section five of Versuch 
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einer Selbst-Kritik, Nietzsche asks, "wer wO.fste den rechten 
Namen des Antichrist?" ("who could claim to know the rightful 
name of the Antichrist?") . In Ecce Homo (III, 2) he writes, 
"ich bin ... der Antichrist." 
Recently an even more relevant exarrple has been pointed 
out by Gary Shapiro in "The writing on the wall: The Antichrist 
and the semiotics of history" (in Solomon 1988: 212-213). In a 
final paragraph of Der Antichrist deleted by his executors, 
Nietzsche concludes the work with a summary judgement against 
Christianity entitled "Gesetz Wider Christentum" ("Judgement 
Against Christianity"). In it he calls for the religion to be 
banned, its churches razed, and its priests to be treated as 
outcasts. The verdict is signed, "Der Antichrist." In a 
relc:ted letter written shortly before his collapse, Nietzsche 
e~:pr~~s~~ 1:-.~s~.X~()pe for support from capitalists and Jews in 
carrying out this judgement, thereby raising the incredible 
possibility that he might have actually been serious. This is 
not so farfetched as it may seem, considering the analogous 
roles played by followers of other firebrand atheists of his 
time including Feuerba~h and Bakunin (both of whom were active 
in the Revolution of 1848), and of course Marx. With 
PEec~<:J.en~-~---like these, Nietzsche may well have aspired-:-:-_9-t 
le_?st; in his fantasies--to see his phi!~~()pJ:?:y pr-ovo~~---Ci J3t.I!lJ1a,r 
uprising against the state churches of the German-speaking 
_, .. ~-~·--·~-··~~-~- --~- ~>· ··-- '~h~- - ~ -~ .~.-- ~-· 
~ands, whose religion he associated with the culture of extreme 
nationalism and anti-Semitism. 
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The main task of Der Antichrist is to set forth 
Nietzsche's analysis of Christianity as a basis for his 
eventual condemnation of that religion. He begins by reviewing 
the central ideas from his two ethical books, again naming 
Christianity as the vehicle for the ascendancy of slave 
morality over master morality. The same weakness and hostility 
to life found in Christianity is carried over into works of 
modern philosophy, which seek to ground morality in something 
beyond ourselves, beyond the world. Even Kant, who denies that 
we can know anything about this beyond, nevertheless searches 
for and finds another transpersonal basis for his ethical 
theory, with the result that most of the old values are 
retained. Nietzsche writes that "Nichts ruiniert tiefer, 
innerlicher als jede »unpersonliche« Pflicht, jene Opferung vor 
dem Moloch der Abstraktion." Instead, "ein Tugend mu:!S unsre 
Erfindung sein" ("Nothing ruins us more profoundly, more 
intimately, than every 'impersonal' duty, every sacrifice to 
the Moloch of abstraction." [ ... ] "A virtue must be our own 
invention"; AC 11) . We may ask, is the problem with 
Christianity and Kant that they attempt to justify ethics with 
something abstract (which may not exist), or is it that they 
~-~ '"' ___ ·" '" ..... ""- ~""' , 
attempt to justify ethics with reference to something ext~nal 
--·---·~···~ ~~- ""·~-· ~·--·-"~~~-~~--··--___..,__~-~~-·-~~··> 
to ourselves? That the two are not mutually inclusive is 
illustrated by internal metaphysical constructs (the soul, the 
subtle body) which have been posited from time to time. While 
Nietzsche blurs the two criticisms together, I think that he 
107 
m~.~~ to refer prir:na.r~}Y to ourmisguided search fo:J:'~.-~?_{.!~nal 
sources of value. After all, his own works contain a number of 
ideas (e.g. the Ubermensch, eternal recurrence) which might be 
similarly criticized as nonexistent abstractions. 
Nietzsche's objections to Christianity are not meant to 
apply to all religions. Buddhism, for example, shares some of 
the flaws of Christianity (e.g. a deep distrust of worldly 
pleasures), but by justifying morality on non-metaphysical 
grounds (i.e. the avoidance of suffering), escapes others. In 
the end Nietzsche pays Buddhism a supreme (if unwarranted) 
accolade--"er steht, in meiner Sprache geredet, jenseits von 
Gut und Bose" ("In my terms, it stands beyond good and evil"; 
AC 20). In reality, Buddhism is not usually so positivistic as 
Nietzsche and his generation supposed--for example, the 
c.apaci ty of karma to reward or punish sentient beings is 
typically invoked as a motivation for ethical behavior. 23 It 
is unclear what Nietzsche thinks of the content of Buddhist 
morality as opposed to its mode of justification, apart from 
the emphasis on renunciation. The five precepts (to avoid 
killing, stealing, lying, sexual misconduct and intoxicants), 
like other Buddhist lists of rules, sound suspiciously like 
slave morality; however other teachings, such as the tantric 
principle of transforming anger and desire into helpful forces 
23 In Tibetan Buddhism, following Atisha, persons 
lesser, middling, and greater capacity are said to 
respectively motivated by the wish to avoid rebirth in 
lower realms, to escape cyclic existence altogether, or 







on the path, might well qualify as something higher. 
In the case of Jud2tism, Nietzsche admires its pr_.il!l~va!_ 
p~~t, but disapp~oves of its deve~_?j).!:f!~!lt. during t,]:)g er('l_ .. Q:f__JJle 
latter prophets. We should note that Christians, then as now 
often see the New Testament as an improvement upon the Old, and 
regard the latter prophets as anticipating this improvement 
""' '" ....._,.~-,~~--'*""-"""""'--
(th~ wrathful God becomes a lovirJ.¥ Father, ti:e. Israelit~/~~-~~sh 
focus gives way to a mo:J:'~ .... ~!l-~~~rsal _ __E!§!§Sa_9_§_~ ___ J_~g_§:1ts_I!l_ ___ is 
downplayed). Nietzsche turns this estimation on its head by 
citing as the golden age of Judaism the Kingdom of David, a 
time when the Israelites successfully overran their neighbors 
and therefore came to see themselves, along with their tribal 
god, as superior to all others. After the death of Solomon 
came the decline--the kingdom fractured into two warring 
halves, which were then left vulnerable to a series of 
invaders. This political collapse naturally led to a loss of 
faith among the Judeo-Israelites in their own supremacy, a 
tendency which Nietzsche finds reflected in the frequently 
self-critical message of the latter prophets. By the Roman 
period, the remnants of Israel had become accustomed to foreign 
occupation, and consequently lacked the self-confidence of 
their ancestors. -~~ligious af~_<:J:::s_ were now C<?Pt.E'.~~}ed ___ e;'i __ the 
te!!l:P~.~--J>Ei:~~!::~()Od, whi~ Nietzsche views wi_t:h 99J1t~mP.t .• 
Jesus, 11 dieser heilige Anarchist 11 (II this holy anarchist 11 ; 
AC 27), was reacting against their transformation of the 
original values of the Jewish religion into something ignoble. 
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The outcome of his challenge to priestly authority was 
predictable enough, since he had been basically asking for 
trouble all along. "Er starb fur seine Schuld--es fehlt jeder 
Grund dafD.r, so oft es auch behauptet worden ist, dag er fur 
die Schuld andrer starb. --" ("He died for his guilt. All 
evidence is lacking, however often it has been claimed, that he 
died for the guilt of others"; AC 27) . But even in death, 
Jesus managed to put his teachings into practice: 
Dieser »frohe Botschafter« starb wie er lebte, wie er 
lehrte--nicht urn »die Menschen zu erlosen«, sondern urn zu 
zeigen, wie man zu leben hat. Die Praktik ist es, welche 
er der Menschheit hinterlieg: sein Verhalten vor den 
Richtern, vor den Haschern, vor den Anklagern und aller 
Art Verleumdung und Hohn--sein Verhalten am Kreuz. Er 
widersteht nicht, er verteidigt nicht sein Recht, er tut 
keinen Schritt, der das A.ugerste von ihm abwehrt, mehr 
noch, er fordert es heraus ... Under bittet, er leidet, 
er liebt mit denen, in denen, die ihm Boses tun. 
[AC 35] 
[This 'bringer of glad tidings' died as he lived, as he 
had taught--not to 'redeem men' but to show how one must 
live. This practice is his legacy to mankind: his 
behavior before the judges, before the catch-poles, 
before the accusers and all kinds of slander and scorn--
his behavior on the cross. He does not resist, he does 
not defend his right, he takes no step which might ward 
off the worst; on the contrary, he provokes it. And he 
begs, he suffers, he loves with those, in those, who do 
him evil.] 
Unlike Jesus is Der 
!}!1-~-~<;l}!i~::O..E Nietzsche draws a distinction between tq~ __ !!lC?E.9:1_:i.:.ty 
oL_Je$l,!_~--1~h~_c:;h he admires) and that of the Chri§_!=~:!:~£1: .. ~~-~i:gion 
(which he abhors). This raises the minor terminological 
problem of which aspect to favor with the name of 
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"Christianity." On one hand, Nietzsche famously cautions that 
there were never any "Christians" in the sense of genuine 
followers of Jesus' teaching, other than Jesus himself. "--Da.s 
Wort schon »Christentum« ist ein Mi:fSverstandn.is--, im Grunde 
gab es nur einen Christen, und der starb am Kreuz" ("The very 
word 'Christianity' is a misunderstanding: in truth, there was 
only one Christian, and he died on the cross"; AC 39). Then, 
almost in the same breath, he turns around and states that 
Jesus himself was not a Christian, and so there were never any 
Christians! We may speculate that Nietzsche allowed himself to 
be guided not by consistency, but by his desire to shock. 
Problems arise when we try to identify what exactly is so 
praiseworthy about Jesus, or blameworthy about his followers. 
On one hand, any teaching which praises the meek and admonishes 
listeners to turn the other cheek sounds like an exarrple of 
slave morality. On the other hand, Nietzsche uses the same 
sort of teaching to illustrate Jesus' lack of ressentiment. It 
is instructive to consider in this context Nietzsche's 
treatment of the what we might call the fire-and-brimstone side 
of Jesus favored by Schweitzer. Section 45 of Der Antichrist 
consists of a selection of particularly venanous quotations 
attributed to Jesus 1n the gospels. Nietzsche doubts that 
Jesus ever said anything like this, and faults the early church 
for putting such spiteful words in his mouth. 24 Since 
24 Nietzsche's view on this point 1s not so far from 
recent biblical scholarship. Kloppenborg ( 1987) for exarrple 
divides the Q material into two main groupings, with Q1 roughly 
corresponding to the wisdom verses and Q2 to the apocalyptic 
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Nietzsche is thus able to pick and choose among the sayings 
attributed to Jesus, it may be that he could deny that Jesus 
ever praised the meek, for example. Another possibility is 
that the same action (turning the other cheek) or even attitude 
(love) may be either motivated by ressentiment, or not. A 
third is that between the writing of his two ethical books and 
Der Antichrist, Nietzsche has changed his mind about the merits 
of the attitude enjoined by the Sermon on the Mount. 
A clue may be gleaned from Nietzsche's treatment of 
certain issues in nineteenth-century biblical scholarship. A 
major concern of Western religious historians of this era was 
to reconstruct the life of Jesus in such a manner as to 
reconcile the various discrepencies and disagreements of the 
gospel accounts. In section 28 Nietzsche rightly criticizes 
this enterprise for focusing narrowly on contradictions in the 
received tradition, as opposed to critically examining the 
tradition itself. Scholars who attempted this latter course 
include David Friedrich Strauss and Joseph Ernest Renan, famous 
early writers in the field of Christian origins. Strauss is 
remembered chiefly for his treatment of the life of Jesus as an 
example of mythology; Renan for his Vie de Jesu, which 
reconstructs the life of Jesus in a sugary, pious prose style 
verses. (A third stratum, Q3, consists mainly of narrative 
elements such as the temptation in the wilderness.) Based on 
the grammatical and rhetorical structure, Kloppenborg concludes 
that Q1 is primary and that Q2 was added later, probably under 
the inspiration of the uprising of 70 A.D .. His interpretation 




but downplays the miraculous element. Interestingly, Nietzsche 
execrates them both for attempting to cling to Christian values 
even after rejecting the central teachings of the religion. 
Here it app~rs that what Nietzsche hates most about 
Christianity is its role as an arbiter of societal values. 
This interpretation fits in well with the idea that a virtue 
must be our own creation, as well as with his proclamation of 
the death of God. It also fits in well with his disdain for 
the kind of social values he sees German Christianity as 
srpporting, namely German nationalism and anti-Semitism. 
In any case, Nietzsche maintains that the early church 
failed to understand or live up to the teachings of its 
founder, and after his crucifixion lapsed into slave morality. 
This tendency has continued through the Middle Ages, the 
Reformation, and Nietzsche's own era. As a result, the 
Christian religion deserves condemnation for perpetuating slave 
morality. 
--Hiermit bin ich am Schlu~ und spreche mein Urteil. Ich 
verurteile das Christentum, ich erhebe gegen die 
christliche Kirche die furchtbarste aller Anklagen, die 
j e ein Anklager in den Mund genommen hat. Sie ist mir 
die hochste aller denkbaren Korruptionen, sie hat den 
Willen zur letzten auch nur moglichen Korruptionen 
gehabt. Die christliche Kirche lie~ nicht mit ihrer 
Verderbnis unberuhrt, sie hat aus jedem Wert einem 
Unwert, aus jeder Rechtschaffenheit eine Seelen-
Niedertracht gemacht. [AC 62] 
lWitb this ;r: _arn __ at: th~ end and J pronounce my judgem~nt. 
I. condemn Christianity. I raise against the Christian 
church the. most-teriiSie. oT··a.if ·a.ccusati.o'ns that any 
accusJ;;!r eyer uttered. It is to me the highes_t Q_L_all 
concei:v.:able.cQ;r,rupti911s· .... rt: __ h-a~_b_a~ci.ib~~: VI~))_!,Q ___ th~J.ast 
cg~ruption that is even possible. The Christian church 
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119-s. __ J,eJt: :rlQt:higg _ unto1.1ched by its corruption; it has 
turned ev~:ry value into an un-value, eve:ry truth into a 
1!~_!_-~yery_ ~I1:t:E?J£~.!Y int~_c;tyileness of the s.ouJ.] 
Then follows the "Gesetz wider Christentum, " a raucous fa twa 
outlining the details of Christianity's condemnation, thus 
accounting for the eventual subtitle, Fluch auf das Christentum 
("Curse on Christianity") . I~- ke_ep~!.J:-~_\N:i:!:E_~etz~-~he ~~-<?all in 
~~-<?-~~-~~----~--~o reorg_~I?:-~_ze the calen_~E .. ?O that the _year is 
counted from the time of the last Christian rather than the 
first, his decree is dated the first day of the year one. 
,/~· 
In his Z.a,:rat:Jmstra seminaJ:::, .:T~:rl9__9:f:f.~:r::1Tis th~---~-i:gk.J?_~t~e~n 
Zarathustra and the Antichrist, as well as the notion that 
Nietzsche thought of himself as the Antichrist. Zarathustra 
... enters upon his career very much in the way of the 
former Saoshyants, Christ or the Antichrist. One knows 
of course from the writings of Nietzsche--even if one 
only knows the titles of his works--that he had the idea 
of an Antichrist very much in mind. He J!l.9:1s.§§___9_f~_c_s:m,r::;_§_ a 
gre9:t:, ___ §_t,_q:ry ?-.Pout _his_ anti-_Christianity, and takes 
himself as being_ an Antichrist incarnate--by no means as 
a_--merely .. dev1IIs:h"":brother _of Christ, however, buf··a.s a 
-~Q_e-w-·saoshyanf. · ti.§ \fYill d_E?st:r:9y toe Jqrme~-- y_gJues-- surE3 
enough-;· but~r something better and more ideal, for a 
moral I f~7-- ·rrnicfi I1:lghEir_, .. Than ____ E'he-_ Christ fan ___ moral ffy-:-·---I-i"e 
feels himself therefore as a positive·-···saoshyant,. in spite 
of the- "'fact that he ·accepts the fftie .. of--"irrurioraJ,i,§_t":_and 
,;Antich:rtst. " ~ zs: 13 J 
As we shall see, Jung links the Christian notion of a coming 
Antichrist with the Zoroastrian concept of great world-ages or 
hazaran ("millennia") , each led by a prophet. 
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p~ese_r:::tted in Christianity and the Bible. Unlike Nietzsche, 
Jung reacts to these images with a kind of holy awe or 
tremendum; asserts that such passages reveal the psychologi~al 
i_!_!l:ot ont?~~g~~a~-unity of light and darkness, good and eyil; 
and hails Christianity and the Bible for their integrative 
sy~-~ism. God and Satan, Christ and Antichrist may oppose to 
one another, or they may be combined into a single image as the 
wrathful Yahweh of the Book of Job, or Christ of the Book of 
Revelation. The process whereby God becomes conscious, and his 
dark and light aspects reconciled, represents similar processes 
-------·----~--~~---------·~ --------------- . -----· ---- ... 
within the human psyche. (Jung shows little interest 1n 
political questions--perhaps he was simply reluctant to discuss 
them.) The definitive Jungian treatment of these issues may be 
found in Antwort auf Hiob (Answer to Job, 1952) . 
The whole of Antwort auf Hiob emphasizes the theme of 
God's nonduality with respect to good and evil. In the preface 
Jung alludes to his explanation in Aion of a common 
psychological origin for the Christ/Antichrist relationship and 
the zodiacal symbol for Pisces--two fishes, one pointed up and 
the other pointed down--which supposedly caused that sign to be 
associated with Christ in various ways. He takes another 
analogy from Clement of Rome, whom he approvingly quotes to the 
effect that God rules the world with a right hand and a left 
hand ("mit der rechten Hand Christus gemeint, mit der linken 
Satan"; preface) . Augustine's doctrine that evil is merely 
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privatio bani ("the privation of good") is described as an 
overcompensation for the Manichaeism which that church father 
had previously professed. 
and_ t~~~·~-!!lodern Christians who fail to. rec;9Jn~ze this have 
lapsed into heresy? Or does this mean that regardless of the 
-" < < "' ' • ' •• -~·~~' 
truth about God, to attempt to conceive of him as exclusively 
good would be psychologically unbalanced? While the ambiguity 
-~·-----__..,.._-.-.....,_,_, ___ ,' '~"' _, .. ,..,-,-.,.., .. ~'"''""v'*' '""'--·~•· ·--~--•~""-'"'"~·--~··• 
between these two positions is probably impossible to fully 
resolve, we can derive some guidance from Jung's statement that 
"«physisch» ist nicht das einzige Kriterium einer Wahrheit" 
("'Physical' is not the only criterion of truth"; GW 11, 553), 
and that psychic truths are independent of physical reality. 
By this Jung is admitting that, for example, miracles like 
those described in the Bible are impossible so long as we take 
them literally, but belong to the same symbolic Twilight Zone 
as dreams, where natural law does not hold sway. j_Ho~~~~E'----!::J:~s 
~xper_i e!-lc~.-~f pol terge~:=:!:::-.~~yl e_ps._y~~~-~_p~~~<::~_e.I1a suggests __ !hat 
physical miracles sometimes occur.) In fact, .:J'~ng_j_<;;!!_l~, 555) 
sees this very impossibil 
Just as miracles need not demand a "P~Y."~~--~<:l~_'~_~_j_<:>r 
~.;le!:W __ P!J: .. _~-l.:t~.~~P_<?~?~M~s harder to pin down. 
A related issue is that of the literal truth of the 
biblical accounts. While Kaufmann faults Antwort auf Hiob for 
failing to exhibit even a minimal awareness of the historical 
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and textual issues, 25 this misses the point of Jung' s 
methodology. When we inquire into 11 the meaning of Job, 11 we may 
be thinking of the ideas of some historical Job; or of the 
author of the Book of Job; or perhaps of an editor who created 
·the book from previously existing but disparate texts; or of 
any of the traditional interpretations from Judaism or 
Christianity; or even the meaning of Job as it has filtered 
down to the popular level (assuming that it has filtered down 
to the popular level). Of course any number of levels may be 
worth studying, but Jung specifies that his approach focuses on 
... wie ein christlich erzogener und gebildeter Mensch 
unserer Tage sich mit dem gottlichen Finsternissen, die 
sich im Hiobbuch enthullen, auseinandergesetzt, bzw. wie 
diesen auf ihn wirken .... Es soll keine kuhl abwagende, 
j eder Einzelhei t gerecht werdende Exegese gegeben, 
sondern eine subjektive Reaktion dargestellt werden. 
Damit soll eine Stimme laut werden, die fur viele, welche 
Ahnliches empfinden, spricht, und es soll eine 
Ershutterung zu Worte kornrnen, welche von dem durch nichts 
verschleierten Anblick gottlicher Wildheit und 
Rucksichtslosigkeit ausgelost wird. [GW 11, 561] 
[ ... the way in which a modern man with a Christian 
education and background comes to terms with the divine 
darkness which is unveiled in the Book of Job, and what 
effect it has on him. I shall not give a cool and 
carefully considered exegesis that tries to be fair to 
every detail, but a purely subjective reaction. In this 
way I hope to act as a voice for many who feel the same 
way as I do, and to give expression to the shattering 
emotion which the unvarnished spectacle of divine 
savagery and ruthlessness produces in us.] 
25 Kaufmann ( 1980: 410) complains that 11 Jung seems to 
assume that Job really lived after David's time, and he treats 
the Biblical tale of Job as if it had really happened just the 
way it is reported .... 11 
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Jung is exploring the meaning of Job not to biblical 
scholars (who would regard the historical and textual 
assumptions in Antwort auf Hiob as painfully unsophisticated), 
or to ordained religious (who would have been unlikely to have 
conceived of God in this fashion before Jung came along), or 
even to the average Christian (whose knowledge of the Bible is 
not nearly so elaborate), but to himself, or a person in his 
approximate circumstances. At the same time, Jung is not 
terribly consistent about this, as when he hypothesizes about 
the psychology of the ancient Israelites, for example (e.g. GW 
11, 561). Jung analyzes the Book of Job as he would an 
archetypal dream; and like such dreams, the Book of Job is 
shared by whole cultures if not the entire human race. To 
Jung, statements in holy scripture are "imJSerungen der Seele," 
("utterances of the soul") even though we did not invent them 
( GW 11 , 55 7 ) . That is to say, all the characters--God, Satan, 
Job, and the rest--are ourselves, in that their words and 
actions illustrate aspects of our own psychology. By 
reflecting on them, we gain insight into ourselves and our 
spiritual growth. 
Wlt~J::_Qu~t to immediately occur to Jung' s hypothetical 
----·~--~-,.~---"'-··-~'"~'~J ,,_<,.,.._..~--~·-----'"-""'- ~-~····~--~ , __ ·-'·'"··- ·----- ·- -'"'-·~·- ·--~-·-·--- ·--····--·---
Christian-educated reader is that the God of the Book of Job is 
not the tmambiguous cha.rrpion of goodness and morality _that _such 
a. r~<:l.C!~r: might -~-~y~ been led to. ~~~t from Sun~z. ~<;b:_ool. 
That~_Go<;l~_o_uJ:9 __ aftJ:i:s:_t a rigJ:1t:~.?~~§t_r1 ___ with __ ~y~:r-e£cal.ating 
le_ye.ls gf_.S.:.E}l_~:l.t:Y.! .. basical~z. on a dare from S<:i.t:ai'J:, .s.1JgQ:.~$tS 
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that he is essentially amoral and even incapable of morali~x_at 
this P?~~t in the biblical epic. 
Er ist aber zu unbewugt, urn <<moralisch» zu se1n. 
Moralitat setst BewuiStsein voraus. Damit soll 
selbstverstandlich nicht gesagt sein, dag Jahwe etwa 
unvollkommen oder bose sei wie ein gnostischer Demiurg. 
Er ist jede Eigenschaft in ihrer Totalitat, also u.a. die 
Gerechtigkeit schlechthin, aber auch das Gegenteil, und 
dies ebenso vollstandig. [GW 11, 574] 
[But he is too unconscious to be moral. Morality 
presupposes consciousness. By this I do not mean to say 
that Yahweh is imperfect or evil, like a gnostic 
demiurge. He is everything in its totality; therefore, 
among other things, he is total justice, and also its 
total opposite.] 
This view of God as unconscious is meant to explain why God 
must always oppose himself, subverting his own projects, and 
why he is relatively unaware (as illustrated by his suspicion 
of, as opposed to omniscient knowledge about, Job). God cannot 
be said to be completely unconscious, however, since he 
violates moral rules which he himself gave on Mount Sinai. 
Rather, he can best be described as an emerging consciousness, 
like a child's. Sometimes he does evil because he cannot help 
it; out of his own opposite nature (as in the Garden of Eden, 
when he shows Adam and Eve the tree from which he 
simultaneously forbids them to eat); sometimes the evil is 
intentional, as with Job . 
.In hi.$ d~alings with Job, God has given in to his dark 
?i<J.~ and consciously chosen evil. Jung calls the light and 
w ~---· ____ _,___._......._, , ..... ~-····· ·---· ~----~--- ---"- "~·- ·-·-----~-~~--- -~---- ·-·-----~-·~·-·~-~ ···-··--~ .. -~-----~--~------~--
dark aspects of God's thought his "sons," undoubtedly recalling 
~ ·~~ _,. ·~%~---~~- ·-
119 
the Bogomil myth mentioned earlier. But why would God even 
"-····---~--~----·----~~---------·-'·.-....~--
take notice of Job? Job is not simply being punished for his 
sins or tested for his loyalty in the face of adversity--"Hiob 
wird herausgefordert, wie wenn er selber Gott ware" ("Job is 
challenged as though he himself were a god"; GW 11, 594). What 
is it about him that is important enough to warrant this kind 
of treatment? 
Sollte Jahwe einen geheimen Widerstand gegen Hiob haben? 
Das konnte sein Nachgeben gegenuber Satan erklaren. Was 
aber besitzt der Mensch, das der Gott nicht hat? Wegen 
seiner Kleinheit, Schwache und Wehrlosigkeit dem 
Machtigen gegenuber besitzt er, wie wir schon andeuten, 
ein etwas scharferes Bewu£tsein auf Grund der 
Selbstreflexion: er mu:fS sich, urn bestehen zu konnen, 
immer seiner Ohnmacht dem allgewaltigen Gott gegenUber 
bewu£t bleiben. [GW 11, 579] 
[Has Yahweh some secret resistence against Job? That 
would explain his yielding to Satan. But what does man 
possess that God does not have? Because of his 
littleness, puniness, and defencelessness against the 
Almighty, he possesses, as we have already suggested, a 
somewhat keener consciousness based on self-reflection: 
he must, in order to survive, always be mindful of his 
impotence.] 
Here the conflict between Job and Yahweh resembles that 
between Miller's ego and unconscious in Wandlung und Syml:;ole 
der Libido. The unsuspecting object of the wager between God 
and Satan cries out to the former for justice, on the dubious 
assumption that God is in fact just. What Job has not yet 
grasped is that God is neither good nor evil, nor is he divided 
against himself (Satan remaining a loyal functionary of his 
heavenly court, at least for now). Yet God wants to be just, 
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so Job's protest is effective. By appealing to God in this 
way, Job manages to defeat him. 
form of the voice from the whirlwind--reveals his true nature 
to Job, as an "Antinomie" or "eine totale inn ere 
Gegensatzlichkeit" ("a totality of inner OPf>()~ites") which is 
the S()'ldrc;e of his dynamism (GW 11, 567). 
While the experience leads Job to a better understanding 
of God, at the same time it enables God to better understand 
himself, albeit much more slowly (or else, suggest Jung, Job 
would not have gotten away so easily). In particular, God 
becanes conscious of the moral predicament which led to his 
defeat at Job's hands, as well as the reality 'of the defeat 
itself. 
iJ:?:!:.~testamental a.pocrypha, where he maps God's further 
P.~Y:.<=hOl()gical development in the wisdom literat~~~---~-~~()n~--~ith 
a noteworthy digression onto the recently-established doctrine 
-·----··· k·-~--- --~~-·~--,~-..-~---~--~~~~-----~~~-·~- ___ ,.._, .. _.__ . ~"'~---~-~--~--~~'·-·---~ .... -----~---·~·-- -~ .. ·---··· 
of the Assumptio Mariae, i.e. Mary's bodi~X-~f:l~-~ption into 
heaven). The upshot of all this is that by the New Testament, 
--~-- --··· ··-···- ---~-··-·---·------~-...... ... ~.~ ,. ~ .,.,,_,,~,""''~*------·--~~""'M<·~~~"'-~---~~· -"-'"'··~ ·"-'-'-'-»<·-·-~·-·····- -----
l;-~-~·- go()? and evil sides separately. In the case of the good 
side, the result is Christ, a composite figure (human and 
divine) "etwa so, wie wenn man Hiob und Jahwe in einer 
Personlichkeit vereinigt hatte" ("rather as if Yahweh and Job 
were combined in a single personality"; GW 11, 648). _____ {?_~-t~ __ i§ __ 
now__~:)(p_~ll.~9.J.IQ.l!l __ !:_l}.§_}!.~~Y..§P:.!Y ..... C:Q~_.I!:_, __ ~Q. J:hi3...L .. ~hr.isJ ... i~ .9-PlE::! .. _ to 
observe him fall to earth "like lightning from heaven." __ T_h_i_s 
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represents God's (temporary) denial of his own dark aspect, 
·-~~' 
which must then take form outside himself. 
Infolge der relativen Einschrankung Satans ist Jahwe 
durch Identifikation mit seinem lichten Aspekt zu einem 
guten Gott und liebenden Vater geworden. Er hat zwar 
seinen Zorn nicht verloren und kann strafen, aber mit 
Gerechtigkeit. Falle in der Art der Hiobstrag6die sind 
anscheinend nicht mehr zu erwarten. [GW 11, 651] 
[As a result of the partial neutralization of Satan, 
Yahweh identifies with his light aspect and becanes the 
good God and loving father. He has not lost his wrath 
and can still mete out punishment, but he does it with 
justice. Cases like the Job tragedy are apparently no 
longer to be expected.] 
equal and opposite dark side, and the New Testament is filled 
with hints of their inseparability. For example, Jung is 
imp~~§SE:!d by the line of the Lord's Pra¥er that reads,~~ "Lead us 
__ n<?_t: i_r1!_<? __ t~p1::__~!_i9.~11 (as if God mig-ht do just that); or by the 
image of Christ crucified between two thieves--a quintessential 
symbol of the integration of God's two sides, since one of the 
thieves will go to heaven and the other to hell (GW 11, 659). 
The return of Christ to establish his kingdom is inexorably 
linked with the reign of Antichrist. The devil may be bound 
for a thousand years ("and after that he must be loosed a 
little season") or hurled into the lake of fire, but he can 
never be destroyed. God's light and dark aspects are 
recanbined into the terrifying Christ of the Book of 
Revelation, a judge who not only admits saints to heaven but 
also condemns the wicked to hell. Finally there come the 
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heiros gamos of Christ with his bride, the New Jerusalem, which 
Jung hails as a triumphant reintegration of God's dualities, as 
well as a reconciliation of the tensions introduced with the 
Book of Job. 
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III. ZARATHUSTRA: THE IRANIAN HERITAGE 
In this chapter I will discuss several aspects of Iranian 
religious lore with a 
interpretation of him. 
bearing on Nietzsche, or on Jung' s 
Oddly enough in view of his usual 
t§E_dencx~ to. ~!=:!!:i:!=>~t=:-~-·~ ':isionary material c1irectly to the 
collective unconscious, Jung makes a point of tracing much of 
Nietzsche's imagery to books on ancient Iranian lore. The 
reluctance of Nietzsche scholars to engage in Iranology 
notwithstanding, Jung is surely right in insisting on its 
relevance. Although the civilization of Iran is presently less 
appreciated in the West than those of India or China, its 
contributions to world culture and religion indisputably belong 
on the same order of magnitude. This would have been even more 
evident in the nineteenth-century, when Persia loomed large 
over European culture and Farsi was a major language of 
diplomacy. In the religious sphere, Zoroastrianism was only 
the most obvious of several Iranian religious traditions which 
demanded the attention of Nietzsche's generation. 
In the case of Zoroastrianism, Jung' s evaluation of its 
influence on Nietzsche seems to me essentially ac.curate. 
Nietzsche does not explicitly refer to any later developments 
in Iranian religion, although I suggest that he was influenced 
by the nineteenth-century Babi movement. Neither Nietzsche nor 
Jung appears to pay much attention to Islam (for example, in AC 
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60 Nietzsche praises the nobility of Islamic science and 
civilization in contrast to the values of the Crusaders). Jung 
for his part variously alludes to the Iranian gnostic Hymn of 
the Pearl from the pseudepigraphal Actae Thomas; the Mithraic 
mysteries, 
have been 
then assumed by scholars such as Franz Cumont to 
imported from Iran into the Roman Empire; the 
Mandaeans of Basra, a still-surviving gnostic baptist community 
whose members venerate John the Baptist but not Jesus (whan 
they regard as a renegade Baptist disciple); Manichaeism, a 
consciously syncretic Iranian religion which reached from Spain 
to coastal China and once claimed Saint Augustine as an 
adherent; and the Bulgarian Boganils of Bosnia, a medieval 
Christian movement which is sometimes thought to be a 
Manichaean remnant. 
Despite Noll's suspicion that Jung was fascinated with 
the Mithraic mysteries as an Aryan answer to Christianity, Jung 
does not appear to single out Iranian religious movements for 
disproportionate emphasis--if anything he tends to conflate the 
smaller movements into a Western esoteric framework centered 
around gnosticism and Christian mysticism, while citing 
Zoroastrian themes with approximately the same frequency as 
Hinduism, Buddhism, or Taoism. (In any case the issue is less 
important than it might seem since Jung tends to read his own 
views into religious traditions from all over the world without 
taking much account of their particular historical or cultural 
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contexts. ) 26 Jung however does not claim that Nietzsche was 
consciously familiar with gnosticism, Christian mysticism, and 
so forth as he was with Zoroastrianism (a realistic 
assessment). Any Nietzschean parallels with this literature 
would therefore have to be attributed to something other than 
historical influence, such as certain alleged cross-cultural 
commonalities among visionary mystics. This need not imply 
that some sort of visionary mysticism is true. For e~"(imp~e, 
competing explanations of such parallels have made reference to 
shared human psychology (Jung), pan-Middle-Eastern/European 
or to c~rtain logical structures 
within the religious language-game (Couliano) . 
A. Zoroastrianism 
26 
"The difference between Eastern and Western thinking" 
(GW 11, 759 ff.), which Jung wrote as a foreword for WY Evans-
Wentz 's translation of the The Tibetan book of the Great 
Liberation, is a good example of Jung's methodological failings 
with respect to the study of world religions. In it his main 
point is to establish certain essential characteristics of 
"Eastern" (inclusive of China, India, and Tibet) and Western 
psychologies. The former is relatively introverted and 
"quietistic"; the latter is extraverted and oriented toward the 
intellect. With respect to the "Eastern" side there exist so 
many counterexamples that Jung' s theory becc::rnes at best a 
terrible distortion. Besides yoga India also has a hoary 
tradition of logic and intellectual debate (to which several 
materialist schools contributed), as well as popular devotional 
movements which actively 0 seek followers. Most Chinese 
religious forms are anything but quietistic (firecrackers are 
popular). As for the Western side, even if we limit ourselves 
to psychologists we find figures like Flournoy or William James 
writing before Jung and numerous others writing after him. 
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Why would Nietzsche name the main character of what is 
arguably his magnum opus after the founder of Zoroastrianism? 
After all, someone like Tra~achus could have matched 
Nietzsche's own views more closely without the necessity of 
rewriting history. In terms of sheer satirical potential, a 
better choice might have been Jesus or Socrates, since details 
about their lives and teachings would have been generally 
familiar to his audience, and would have provided more readily 
recognizable "sacred cows" for Nietzsche to burlesque. As Jung 
(e.g. ZS: 225) points out, unless the allusion to the 
historical Zarathustra--whom I will henceforth refer to by his 
Greek name of "Zoroaster" in order to avoid confusion--is 
entirely gratuitous, to ignore the Iranian contribution would 
be comparable to reading Joyce's Ulysses without reference to 
Homer. At the same time, as with Ulysses it would be a mistake 
to downplay those far more numerous aspects of Zarathustra 
which originate with Nietzsche and have no discernible Iranian 
parallel. 
Those Zarathustra commentators who do not ignore the 
issue of Zoroastrian influences altogether (e.g. Berkowitz, 
Santaniello, Higgens) are divided as to how much of Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra--and if anything, what--is traceable to his Iranian 
namesake. Kohler ( 1989: 387) prefers to trace Zarathustra' s 
character to the Romantic fiction of Holder lin and Flaubert, 
and his name to Zoroaster's reputation among the Greeks as a 
"persische Magier" ("Persian magus") or "Zauberer" 
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("sorcerer"). A common tendency is for Nie~zsche scho~Cl.E,~_,E_? 
view the Zoroastrian contribution solely in terms of that 
religion's famous dualism betweer1 g~od and evil~ and to discuss 
even that all too briefly (e.g. Kaufmann 1956: 172; Danto 1965: 
< ' 
196). Irving Zeitlin ( 1994: 18-20) is slightly more elaborate 
in complaining of "a powerful tendency in us to think in 
dualisms, " which led Nietzsche to choose Zarathustra as his 
"super-protagonist." According to his reading, Nietzsche 
portrays Zarathustra as an ideal human type who will transcend 
duality at the end of time. Lampert (1986: 2-4) appreciates 
the depth of the Zoroastrian contribution to Zarathustra more 
fully than his colleagues, specifically citing Zoroaster's 
emphasis on morality; the good/evil dichotomy; the Zoroastrian 
understanding of history; and the Zoroastrian roots of the 
Hebrew prophetic tradition. Lampert occasionally sees 
Zoroastrian symbolism reflected in odd details of Zarathustra--
for exarrple, he interprets the eagle and serpent from the 
prologue as symbols of Ohrmazd and Ahriman, respectively (1986: 
29) . 
Jung begins his seminar with an exposition of early 
Zoroastrianism, thereby placing himself in the company of those 
Nietzsche commentators who affirm the significance of the 
Iranian allusion. To the extent that Jung's claim is correct 
and the bulk of Nietzsche's Zarathustra can indeed be traced to 
the collective unconscious, this might seem to exclude more 
terrestrial sources of influence such as Nietzsche's readings 
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in Iranian history. Nevertheless Jung clearly recognizes 
Nietzsche as having been profoundly influenced by historical 
material as well as his own psychological experiences: 
Then I found an allusion to the peculiar fact that 
Nietzsche as a young man studied in Leipzig, where there 
is a funny kind of Persian sect, the so-called Mazdaznan 
sect, and their prophet is a man who calls himself El Ha-
nisch [Dr. Otoman Zar-Adusht Hanish, nee Reinhold 
Hanisch] . . . It has been assumed that Nietzsche became 
acquainted with certain members of that sect and thus got 
some notion about Zarathustra or the Zoroastrian 
traditions. Personally, however, I don't believe this; 
he would never have gotten a very high idea of 
Zarathustra through their representations. Nietzsche was 
a well-read man, in many ways very leamed, so it is 
quite probable or even certain that he must have made 
some special studies along the line of the Zend-Avesta, a 
great part of which was already translated in his day. 
[ZS: 4] 
The Mazdaznan Fellowship to which Jung refers flourished at the 
turn of the century, and is still active in California and 
England. Its name refers to Ahura Mazda (who is here conceived 
in New Thought terms as a universal mind or infinite 
intelligence) , and recalls the Farsi name for the religion 
known in English as Zoroastrianism or Mazdaism (mazdayasnian) . 
The group's major emphases (cf. Hanish 1960) include breath 
control, eccentric Aryan racial theories (white people are said 
to have originated in Tibet), eugenics, mental healing, and a 
special type of vegetarian or "varietarian" diet which, contra 
Jung, was drawn not so much from the practices of Iranian 
Zoroastrianism as from certain nineteenth-century health trends 
(although Manichaeism might provide a rough parallel). As Jung 
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indicates, there is no good reason to suppose that Nietzsche 
was influenced by this group, and consequently little need to 
consider its teachings any further. 
However, although Jung denies this particular claim of 
historical influence, in the process of affirming Nietzsche's 
good taste he affirms another source of influence, namely 
Nietzsche's 11 special studies along the line of the Zend-
Avesta. 11 Again, I concur with Jung' s judgement, for reasons 
that will became clear presently--in fact the degree of Iranian 
influence on Nietzsche goes much further than that, as Jung 
himself concedes. Occasionally Jung shows some discomfort with 
the idea of Nietzsche having been inspired by Zoroastrianism: 
The fact that Nietzsche chose the archetype of 
Zarathustra has nothing to do with the Persian archetype; 
one finds precious little of Zoroaster in Zarathustra. 
[ZS: 649] 
Even so, Jung cannot bring himself to ignore the likelihood of 
Nietzsche having acquired conscious knowledge of 
Zoroastrianism. After making the above statement, for example, 
Jung then spend's the rest of the lecture qualifying or 
contradicting this statement with a long dissertation detailing 
several specific borrowings. 
How could a given image such as Nietzsche' s Zarathustra 
be simultaneously inspired by history and the collective 
unconscious? One explanation might be that since much of the 
Iranian material is mythical in nature (and therefore arguably 
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archetypal for the Jungian), Jung might reasonably point to the 
collective unconscious as the ultimate source for the Avesta 
and similar works, and then say that Nietzsche is building on 
these preexisting archetypal experiences in much the same way 
as with the biblical material. In fact, as we shall see Jung 
is quite willing to treat Nietzsche's Zarathustra as the same 
sort of archetypal entity as the Saoshyants (sayashans, 
"benefactors") of Iranian mythology. Another explanation could 
hinge upon the distinction between an archetype and an 
archetypal image . Strictly -~p~_aking, we do not ~:rS:§tve 
a~_c:_l?:~t:XEE:!~- _.ee.r se, but: only their images, whicl1. may be quite 
culture-bound. Just as the same archety12e ~~2~!:'"·· manif__§st 
either as Kuan Yin or the Virgin Mary, so might Nietzsche's 
Zarathustra have taken another form altogether had Nietzsche 
studied Tibetan instead of Iranian lore, yet played essentially 
the same role. An intermediate possibility is that Jung sees 
ancient Iranian lore as belonging to a pan-Aryan body of 
archetypal imagery which Nietzsche could have tapped into by 
virtue of his race or culture. After all, one of the greatest 
attractions of Iranian lore for fin-de-siecle Europeans was the 
possibility of replacing elements of their culture perceived to 
be Jewish in origin (e.g. Christianity) with Aryan themes that 
would resonate better with the prevailing anti-Semitism. 
What did Zoroaster do to merit Nietzsche's literary 
tribute? In a sense, this is a bit like wondering why Ben 
Jonson might have been moved to honor Shakespeare. Zoroaster 
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is quite simply one of the most influential people who ever 
lived; and if his contribution seems obscure to many people 
today, this is attributable to our ignorance rather than his 
unimportance. Even those who are inclined to doubt such claims 
can hardly avoid thinking along lines established by 
Zoroastrianism. For example, many of the characteristic 
doctrines and practices of Judaism, Christianity, and Islam 
seem to have been borrowed from that religion. I_ndeed, ____ (l _ _9Q_QS!: 
case can be made for the view that for much of its history the 
Near East is best understood as a fringe_ regioi'!_ where the 
Irani~!l_C:t!l_!:~ral _§phere !fiet the Hellenistic world, although 
this is a perennial topic of debate among biblical scholars 
(with the pro-Iranian case not having been helped by the 
attempts of certain early apologists to rescue Jesus from the 
charge of being Jewish) . The reader is likely to find familiar 
such quintessentially Zoroastrian notions as the seven days of 
creation, with different things created on each day; the 
division of the world into domains of good and evil, each with 
its own ruler; the figure of a reforming prophet who challenges 
the secular and religious establishments (and in this light the 
parallels between Isaiah chapters 40-48 and Gatha 44: 3-5 have 
long been noted) ; expectations of a future prophet or savior 
who will rally the faithful; the anticipation of a final battle 
between good and evil in which all souls will take part; the 
bodily resurrection of the dead; and the concept of a final 
judgement to determine who will be allowed to enter paradise. 
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Other Western religious elements for which Zoroastrianism is 
one of several possible origins include monotheism, speculation 
about an immortal soul separate from the body, and the practice 
of immersing oneself in water in order to restore spiritual 
purity. If Western philosophy is a series of footnotes to 
Plato, as Whitehead says, then I would add that Western 
religion is a series of footnotes to Zoroaster. Several 
important traditions within Vaisnava Hinduism (i.e. the Kalkin 
myth) and Mahayana Buddhism (the myths of Shambhala and 
Maitreya) also bear the unmistakable starrp of his teachings, 
since they center around a climatic future battle between the 
forces of good and evil. Jung alludes to Zoroastrian 
influences on Indian lore in the form of the Ami tabha and 
Maitreya complexes (ZS: 13). 
While the importance of Zoroaster and Zoroastrianism 
should be generally conceded, it does make sense to ask how 
Nietzsche would have perceived them, or which aspects would 
have particularly attracted his attention. In Nietzsche's day, 
on several counts. Owing to his fame among the Greeks, 
Zoroaster himself was commonly revered in Masonic literature as 
one of a number of ancient sages and religious founders which 
typically also included Buddha, Pythagoras, Plato, and Hermes· 
Trismegistus. In the nascent field of Religionswissenschaft, 
the study of Zoroastrianism (like the study of Mithraism) 
surprised Christian intellectuals who had grown accustomed to 
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thinking of "pagan" influences on their religion primarily as 
later corruptions of Christianity's pristine original 
teachings. Those who kept up with Indian or Iranian affairs 
might have noticed the political efforts of the Bomrey and 
Gujarati Par sis on behalf of their oppressed Irani 
coreligionists in Kerman and Yazd; or the modernizing trend 
among Parsi intellectuals (encouraged by contacts with liberal 
Europeans, especially Theosophists) which sought to eliminate 
such previously central elements of Zoroastrianism as myth, 
ritual, and religious laws in hopes of restoring the pristine, 
original teachings of Zoroaster. 
One of the most important nineteenth-century roles of 
Zoroastrianism involved the then-recent realization among 
philologists that there was such thing as an Indo-Europ~n 
(Note that the terms "Aryan" or " Indo-
European" properly refer to language groups, not races or 
cultures.) This discovery led to a new interest in Iranian as 
well as Indian lore, with ancient Zoroastrian literature 
constituting one of the most important :p~i,ma:r:y sources. 
Nietzsche, whose graduate training was in philglggy, could 
hardly have avoided the subject. 27 The existence of such a 
27 In terms of Sanskrit, Welbon (1968: 185) claims on the 
basis of unspecified sources that "Nietzsche did learn some 
Sanskrit at Leipzig, " prorebly under the tutelage of Friedrich 
Max Muller's teacher (and Wagner's brother-in-law) Hermann 
Brockhaus. How much we are not told, but a linguistic-style 
survey would prorebly have satisfied Nietzsche's philological 
interests. GMC Sprung in "Nietzsche's interest 1n and 
knowledge of Indian thought" (in Goicoechea 1983: 166 ff) 
concludes that Nietzsche's citations of Indian literature and 
the evidence of his bookshelves is consistent with the 
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fundamental cultural connection between pagan Europe and 
archaic India proved to be of more than academic interest as 
occultists and racial theorists increasingly found themselves 
drawn to "Aryan" mythological and social themes, somewhat 
imaginatively reconstructed. (Nazi Germany would later follow 
their exarrple, most famously in their appropriation of the 
swastika, a symbol common to India and pagan Europe.) 
Nietzsche has little to say about occultism or occultists (ZGM 
I, 6 derides alternative medicine alongside Western 
appropriations of Hinduism and Buddhism, which appealed to the 
same subculture as occultism proper) but often alludes to Aryan 
racial theories. In some respects he treats them favorably, as 
ln ZGM 1, 11 when he praises the ancient Romans, Arabs, 
Germans, Japanese, Vikings, and the Homeric heroes for being 
warlike "beasts of prey". (Nietzsche does not actually call 
them "Aryans", and was presumably well aware that Arabic and 
Japanese belong to different language families altogether.) On 
a more fundamental level he opposes such theories. In this 
case, for exarrple, he subverts the more usual reading of Aryan 
history by identifying his enemies with certain undesirable 
"pre-Aryan" remnants. Interestii'l<;Jly, the historical._g_:!::Yis~c;:>D: 
of Aryan society into three main castes (a warrior/ki~ly 
-·•• •••·~~·~··~ '"'''"~' 0,~ ~,,,,, ,, '>'><~-"""""""'--'"'"-"''-""........__.,,,,.__,~,~-··--"'----'---·---·-·--·-·-~H~-.,_..,~-~4-'«•H•«••~-~-··-><-• 
assumption that he had read perhaps half a dozen relevant 
books: several Upanisads, Deussen's book on Vedanta, the Laws 
of Manu, the Dhamnapada, and Schopenhauer. In other words, his 
reading was modest and entirely in translation. As for Iranian 
lore, I picture him as having read some of the Avesta as well 
as the Zoroastrian sections of Friedrich Creuzer's Symtolik und 
Mythologie der alten Volker. 
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caste, a sacerdotal caste, and a numerically-J?:t::§Q91!l~J1ant 
~~ricultural one) sheds much 1~9ht on Nietzsche 1 s._references to 
Herren-Moral, Sklaven-Moral, and Herden-Moral, which would then 
correspond to three coexisting ethical orientations of this 
prist::_~E:~._epoc~~ This is reinforced by Nietzsche Is allusions to 
chandalas (the "untouchables" of India 1 s caste system) 
throughout Der Antichrist. 
One crucial innovation of Zoroaster, a member of the 
"~ ·~ ,, 
priestly caste, was his rejection of a class of deities known 
/"'""""' ··----~--" 
as daevas (Sanskrit devas) in favor of another class of dei!Jes 
called ahuras (Sanskrit asuras), most not:~~Y.-.:~~'UY.:~--~~~99:~.-_!he 
ranks of the daevas are filled with warlike deities (e.g. 
Indra which we kif()~ from the gods named in a fourteenth-
century Hittite-Mitanni treaty to have been objects of cultic 
w~rship in pre-Zoroastrian times, much as their Indian 
counterparts are today. It may _be that Zoroaster disapp~()~d 
of the behavior of the followers of such cults, which are 
...-----~--. ,. 
likely to have consisted primarily of members of the warrior 
~-.-- --·--· 
caste. In any case he drew a sharp distinction between the 
ahuras, who are good and worthy of worship; and the daevas, who 
• ,,. '"'""'-""•cHW"'""~-c.->o~·- ••· -· ,...,_~··· ""• .- ~ 
are neither. The earliest literature. traces the mytholqg:!,c2,;L 
division to two sons of Ahura Mazda, .. Spent a fr.[ainyu (the "good 
"/ ~~-~~--'«~------------· -·-· 
spi,:r:-it;"). and Angra Ma~rwu (the "evil 
chose the paths of asha ("truth") and druj ("lies"). The 
.f'l.h!Jf:Ci_§ Jollowed Spenta Mairwu, while the daevas followed Angra 
J:!airwu. 
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mor~ f:r.:_~-~~!1~-~¥ contr~~-~ed with Ormazd (Ahura Mazda) than with 
Spenta Mainyu; under Zurvanism, "Time" ( Zurvan) was named as 
the father of both Orrnazd and Ahrirnan. Certainly the theme of 
good/evil dualism was one of the better-known features of 
Zoroastrianism (as well as Manichaeism) in the nineteenth 
century. Although it is debatable whether Zoroastrian dualism 
~~-~~~ m?~~--~~treme than the co~P:Eab~~t,~n~~~~es within the 
Abrahami<: tr,aditions, .. its "two principles" do enjoy a certain 
psyc[l_<:>_~<:>_g~.c~-~--~¥-~et~.:. For Zoroaster, the contest between the 
two principles extends to the everyday ethical choices of human 
beings. Our practice of good thoughts (humata), good words 
(hukhta), and good deeds (hvarshta) instead of their opposites 
(respectively dushmata, duzukhta, and duzvarshta) determines 
whether we will go to paradise or hell on the day of 
judgement . 28 If Nietzsche thought of Zoroaster along these 
lines, he would surely see this as another exarrple of a "slave-
revolt" (or more precisely, a priestly one) in morality. 
_Some -~nsight on ___ _?;C:~~~~~:r:· s in._n?Vations_~l!l_ay _E~ __ _provided 
b_y_ .tl1...§-.JS~~~§~_XE?zi<::!_~-~'-··-whose famous vene:r:~-~-~OJ:l~()f the devil 
(M:~-~e~--~awuz, the "peacock angel") is sometimes thought to 
. --· "~--~·-----
~E!p:r:esent a survival of a pre-Zoroastrian __ C:ll..~~-· Kreyenbroek 
(1995), for example, argues that the stages of the pre-
28 Since an etymologically-related Vedic triad appears as 
prayer (sumati), hymns (sukta), and sacrifices (sukrta), it 
appears that Zoroaster cast in ethical terms what had 
previously been strictly ritualistic or propitiatory concepts, 
although Zoroastrianism has plenty of these as well. The 
Zoroastrian triad also recalls the "body, speech, and mind" of 
Buddhist lore. 
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Zoroastrian sacrificial ritual or yasna (Sanskrit yajna) 
provided the model for pre-Zoroastrian account of creation, 
much as its Vedic counterpart inspired the cosmology of the 
Upanishads. If so, then each stage must be assumed to 
represent the creation of something good, since it is offered 
to the deity in the yasna. However, Zoroastrian mythology 
ascribes some of the first seven creative acts (e.g. the 
slaying of gav-aevo-data, the "uniquely-created bull") to Angra 
Mainyu, which suggests that Zoroaster was condemning beliefs 
and practices which had previously been regarded as positive. 
The Yezidis may represent a partially Islamicized remnant of a 
non-Zoroastrian Western Iranian sect which venerated a deity 
regarded as evil by their neighbors; hence the Yezidis' 
reputation as devil-worshippers. 29 Under Islamic influence 
Melek Tawuz came to be identified (even by his own worshippers) 
with the Qur'anic Iblis. At some point the Yezidis 
incorporated the teachings of Ibn al-Arabi, who taught that 
Iblis was cast out of heaven for refusing to bow before Adam 
29 The subject also has a bearing on the debate over the 
origins of the Mithraic mysteries, since anti-Iranian Mithraic 
scholars have protested the identification of the Mithraic 
tauroctony or bull-slaying scene with its Zoroastrian 
counterpart on the grounds that in the latter, the bull is 
slain by Angra Mainyush rather than some suitably benevolent 
deity analogous to Mithras. Without belittling either the 
Hellenistic trappings of Roman Mithraism or the recent 
astrological theories of Beck and Ulansey, I believe the anti-
Iranians are overlooking the extent to which Iranian religion 
was accepted into Roman society (e.g. the magi), especially in 
border regions such as Eastern Anatolia. I am even inclined to 
see a connection between the leontocephalic god of the Mithraic 
mysteries, Narasimha of the Bhagavata-Rurana, and the Chinese 
lion dance. 
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(an honor which he reserved for God himself, making him more 
monotheistic than God). Nevertheless Iblis never ceased being 
the greatest of God's lovers (thereby providing a model for Ibn 
al-Arabi' s Sufi audience) and was eventually restored to his 
former station. 
Related to the "two principles" is Zoroaster's 
distinction between the "three times": past, present, and 
future. In the past, good and evil are said to have inhabited 
separate realms; in the present--now that the world has been 
created as their battleground--they are mixed together; in the 
future, after a final war between good and evil, they will once 
again be separated as each being is judged. Whereas the pre-
Zoroastrian conception of history was likely cyclical (again as 
in the Indian system), the Zoroastrian one incorporates some 
cyclical movement into a fundamentally linear vision of 
history, with a beginning and an end. To the extent that 
Nietzsche thought of Zoroaster in this light he would not have 
approved, given his avowed preference for eternal recurrence. 
Nietzsche explains the grounds for his decision to name 
his Zarathustra after the Zoroastrian founder in two main 
passages. One is from the Nachlass: 
Ich muBte Zarathustra, einem Perser, die Ehre geben: 
Perser haben zuerst Geschichte im Ganzen GroBen gedacht. 
Eine Abfolge von Entwicklungen, jeder prasidirt ein 
Prophet. Jeder Prophet hat seinem hazar, sein Reich von 
tausend Jahren. [24 (148), early 1884; vol. 11, p. 53 of 
Samtliche Werke] 
[I had to give Zarathustra, a Persian, the 




aeons. A succession of developments, each presided over 
by a prophet. Every prophet has his hazar, his kingdom 
of a thousand years.] [My translation.] 
Here the distinguishing characteristic of Zoroaster is said to 
be his conception of history in terms of hazaran ("millennia") , 
a term which Nietzsche could have encountered in Renan's Vie de 
Jesu. (Nietzsche uses it again in z IV, 1). Whether Nietzsche 
specifically means the cyclical or the eschatological aspect of 
this belief is unclear, though either would make sense in light 
of his other writings. The other passage is from Ecce Homo. 
At the beginning of "Warum ich ein Schicksal bin" ("Why I am a 
destiny"), Nietzsche thinks it appropriate for the new 
Zarathustra to atone for the errors of his namesake, who first 
led humanity to believe in the good/evil dichotomy. In this he 
would be inaugurating a new prophetic cycle, by showing how the 
old values devalue themselves (that is, Christianity values 
truth, but the religion itself is not true) . While much of 
this is similar to what Nietzsche says in the first passage, 
this one introduces a new element, namely an allusion to 
Zoroastrianism's famous dualism between good and evil. The 
resulting link between a fall into belief in "two principles" 
and another into a linear conception of history again recalls 
Zoroastrian doctrine. 
Jung mentions both quotes in his Zarathustra seminar. 
After briefly resisting the notion that Nietzsche had been 
influenced by Zoroaster (as quoted above), Jung concedes, 
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Well, it is true that in Zoroaster's teaching, good and 
evil are most important, and Nietzsche thought he was 
called upon by fate to mend the trouble Zoroaster had 
originally made in the world. Nietzsche was still on 
that euhemeristic point of view that man could invent 
values, which of course is a tremendous error ... 
[ZS: 649] 
What trouble did Zoroaster start? Jung says that his teaching 
... was characterized by one particular feature which was, 
one could say, the clue for the fact that Nietzsche chose 
that figure. In fact, Nietzsche himself says that he 
chose Zarathustra because he was the inventor of the 
contrast between good and evil; his teaching was the 
cosmic struggle between the powers of light and darkness, 
and he it was who perpetuated this eternal conflict. And 
in the course of time Zarathustra had to come back again 
in order to mend that invention, in order to reconcile 
the good and evil which he had separated in that remote 
age for the first time. [ZS: 5] 
Jung agrees with Nietzsche's assessment that Zoroaster was the 
first dualist. Based on the passage from the Nachlass (a 
version of which he read in F6rster-Nietzsche' s biography), 
Jung connects the theme of good/evil dualism with that of a 
series of Saoshyants who appear once in a millennium, as the 
aspects of Zoroastrianism that caught Nietzsche's attention. 
Jung briefly describes the Zoroastrian creation myth from 
the Vendidad, with the crucial interpretative twist that it is 
Vohu Mano ("good intention", an emanation of Ahura Mazda) 
rather than Spenta Mairryu who is set opposite Angra Mairryu. 
The effect calls to mind the nondual Yahweh of Antwort auf 
Hiob: 
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These two spirits, . Vohu r-.1ano and Angro Mainyush, were 
···· togefhei·--rn.- the-original .Ahura Mai&', ··shoWing t]1at-In the 
'beginriing-the~re w,is. DC) separation' oT"""goo'CI "and ___ §vi:L-:··--But 
after a --wfiiTe 'fliey began to qua-i:re1 with each other, and 
a fight ensued, and then the creation of the world became 
necessary ... What Ahura Mazda is doing in the end is not 
quite visible or understandable; he is of course supposed 
to be on the side of the good--he is with his good 
spirit, but whether he is with his bad spirit too is not 
clear. It is the same awkward situation that we have in 
Christianity.... [ZS: 7-8] 
of Christianity in connection with 
Zoroa.._~1::r_~_9-:nism is a crucial element of his commentary, since he 
discerns much the s~m~ __ in~erplay between dualistic and monistic 
For exarrple, the fact that 
Nietzsche gives Zarathustra's age as thirty 
... at once creates an identity between Zarathustra ar1d 
___ . __ t:h·e-·Chr-ist:. This is an idea whiCh ls corrnnonly grimted 
historically: namely that it is in the Zoroastrian 
teaching that every thousand years--which simply means an 
indefinite world period, about half a month of the great 
platonic year--a Saoshyant appears (that is a reaper, a 
savior), who teaches people a new revelation, a new truth 
, or renews old truths, a mediator between god and man. 
This is most definitely an idea which went over into the 
Christian teaching, where it took a somewhat different 
form. In Christianity the idea of the enantiodronria came 
in. After the teaching of Christ has had its effect, 
then Satan is given a chance, as you learn from the Book 
of Revelation, "for two times and half a time" --also an 
indefinite period in which he is allowed to enjoy 
himself, working all sorts of evil. [ZS: 12] 
Whereas ancient _ Zoroastrianism posited two equal deities 
who reign simultaneously, Christianity made their kingdoms 
consecutive. This is an allusion to Jung'.s interpretation of 
the Antichrist, Christ's "dark brother", a sort of "negative 
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Saoshyant, appearing when the positive reign of Christ was 
coming to an end" (ZS: 12) . 
Now this idea of the Saoshyant of course also entered the 
mind of Nietzsche: his Zarathustra is a Saoshyant who 
comes after the thousand years are once more fulfilled--
of course not quite, but a peu pres. [ZS: 13] 
Thus Jung relates the conflict between good and evil with the 
Zoroastrian concept of time. He draws a connection between 
this idea and Joachim of Fiore's division of human history into 
ages corresponding to the members of the Trinity: the Old 
Testament, the Age of the Father; the New Testament, the Age of 
the Son; and the Millennium, the Age of the Holy Spirit ·----~ince 
'::J:_~!:l_q __ ~_~es the devil as a hidden fourth member of the TrirE:~J', 
it follows that he should have an aeon of his own; and thi1S is 
the reign of the Antichrist. (Oddly enough, Jung's mention of 
the inexactitude of the thousand-year periods makes Martin 
Luther the previous prophet before Nietzsche.) "So 
his message is opposed to that of Christianity" (ZS: 13). 
The idea of Nietzsche's Zarathustra doing away with the 
values established by his predecessors in Zoroastrianism and 
--··~-~~w--- ~-~--.. ~~·---------~·-~·--·· """-· -•- --·"--• 
Nietzsche's references to hazaran, I suggest that he is 
attempting to combine the etemality of a cyclical universe, 
which he praises under the name of "eternal recurrence, " with 
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the possibility of transcending the present order of things. 
It is often observed that Nietzsche's idea of eternal 
recurrence appears to be incompatible with his expectation of 
--~---·-• --·- ·-~•ov ·-~•' -•~·~- ~•••--•••• ~ •• •·--• ·-·~ • ~ ·---• 
the Obermensch, of whom humanity has never yet seen the like. 
Yet the Zoroastrian system provides a model for how the two 
ideas might be reconciled. On one hand, no prophetic message 
is absolute or meant to last forever, since such rE:!velatisms 
are always subject to being superseded }::):y some new trut_"b:_ __ ~n t0:~ 
future. This accords well with Nietzsche's suspicion of truth 
and values. On the other hand, the imagery of 
suggests that each new dispensation is in some way a 
continuation of the earlier ones. In this light, the next 
prophet would be in some sense the return of the historical 
Zarathustra. In bringing out this allusion, Jung has thus made 
possible what lS arguably a solution to an important problem of 
interpretation with respect to Zarathustra. 
B. Visionary gnosis 
One of the most important innovations of Zoroastrianism 
was its emphasis on boundaries, i . e. between the II two 
principles II of good and evil. This teac!J.ing also serve,_<:!__to 
create barriers between early Zoroastrianism and rival cults of 
--- -----~......_. __ .,....__.__~------~-------- ----------=--- -·~ --~--,~~~~~----~---~·-·--------
wh;i.~l1,~~~9r~ster disapproved, such as that of Indra and the 
--·------ -~---------~· . ....., ""-"'"'~----,. ........ -~.---~ -~-· -- -~- -~--....,.__- -------~- .. . "----~-- ~--·-""",_......,,__ __ 
other daevas. Although this perspective spread only gradually 
under Zoroastrianism, later prophets in the Jewish, Christian, 
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and Islamic traditions were more successful in drawing sharp 
distinctions between what they regarded as the true religion on 
one hand and certain preexisting cultic elements of their 
cultures (or religions founded by rival prophets) on the other. 
As these religions spread, cultural differences between areas 
under the control of rival religions were exaggerated, until 
people in Europe and the Middle East ultimately came to think 
of themselves as living in separate cultural worlds altogether. 
Such imposed boundaries often disguise important 
cormnonalities, either left over from previous eras when the 
political situation was different or the result of inevitable 
cross-border influences. At the same time, attempts to 
identify these invariably prove controversial--scholars of 
Roman Mithraism are divided as to whether that religion should 
be regarded as an Iranian import or an indigenous Roman mystery 
religion; while scholars of ancient gnosticism variously trace 
this cluster of movements to Jewish, Hellenistic, or Iranian 
origins. One of the pan-Eurasianists, Henri Corbin ( 1978) , 
uses the term "gnosis" to include not only the cormnonly-
recognized gnostic movements of the ancient Mediterranian but 
to many facets of Iranian religion as well. While to many 
"gnosticism" suggests a radical rejection of the physical 
world--along with its creator--in favor of a world of spirit to 
which the gnostic aspires to return (a perspective which 
Nietzsche contradicts through his exhortations to remain 
"faithful to the earth") , Corbin sees as the defining 
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characteristic of "gnosis" the concept of esoteric knowledge 
and/or visionary experience as salvific (which need not imply 
any particular description of its content). Accordingly, for 
him "gnosis" encanpasses such disparate traditions as 
Hermeticism, ancient Jewish mysticism, and Iranian Sufism, 
which combine visionary experiences of the cosmos with a more 
world-affinning perspective than the "heretical" Christian 
gnostics. (Today "gnosis" is sometimes contrasted with 
"gnosticism", with the latter term reserved for the more 
restricted sense.) 
resemblance to aspects of Mahayana Buddhism and even rel~g:is::ms 
Taoism, with which it boasts plausible historical links. This 
-·-~ -·~··m-···-'"""'"_.,,..___ •• •·-~• ••~•••~·-~·-"-·~··- ,_,,"_ ·•-•. -"~oM•• •• .- • -··~"*'""~-·-,_-.,.~---_.,..,.,.....,_,_~,.--.~ 
suggests that traditions of gnosis have radiated outward from 
Ir~n in s~yeral directi?~~'. if they di.9 __ .rl:~~"-~~..Eecl.SiY. exist in 
~_!:1-~s~ \f~E~.?~~---cu~-~l!~es _ _p:-_2:~~9 the rise of the boun~.~:X:~~ing 
Western religions. 
<•-··~ . ..,,_- ,. ···"- ·~- ... ~-""""···•..- '<'·--~ .. --~,.,....,., ..... __ 
Nietzsche 1 s experiences of Zarathustra recall a common 
theme in visionary gnosis, in which a luminous figure appears 
before the gnostic to serve as his guide in the supersensory 
realm. Such figures may take the form of a god, (e.g. the 
deities of religious Taoism; the figure on the throne in the 
Book of Daniel), angel (e.g. Jibril 1 S appearance before 
Muhammad; Metatron from Slavonic Enoch); buddha or bodhisattva, 
religious founder, saint, hero, or one 1 s personal teacher. 
Rene Guenon 1 S Lord of the World (1927) traces a Theosophical 
myth of a mysterious ruler who directs world affairs from his 
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hidden refuge, to older notions of a kingly "celestial 
intermediary" as exemplified by Manu, Metatron, or Melchizedek. 
In The Man of Light in Iranian Sufism (1978), Corbin focuses on 
guidebooks to visionary experiences rather than the more 
widely-known classics of Islamic philosophy or Qur'anic 
exegesis. C~:r:rt::reil to his account of Semnani, Surhawardi, and 
other Iranian Sufi writers is the notion of Hurqalya, a 
luminous supersensory realm which is conceived both in 
cosmological terms (i.e. as a heavenly earth situated in the 
~,_ -H•'-'H-"'•- • .• ~.~~~- -·~~'~'"'"'"~·~- "'C''"'"''~" "< _,",~,...,-,, -
celestial "north" or "east") and psychological ones (as 
s~~-e.~hing to be reached through intense inner-directed 
spiritual practice 
para.~()xical exp:-essions as a "black !ig-ht :· or "numino~-~-~q~glJ.!" 
(Corbin 1978: 15). 
encountered there are the a!:l:9'els, sheikhs, and :PE£Pb:_~1=:~of 
Islam. While details differ according to the teacher, it seems 
that each person boasts a spiritual guide who is related in 
some mysterious way to the glorified form of the practitioner. 
The two are not identical, but the guide can only appear to 
those who have properly purified themselves. This theme Corbin 
traces to the Zoroastrian teaching which holds that our souls 
_ .. ---~--~---,__,., .. ~ ""--·~·,.-~,..,-· ... -·,_,_,,. , . ._.,.,..., ... """""""""""'""'""'"'"'""'~--·"'""-· ~ . "'' ·""-"""''0" --...~-----~--"" -~---~---._.. ... ----"~----
are sparks of light trapped within the darkness of the material 
~-------· ........ --~-----"""""-,_",.. __ ... ~-"-"'---'"'"'"'"'-····~-,-·"""'"""'··· 
world. 30 To Corbin it also recalls the Hermetic notion of a 
"perfected nature" or the Manichaean and Mandean one of a 
30 Incidentally, this belief inspired Zoroastrian artists-
-as well as Christian and Buddhist ones after them--to paint 
haloes around saintly figures. These in turn inspired the 
familar royal symbol of a golden crown with rays. 
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"heavenly twin". The notion also runs parallel to similar 
ideas from the Indian schools of Samhkya and Vedanta (my gloss, 
not Corbin's) , as well as Kabbalistic accounts of the cosmic 
man Adam Kadmon, early Christian and gnostic accounts of 
Christ, and analogous themes from Mahayana Buddhism and 
religious Taoism. The degree of interconnection between these 
various religions is not commonly realized, again due to the 
Zoroastrian emphasis on boundaries. 
In section three of Ecce Homo, Nietzsche speaks of his 
encounters with Zarathustra as involuntary ('><?? __ hab~.nie_~J.-ne 
Wahl gehabt"), and himself as a mere mouthpi~<:;-~_.}ikening _!?e 
process to poetic "inspiration" in the original sense of a kind 
•• ~ .. -. <+ ------- ~---~---~-- ~ ----------·~--~---- --~·----- ----~·-·------~·---'""' ~-------------------~ h---·----~------·-----
of revelation from the muses. The power of the exp~E-~er:tc~ 
---·-·-·"··-~·-----------~-----.------- "·--· -----------~----------·- _______ .J ·-· 
~2P~E~ .. -~?. ~c:_~~ shaken hi.~-- ~~~pl~!. so tha~ in _attef!1p"t:ir1~_'t:_? 
ggsg_~i12§ .. ~!=:. he is led to com:pa..r~ ~t to J.~ght1J:ir1g, a)}Q ___ !,g_§TS. 
When Jung refers to this confession of Nietzsche's, the reader 
is left with the distinct impression that .':!~P~L .. -~~- able to 
emp~thize with a side of Nietzsche which more ph_~l<:)soph~~a~2:-y­
inclined commentators, accustomed as they are to a more 
overlook or fail to appreciate. In 
this context Jung also cites the testimony of Nietzsche's 
sister to the effect that Zarathustra was more than just a 
character in a book: 
Now Zarathustra is by no means a merely metaphorical 
or poetical figure invented by the author himself. He 
.once wrote to his sister _ that Zarathustrc:t __ hc:tCi _§.l_reqgy 1 
a.12.12eared to him In a dream when--:hewa·s--a.· boy. L~~~ J • 
<r~"-""""'""-~-~-·-¥• ~ ""'~~ .. -''""'" .... -~~· •••·• '"""'"-~'" ______ n•-•••-••••·-•• 
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Jung' s source, Elisabeth Forster-Nietzsche, writes that her 
brother "had the figure of Zarathustra in his mind from his 
very earliest youth: he once told me that "even as a child he 
had dreamt of him. At various times he gave this dream-figure 
different names ... " (The quote is from Volume II, chapter 12 
of the English translation of her biography of Nietzsche; __ for _ 
some reason this paragraph is missing from the German. 
~---·-- ·-·~·~~ ..... ~--,-·-~· _,.. 
In defense of the idea of Zarathustra's relative autonomy 
from Nietzsche, Jung also quotes the last two lines of 
Nietzsche's breath-taking short poem, "Sils-Maria", which I 
reproduce here in full: 
Sils-Maria 
Hier sag ich, wartend, wartend--doch auf nichts, 
Jenseits von Gut und Bose, bald des Lichts 
Geniegend, bald des Schattens, ganz nur Spiel 
Ganz See, ganz Mittag, ganz Zeit ohne Ziel. 
Da, plotzlich, Freundin! wurde Eins zu Zwei:--
--und Zarathustra ging an mir vorbei .... 
[Echtermeyer & von Weise 1982: 523] 
[I sat there waiting, waiting:::-1191: _for ?J.nyt=:hJ.ng..:.. 
Beyond good and evil, enjoying soon the light. 
Soon the sha'de, now onlyplay~-now--····-0 ·---·-. --
The lake, now the moon, wholly time without end. 
Then suddenly, friend, one became two--
--~~-za·r(3_thustra passeCi-~y_:jti~~ ( 
[Translated in ZS: 10 n. 10] 
Kohler (1989: 386 ff) gives several variations of this poem as 
Nietzsche developed it. Named for the Alpine town in Upper 
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Engadine, Switzerland where Nietzsche wrote Part II of 
Zarathustra, the poem 1s conceptually noteworthy for its 
cryptic linking of two of Nietzsche 1 s most important themes: 
th~ idea of going "beyond good and evil" on one hand, and the 
character of Zarathustra on the other. Here, Zarathustra 
appears to represent a level of reality which carl:_ onl~ app_~r 
after one has transcended at least the duality of good and 
evil, and perhaps duality in general. 
------------------------------
Jung reminds his class 
that Sils-Maria is almost six thousand feet above sea-level, 
- -
and that Nietzsche "used t()_ f3peak of being six thousand feet 
.:tJ?~V~---~?. .. <:>~---~~9-___ evil--above ordinary humanity, that is" (ZS: 
/ 
15) . 31 The theme of going beyond good and evil, we may note, 
is metaphorically repeated in the play of light and shadow 
which is so central to the poem. At the same time, the course 
of the sun can also refer to the relentless march of day and 
night, and hence symbolizes all the petty drudgery of human 
affairs. Like Zarathustra in his mountains, the poet is 
literally above all that. His perspective is one of "wholly 
time without end," possibly an allusion to Nietzsche 1 s idea of 
eternal recurrence. Jung does not comment on the "Freundin" of 
line five. Nietzsche may have meant Lou Salome, Cosima Wagner, 
or even his sister; if asked about it, Jung might have 
responded with a discourse on the Anima. 
31 
__ J: __ egg __ unable to confirm the . quote--Jung is probably 
thinking of tlie--:zarathustia 'cbapter--of-Ecce Homo, in which 
Nietzsche places Sils Maria "6000 FuJS j enseits von Mensch und 
Zeit." 
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Jung sees Nietzsche 1 s testimony that "one became two" as 
evidence that Zarathustra and Nietzsche are not the same 
person. That is to say, Nietzsche 1 s poem r:ecorc1~ ___ a hi~~?E~cal 
;'plit within Nietzsche 1 s psyche, whereby his unconscious._tg_ok \ 
on a distinct personality of its own and adopted th~-~E~PP~~gs 
of Zarathustra. Thus, says Jung, Zarathustra as a character is 
not just a literary invention on the part of Nietzsche, but a 
mysterious f~gure which really did appear to him unbidden from . 
out of the depths of his unconscious, and whose teachings ~e 
t::_:r:-anscribed through a process similar to autc::matic writing. 
Commenting elsewhere on the same poem, Jung explains that 
Nietzsche 1 s soul had been alienated by his adoption of the 
materialism of his era, and that Zarathustra appeared to him by 
way of compensation: 
Zarathustra ist fur NIETZSCHE mehr als poetische 
Figur, er ist ein unwillkurliches Bekenntnis. Auch er 
hatte sich in den Dunkelheiten eines gottabgewandten, 
entchristlichten Lebens verirrt, und darum trat zu ihm 
der Offenbarende und Erleuchtende, als redender Quell 
seiner Seele. Daher starrmt die hieratische Sprache des 
«Zarathustra», denn das ist der Stil dieses Archetypus. 
[GW, 9-I, 20] 
[Zarathustra is more for Nietzsche than a poetic 
figure; he is an involuntary confession, a testament. 
Nietzsche too had lost his way in the darkness of a life 
that turned its back upon God and Christianity, and that 
is why there came to him the revealer and enlightener, 
the speaking fountainhead of his soul. Here is the 
source of the hieratic language of Zarathustra, for that 
is the style of this archetype.] 
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Jung sees Nietzsche's Zarathustra as an expression of the 
unconscious, sometimes meaning Nietzsche's individual 
unconscious and sometimes the collective unconscious. Jung 
explains that 
The man who speaks or writes is Nietzsche; it is as if he 
were the historian of Zarathustra, describing what he had 
been doing. Zarathustra is obviously objectified here, 
the writer does not seem to be identical with him. 
[ZS: 11] 
If Zarathustra exists independently of Nietzsche, as _':!ung 
c_;L~~~s, then what sort of is he? Jung writes that 
·-='···- ____ ....... . 
Zarathustra "became manifest 
himself" (i.e., Nietzsche) (ZS: 10). Recall that for Jung, the 
-- ---- ~-~---···---~-~- ·----~N>••-~·-~ •~ 
psyche can and generally does encompass more than one locus of 
-- ~''"·~-··-~---~--~~·~~--. •• ,_,••~-·--"· "··- ••-••-••-~c '""'"~~ ' •••••• 
12ersonali~x.~ In addition to the e.90 I a nurnber __ ~f Y!l~.<?~~cious 
~~~~~~~-- ex~-~!:. __ ~i ~-~~-·-·the same psyche w~~-<::'ll .. ~.<::;t: in(i_~P~I!.?er1!:1Y_of 
tJ?: .. ~ .. __ _ego _:e_~~!:2l} t;z.:_ (These are termed "c::gmpl_exes" if .!:E .. ~.Y 
originate in the personal unconscious, and "archetypes" if they 
,"'·' - -~---·"·~--~""~--~·~-~-·----· ... ·~- ·- -· ~ 
originate 1n the collective unconscious.) .~.Jhey may be 
encountered during dreams and visions, where t:hey: ____ are 
experienced as something external to the ego. At the same 
time, Jung affirms Zarathustra' s dependence on Nietzsche as 
well as his autonomy: 
Nietzsche does not think for a moment that Zarathustra is 
a spirit in his own dignity and right. He always 
interpenetrates. He is that spirit somehow. [ZS: 203] 
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And again: 
Of course Zarathustra is always identical with Nietzsche; 
he is never clearly differentiated, and so practically 
eve:ry figure in Thus Spake Zarathustra is always in a way 
Nietzsche himself. [ZS: 770] 
Jung doubts that Nietzsche understood the true nature of the 
Zarathustra who appeared to him: 
I am .. quite cert<;d,nL ... f:r:om. w...llg.t J'Li?_t~E>.che .. _E.§y_~_about 
Zarathustra, that he experienced him as an identity 
wiE11In--T:iim.serr·fFiat--liaa ·existed for man· thousands ·--of 
-· - .... ..... .. . .. . . - ......... --··· ...... .... ... . .. -·----·~:¥~------·-···· ---·-····--· ·----· .. ~ ---
___ y~_9:~S ___ bef()re hi.~' t::fiat had always bee:r:t~ When that figure 
appears, he simply emerges from a background which is 
always there; he is called out through the need of the 
time, the emergencies of the actual epoch. [ZS: 13] 
c. The Babi movement 
To my knowledge, no Nietzsche commentators to date have 
thought to ask what was going on in Persia during Nietzsche 1 s 
time, which might have inspired him to choose an Iranian 
prophet as the main character of his Zarathustra. Educated 
Europeans of Nietzsche 1 s day would have had access to much 
information about various religious developments there. 
Moreover these were not seen as merely quaint or exotic 
sectarian developments, but live influences on Western 
intellectuals--although Khajar-dynasty Persia was widely (and 
accurately) regarded as backward and corrupt, the question of 
reform there struck many educated Europeans as roughly 
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analogous to comparable political situations in their own 
countries. 
For nineteenth-century Europeans, by far the most 
interesting religious event in Persia would have been the 
career of Siyyid Ali Muhammad Shirazi, better known to 
posterity as the Bab. The Bab was a Shaykhi leader who in 1844 
declared himself to be the "Gate" (Bab) to the Hidden Imam. 32 
Soon he revealed that he was the return of the Hidden Imam 
himself. Finally, he led his followers to understand that he 
was a new prophet equal in station to Muhammad, with the 
authority to abrogate Islamic law. The result was predictable-
-religious riots ensued, resulting in the arrest, imprisonment, 
and (in 1850) eventual execution of the Bab. Forced to defend 
themselves from a hostile populace and government, his 
followers fought three main battles (at the shrine of Shaykh 
Tabarsi in Mazindaran, the town of Nayriz, and the fortress of 
Zanjan), each resulting in the massacre of the besieged Babis. 
Just when an accord seemed likely, a failed attempt by two 
Babis to assassinate Nasiri 'd-Din Shah in 1852 (they used 
birdshot rather than bullets) brought about a new wave of 
reprisals. 
None of this would have caught the attention of 
Europeans, except for four things: First, the Bab was known to 
32 The first couple of chapters in Miller ( 1974) provide a 
good overview of the Shaykhyi and Babi movements. Nabil (1932) 
is the most readable of the several Persian primary sources on 
the history of the Babi rebellions. 
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have a high regard for Christianity. Forgetting that Islamic 
tradition looks upon Jesus as a prophet of Islam, Christians in 
the West were encouraged to think of the Bab, if not exactly as 
one of their own co-religionists, than at least as a 
sympathizer. Second, by daring to abrogate Islamic law, the 
Bab gained a reputation in the West as a social reformer, if 
not an outright anarchist. For example, his support for 
greater rights for women inspired accusations to the effect 
that the Babis practiced free love, and the fact that his 
followers pooled their possessions led some to regard him as a 
kind of socialist or communist. Especially when compared to 
the corrupt and brutally repressive Khajar government, the Bab 
looked positively radical and progressive. Third, the Babi 
rebellions took place shortly after the series of European 
upheavals including the Revolution of 1848; so the events in 
Persia took on considerable relevance for Europeans. Fourth, 
reports of the Babis' heroism during the massacres aroused 
intense admiration in the martyr-hungry European press. 
The first published book to mention the Babis was Lady 
Sheil's Life and manners of Persia (1856), 1n which she calls 
the Babi religion "the simplest of religions. 
be summed up in materialism, communism, 
Its tenets may 
and the entire 
indifference to good and evil of all human actions" (in Momen 
1981: 8-9). Nietzsche could read English, and might have 
picked up her book on the basis of his interest in Eastern 
religions. A decade later Jakob Polak wrote a book in German, 
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Persien. Das Land und seine Bewohner (Persia: the country and 
its inhabitants, 1865), in which he names as Babi beliefs the 
emancipation of women, pacifism, communism, the expectation of 
an afterlife, and the smoking of hashish (Momen 1981: 16). 
Much more importantly, around the same time fuller accounts 
were published by Joseph Arthur, Comte de Gobineau (in Les 
philosophies et les religions dans l'Asie Centrale, 1865) and 
Ernest Renan (in Les apotres, 1865). These two books led to a 
wave of popular and academic interest in the Babi movement 
which in turn captured the imagination of such well-known 
European intellectuals as Turgenev, Tolstoy, and Benjamin 
Jowett (Momen 1981: 52-54). 
Gobineau ' s book on the Babis was reviewed in several 
German-language newspapers and journals including the Tubingen-
based Allgemeine Zei tung (Momen 1981: 24) . In addition to 
describing the history of the upheavals, which he heard about 
during his diplomatic service in Persia, Gobineau devotes much 
attention to explicating the doctrines of the Bab which he sees 
as a kind of Sufi-oriented pantheism. He also provides a 
translation of portions of the Arabic Bayan (Commentary), one 
of the Bab's major writings. True to his formula, Renan for 
his part sees the Bab as 
A mild and unassuming man, in character and opinion a 
sort of pious and modest Spinoza, was suddenly and almost 
in spite of himself raised to the rank of a worker of 
miracles and a divine incarnation; and became the head of 
a numerous, ardent, and fanatical sect, which came near 
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to accomplishing a revolution like that of Muhammad. 
[in Momen 1981: 77] 
The possibility of Nietzsche's Zarathustra having been 
influenced by Gobineau or Renan is extremely high. Remember 
that Nietzsche could read French, and that both Gobineau and 
Renan were famous French proponents of a type of Aryan racial 
theory which was also popular in Germany. Nietzsche was deeply 
concerned about such theories, so we may safely assume that he 
would have been aware of other books by such authors. Kaufmann 
( 1968: 391 n. 11) quotes the Nazi scholar Curt von 
Westernhagen, who complains that Nietzsche (in his observations 
about "master morality" and "slave morality") intentionally 
uses language reminiscent of Gobineau, only to go on to subvert 
rather than embrace racial doctrines. Furthermore, Gobineau 
was a member of the Wagner circle and on one occasion barely 
missed meeting Nietzsche (Santaniello 1994: 161 n. 67). As for 
Renan, Der Antichrist makes unfavorable mention of his writings 
on Christian origins (e.g: AC 17). 
One more book on the subject deserves mentioning, namely 
Die Babis ~n Persien (1896), written by one Friedrich Carl 
Andreas. Andreas, an ethnic Persian (despite his name) who 
lived in Persia for several years during the 1870's, was a 
Gottingen professor of philology specializing in Iranian 
languages. Nietzsche fans will remember him primarily for his 
marriage to Lou Salome. Since Nietzsche was not informed of 
their engagement until 1887 (Binion 1968: 135), the idea that 
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Also sprach Zarathustra would have been influenced by Andreas 
is not nearly so demonstrable as it would be if the book had 
been written a few years later; still, the connection is 
intriguing. Nietzsche may have known of Andreas in his 
capacity as a scholar of philology, but this is speculation. 
By now I hope I have made the case that Nietzsche had the 
opportunity to be influenced by the Babi movement. Now let us 
examine specific themes from Zarathustra in light of this 
presumed connection. The first revelation of this new 
Zarathustra is that God is dead. 33 While Nietzsche never says 
.!:hJJ3-.. ~~~i~~t:ly, the -~dea behind the death of God seems to be 
the observation that now that belief in God is disappearing, 
-~E-~-·-~dea of God is no longer a~~-~- __ !:::? .. P~~-~grm its traditional 
societal function of serving as a basis for morality. Although 
for the masses of Nietzsche's generation the implications had 
yet to sink in, the eventual result of this collapse of a God-
based morality was to be a series of the most catastrophic wars 
the world had ever known, as our last moral inhibitions are 
abandoned and full vent given to our will to power. Oddly 
enough, there exists a parallel in Babi doctrine to Nietzsche's 
idea of the death of God. The Bab, like Nietzsche, felt that 
civilization was in the process of decay or degeneration, and 
33 Nietzsche had made use of this theme before, most 
notably ___ .in his pa:biliie ·orfne"'"madrri3.n-~wfiO .. Tirsf seekS _.QQg_L_t:hen 
accuses--·ni.iinanify. .. oT"" mtiraering'"" ""Fiim"""-(FrohlTche. ·--Wi ssenschaft I 
/'125). Elsewhere --(ASZ, II,--:n-·:·--however I the cause of death is 
given as God's pity (Mitleid) for humanity, a diagnosis which 
bears a curious symmetry with Zarathustra' s final temptation, 
"das Mitleiden mit dem hoheren Menschen" ("pity for the higher 
man"), at the close of the book. 
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that only a new moral or religious dispensation could restore 
it to health. On the other hand, the dread of species-wide 
degeneration was widespread among nineteenth-century European 
intellectuals, who evidently feared that they were not living 
up to the high standards of bygone eras (Noll 1994: 28-32). 
The interesting thing about the idea of a Babi connection 
is that it suggests the possibility of God being brought back 
to life, in the sense that in the wake of the Bab's teaching, 
belief in God might once again becane a significant force in 
people's lives. As Jaspers points out (1961), although 
Nietzsche's attitude toward Christianity is quite strident, the 
very venom of his condemnation suggests that he cared more for 
the religion than he let on. It is as if he sometimes imagines 
that Christianity would not be such a bad religion if it would 
only live up to the ideals which it theoretically advocates, 
such as truth, compassion, or the example of Jesus. Insofar as 
the religion falls away from these ideals, Nietzsche feels 
betrayed. His condemnation of it should therefore be read not 
as the jeers of a contented atheist, but as the heartfelt pleas 
of a scorned prophet. If Nietzsche calls for Christianity to 
be destroyed, this is because he believes that it can no longer 
be salvaged. At the same time he raises the expectation that 
something new should arise to replace it. 
with the Babi conception of history, 
This is consistent 
inherited from 
Zoroastrianism and Shi'i Islam, as a succession of aeons, each 
centered around a different "pole" (kutub; i.e. a prophet or 
159 
imam). Babi doctrine recognizes a kind of societal or 
spiritual evolution from one prophetic dispensation to the 
next. In order to provide progressively appropriate guidance, 
God periodically sends a new prophet (rasul) or manifestation 
(mazhar), of whom the Bab is said to be the most recent, on an 
average of one every thousand years. 
In place of God, Zarathustra proclaims the Ubermensch as 
the basis of the new morality. Unlike religious believers who 
accept the primacy of otherworldly concerns (such as God or the 
afterlife) over more mundane affairs, the Ubermensch remains 
"faithful to the earth" ( "der Erde treu"; z Vorrede, sec. 3) in 
his values. As we have seen, some early observers of the Babi 
movement thought that they were materialists, although on this 
point they were certainly wrong. The Ubermensch is the next 
stage in evolution, as far above humanity as we are above the 
apes. 34 Nietzsche sees humanity as contemptible, a condition 
to be overcome--"Der Mensch ist etwas, das uberwunden werden 
soll." ( Z Vorrede, sec. 3) ; or if this is impractical, a 
condition whose overcoming is to be longed for. Nietzsche and 
Zarathustra may not be Supermen, but at least they recognize 
their own all-too-human shortcomings. 
This quality of self-contempt is missing among the "last 
humans," who are unable to overcome or "despise" themselves" (Z 
Vorrede, sec. 5) and are thus condemned to remain, as humans, 
34 In Ecce Homo ( "Warum Ich So Gute Bucher Schreibe, " sec. 
1) , however, Nietzsche denies that Darwinian evolution is 
meant; and in the Nachlass (e.g. 1067) rejects Darwinism on the 
grounds that humanity has regressed rather than progressed. 
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until the coming of the Superman. In this we may find 
reflected the attitude of the Babis toward traditional Muslims, 
who in their view have missed the opportunity to continue 
participating in the evolution of humanity by recognizing the 
manifestation of God for this aeon. Without this transcendent 
function (to borrow a Jungianism), which is contained within 
Islam itself, Muslims are doomed to spiritually stagnate, or so 
the Bab would have us believe. Zarathustra is not an 
Ubermensch, but only their herald, a sort of John the Baptist 
to their Jesus; a foreboding raindrop in a cloudy sky to their 
lightning (Z Vorrede, sec.4). This accords well with the 
attitude of the Bab with respect to him whom God shall make 
manifest (man Yuzhiruhu 'llah) as recounted in Gobineau. The 
Bab sometimes writes as if his main purpose were to prepare the 
way for this mysterious figure, whose message will be far 
superior to his own. Gobineau records their belief that just 
as the successive dispensations of Moses, Jesus, Muhammad, and 
the Bab brought about an "advancement of humanity," so does 
Babi doctrine anticipate the coming of "him whom God shall make 
manifest", by which was apparently meant some future prophet 
under whom the process of progressive revelation would 
continue. The Bab's lavish praise for this mysterious figure 
is curiously parallel to Zarathustra' s praise of the coming 
Ubermensch. As mentioned before, such an Iranian model could 
make the concept of the Ubermensch consistent with etemal 
recurrence. 
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In Zarathustra, Nietzsche sees the will to power as a 
basic motivating force for human decision-making. Sometimes we 
refuse to recognize this--Nietzsche criticizes Christian 
morality as hypocrisy on the grounds that even apparently 
selfless moral behavior is actually motivated by a desire for 
power, however sublimated. Nietzsche, however, sees this 
pursuit of will as something which is essentially good. 
Sometimes he advances a more sweeping view in which the will to 
power is claimed to be the ultimate motivation for all human 
activity (JGB, 23), or even all life (as in the fragments in 
Die Wille zur Macht under that heading). While none of this is 
immediately recognizable as a Babi teaching, we can glimpse in 
it something of the Sufi urge to universalize from human 
emotions outward, so that certain emotions (e.g. love) are 
regarded as nearer to God and therefore more fundamental to the 
fabric of the universe. Remember that Gobineau discusses the 
Babis in the context of Sufism, which did indeed influence them 
although it was not really the core of their religious identity 
(in fact they grew out of the Shaykhi movement) . Nietzsche 
might have settled on will as supreme by combining this Sufi 
universalism with the materialist ideals which the Babis were 
sometimes thought to advocate. 
At the beginning of the Zarathustra chapter of Ecce Homo, 
Nietzsche calls eternal recurrence35 "die Grundkonzeption des 
35 Eternal recurrence (Ewige Wiederkehr) refers to an idea 
associated with nee-Platonism, that the same events are 
destined to repeat themselves again and again. The idea had 
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Werks." The idea is linked with that of the will to power in 
Zarathustra, where Zarathustra says, "Die Vergangnen zu erlosen 
und alles »es war« umzuschaffen in ein »so wollte ich es«--das 
heiJSe mir erst Erlosung!" ("To redeem those who lived in the 
past and to recreate all 'it was' into 'thus I willed it'--that 
alone should I call redemption"; z II, 20) This accounts for 
Nietzsche's praise of Spinoza, because only a very noble person 
' 
could have created a philosophy in which everything that is, 
must inevitably have been so (and consequently we do not face 
any genuine moral choices) . Nietzsche's concept of etemal 
recurrence resembles the Shaykhyi and Babi concept of rij'at or 
"return," which refers not to reincarnation (which was known by 
another term, tanasukh, and in any case rejected by the Babis), 
but to the idea that the same types of people appear again and 
again. The idea that the prophets and Imams are not only 
humans who live and die, but also the manifestation of 
universal principles, is a distinguishing feature of Shaykhi 
theology which was carried over into the Babi and Baha' i 
religions. For exarrple, the Bab was said to be the "return" of 
Ali, not in the sense of being the reincarnation of the 
historical Ali, but as another material expression of the same 
been used in Fr6hliche Wissenschaft ( 341) , where Nietzsche 
challenges the reader to consider whether he would regard such 
a revelation as the work of a god or a demon. Whether 
Nietzsche really believes in etemal recurrence, or merely uses 
the idea as a way of illustrating certain attitudes toward life 
( "jasagen" versus "neinsagen"), is uncertain; in Der Wille zur 
Macht Nietzsche argues for the idea on the grounds that the 
number of possible arrangements of matter in the universe is 
finite, and the amount of time infinite. 
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universal archetype, so to speak. (Both Christian and Muslim 
writers have noted a certain resemblance to the Christian 
doctrine of the Incarnation, which has made the idea highly 
suspect within Islamic circles.) Nietzsche could have 
encountered the idea in Gobineau, then appropriated it for use 
in his Zarathustra. 
As Zarathustra progresses, its tone evolves from the 
serious, prophetic, exhortationarY style of the earlier 
speeches to the comic burlesques of Part Four in which 
Zarathustra sings, dances, and laughs. It has occurred to me 
that this transformation reflects Nietzsche's desire to 
supplant the former values, the "spirit of gravity" 
characteristic of religious discourse, with something more 
exuberent and life-affirming. In this Nietzsche may be 
recalling the attitude of the Babi martyrs. Renan praises 
their willingness to be content with their suffering (Momen 
1981: 23), .recalling Zarathustra's song of love for eternity in 
Part Four. In a deeply moving passage, Gobineau relates how a 
group of captured Babis were paraded through the streets with 
burning candles inserted into their open wounds. Their 
expressions, however, were tranquil and joyous. 
guard asked them why they did not dance, 
When a jeering 
since they were 
obviously so happy, the prisoners obliged by dancing (in Momen: 
144). Nietzsche praises this type of attitude under the name 
of amor fati ("love of fate") , which is the main point of his 
teaching of eternal recurrence. 
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If Nietzsche's Zarathustra was indeed inspired by the 
Babi movement as filtered through the lens of his Western 
heritage, this would explain many things: the choice of an 
Iranian prophet as the main character, the meaning behind some 
of Nietzsche's most famous philosophical ideas, and his basis 
for linking them together as Zarathustra' s teaching. 
Furthermore, it reveals something about his intentions in 
writing Zarathustra, suggesting that that work and others after 
it were aimed at overthrowing a social order which Nietzsche 
loathed for the very best of reasons. Jung was right in seeing 
Nietzsche in light of the social and political turmoil of his 
era, but underestimated the degree to which he undertook to 
actively bring about change. Besides the. Bab, the Prophet 
Muhammad may have provided Nietzsche with another model for his 
Antichristian crusade, in which case Zarathustra would be his 
answer to the Qur 'an (which also consists of a series of 
prophetically inspired speeches) . Of course Nietzsche is 
likely to have also intended his proposed crusade as a more 
positive version of the Bayreuth cult designed to atone for 
Wagner's mistakes. 
I cannot resist the observation that for many, the 
suppression of the Babi movement in Persia was not the end of 
the story. Today, some five million Baha'is view the Bab as 
the forerunner of their own religion, which is known especially 
for its exaltation of the unity of humanity above all divisions 
of race, sex, and nationality. To that end, the Baha'is have 
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consciously sought out and achieved a most amazing diversity 
within their own ranks, and have done much to persuade the 
larger world to embrace similar values. (This cosmopolitanism 
was already present to some extent among the Babis, although in 
an Islamic context this would not have been considered novel.) 
Where Nietzsche despite his best efforts failed to make much 
progress against racism and extreme nationalism, the 
inspiration behind his Zarathustra may yet accomplish a great 
deal in this regard. I am reminded of a verse in Zarathustra: 
Tausend Ziele gab es bisher, denn tausend Volker gab 
es. Nur die Fessel der tausend Nacken fehlt noch, es 
fehlt das Eine Ziel. Noch hat die Menschheit kein Ziel. 
Aber sagt mir doch, meine Bruder: wenn der 
Menschheit das Ziel noch fehlt, fehlt da nicht auch--sie 
selber noch?--
Also sprach Zarathustra. [Z I, 15] 
[A thousand goals have there been so far, for there 
have been a thousand peoples. Only the yoke for a 
thousand necks is still lacking: the one goal is 
lacking. Humanity still has no goal. 
But tell me, my brothers, if humanity still lacks a 
goal--is humanity itself not still lacking too? 
Thus spoke Zarathustra.] 
A certain ironic humor may be discerned in the fact that the 
Baha'is should now remember with special fondness, as witnesses 
to their own sacred history, a couple of Aryan racial theorists 
like Gobineau and Renan. 
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IV. ZARATHUSTRA: JUNG'S PSYCHOLOGICAL COMMENTARY 
Now that we have examined certain necessary prerequisites 
to Jung's seminar, at last we are in a position to evaluate the 
most distinctive characteristics of his reading of Zarathustra. 
What does Zarathustra mean? Those commentators who have not 
simply set it aside in favor of other works whose format 
resonates better with their expectations (e.g. Schacht), have 
tended to either isolate passages which seem to allude to ideas 
elaborated upon elsewhere in Nietzsche's writings as 
nonfiction, or else approach it with a running commentary using 
the characteristic methodologies of literary criticism. 
Brinton (1965), Heidegger ("Who is Nietzsche's Zarathustra?", 
in Allison 1977: 64 ff), Kaufmann (1956), and Danto (1965) are 
familiar exarrples of the "main ideas" type; Higgens (1987) and 
Jo6s (1987) are exarrples of the "lit-crit" type; Lampert (1986) 
combines the two approaches. Kohler (1989) takes a history-of-
ideas approach to Zarathustra, with an eye particularly to 
literary themes. Higgens (1987) does this as well for about 
half of her book. 
The principle that Zarathustra as a whole is 
philosophically worthwhile in its own right has been employed 
only rarely. Lampert, one such holistic exegete, views 
Zarathustra in terms of education, with Part One of his 
commentary arguing for the need for a teacher; Parts Two and 
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Three containing the teaching (which Lampert sees centered 
around eternal return and the will to power); and Part Four 
gives an account of the establishment of that teaching (Lampert 
1986: 5). Much of his book simply describes scenes of 
Zarathustra without adding any additional interpretative 
content. Santaniello views Zarathustra as a none-too-favorable 
commentary on Christianity. On her reading Nietzsche proposes 
to replace such central Christian doctrines as God, the 
-~ -~---~-~-~ ·~·---·~-·~·· ·------~----·-·· ·-·-·---
future) messiah, and the afterlife with the will to power, the 
Ubermensch, and the eternal recurrence, respectively 
Santaniello 1994: 70). In addition she interprets the "last 
humans", whom Zarathustra scorns in the prologue, as 
representing Christians (Santaniello 1994: 7 3) • Peter 
Berkowitz reads Zarathustra as a work of political ethics, 
intended to illustrate by example the "kind of life" suggested 
by Nietzsche's philosophy--through Zarathustra's faults as well 
as his virtues (Berkowitz 1995: 129). For Berkowitz Nietzsche 
is both a "conservative" and a "reactionary" in the sense that 
he invokes some traditional values in opposition to others 
(Berkowitz 1995: 131). He admits but rues Nietzche's literal 
belief in the eternal recurrence (Berkowitz 1995: 176), and 
views Zarathustra's frequent displays of incompetence with 
respect to practical matters as a consequence of the conflict 
between his high standards and extreme individualism on one 
hand, and the need for politics (represented by his desire to 
reach out and lead his disciples) on the other (Berkowitz 1995: 
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147-148). Jung joins these as another holistic commentator, in 
the sense that he discusses zarathustra as a whole (for as long 
as the seminar lasted, at any rate) rather than isolated 
themes. Of course we should keep in mind that the number of 
possible readings of Zarathustra is hardly exhausted by the 
commentaries which currently exist. 
Although few aspects of Jung' s psych<?l~()9:~<;~~ re~cl_:ir:!g __ .b-9-ve 
won support from Nietzsche scholars, several have joined him in 
interpreting Nietzsche's essential project as an expression of 
_.;--------- --- ~ --- ---~. --------.. ... . ·-···------- -----~ ------
some sort of nonduality. Two years after Jung began his 
Nietzsche seminar, Jaspers published his book Nietzsche (1936) 
based on the hermeneutical principle that in Nietzsche's 
writings, 
All statements seem to be annulled by other statements. 
Self-contradiction is the fundamental ingredient in 
Nietzsche's thought. For every single one of Nietzsche's 
judgements, one can also find an opposite. He gives the 
impression of having two op1n1ons about everything. 
[ ... ] But it could also be that we have here to do with 
contradictions that are necessary and inescapable. 
Perhaps the contradictories, presented as alternatives 
and appearing reasonable and familiar to the reader when 
considered singly, are actually misleading 
simplifications of being. [Jaspers 1965: 10] 
By looking beyond any of Nietzsche's isolated opinions to his 
overarching existential project, we can recover his genuine 
intention in writing contradictory passages. For Jaspers, this 
project is an attempt to communicate the ambiguity of truth 
(Jaspers 1965: 20). While his analysis has come under severe 
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criticism--most memorably by Kaufmann (1956: 61 ff) --it has 
nevertheless remained an influential reading. Kaufmann may 
also be classified as a nondualist of sorts on the basis of his 
early dualism of reason versus the will-to-power (as 
-------~·-·-·---····-. 
represented respectively by Apollo and Dionysius), to a later 
----~---~---"·--~-... - ----~-·---- -------··----~---··--· ------~------~----~------·---~--~--~--·-----~-~ 
monism (symbolized by Dionysius or Zarathustra) in which the 
--------~~- ·--- -·- --- ----~---~¥-· __ .....,.._~--~·- -------·~" ' .. -~---~-----,···· -· ··-~· . ·--~~--~~···~"""" __ ," __ .. ,.... _., __ 
wi_ll-_to:::"l?_~we~ __ ?as absorbed the vi:L_~~~s __ of --~~-~~~(Kaufmann 
1956: 172). At the same time Kaufmann credits Nietzsche with 
resisting the temptation to make a Kierkegaardian leap into 
faith, although he recognizes in the prophetic character of 
Zarathustra a "terrptation" in this direction (Kaufmann 1956: 
98). Danto's perspectivist reading, one. of his several 
approaches to Nietzsche, also has some affinity with nonduality 
(although it is actually an expression of pluralism) since it 
sets the various possible views of "truth" opposite one another 
into a kind of plenum: "At best or, if you wish, at worst, 
Nietzsche's view of the world borders on a mystical, ineffable 
vision of a primal, undifferentiated Ur-Ein, a Dionysiac depth" 
(Danto 1965: 97) . His tentative characterization of 
Nietzsche's philosophy as "mystical" is quite old, and may even 
be found in Lou Salane' s biography of Nietzsche ( 1988: 91) . 
However, the meaning of the word "mystical" --insofar as it is 
ever made clear--need not include the element of nonduality. 
Turning to those commentators who have found nondual 
elements in Zarathustra in particular, WP Williams (1952: 98) 
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suggests that "Zarathustra resolves the antinomies and 
transcends the polarity of Nietzsche's earlier thinking" in 
such a way as to achieve a more coherent, "successful" use of 
syrnl:::olism. Hans-Georg Gadamer's "The Drama of Zarathustra" (in 
Gillespie 1988: 222) refers to Nietzsche's work as an attempt 
to overcome the "paradox of conceptual speech" through such 
symbolic tensions as that between the child (of Z I, 1) and the 
Ubermensch. Kathleen Higgens (1987: 98) describes Zarathustra 
in terms of a somewhat different "paradox" of language 
resulting from the clash between competing needs for individual 
expression and human communication. As evidence she notes that 
work's subtitle, Ein Buch fur Alle und Keinen (A Book for All 
and None) . A number of more recent scholars have followed Jung 
in making a connection between Nietzsche's alleged nonduality 
and his visionary gnostic tendencies, and the special 
characteristics of Zarathustra seldom go unnoticed in this 
regard. While Zeitlin's chapter on ~Zarathus~~~ is very short, 
he ~_::terprets ~~(3-~~work as an attempt l?¥ __ :t:'li~~tz~c:::£le_!~~tra~cend 
dualism and for the creation of the 
_,_,.._): 
Superman (Zeitlin 1994: 20, 24), a process which recalls Jung's 
In her essay "The Other Nietzsche," Joan 
Stambaugh hails Zarathustra as a "poetic mystical" work based 
on a "coincidentia oppositorum." As evidence she cites imagery 
suggestive of an "abyss of light", a link between the soul and 
the universe as a whole, the balancing of time and eternity, 
and the juxtaposition of noon and midnight (in Stambaugh 1994: 
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135, 137, 149-150). Besides Jung, Stambaugh's analysis also 
calls to mind Corbin's work on Iranian gnosis, although those 
religious movements which she actually mentions--Taoism and 
Zen--are from East Asia rather than Iran or the Middle East. 
Kohler ( 1989: 3 78 ff) also emphasizes Nietzsche's visionary 
side. 
The Romanian structuralist Ioan Couliano (Culianu) 
explicitly calls Nietzsche a "gnostic," and names that 
philosopher as one of a long line of visionary gnostics engaged 
in an "inverse biblical exegesis" whose similarities he sees as 
arising more out of the common principles of binary logic than 
any particular historical influence. The ancient gnostics and 
modern nihilists such as Nietzsche, he says, "closely resemble 
each other" in that they oppose the Jewish and Platonic 
mainstream of their tradition (Couliano 1990: 250). Couliano 
argues that 
the different trends of dualistic Gnosis--fram Gnosticism 
to the Cathars to Romantic poets and XXth century 
philosophers and biologists--hold together by virtue of 
belonging to the same system, generated by similar 
premises. [Couliano 1990: xi] 
(Couliano' s account of dualism is discussed further in the 
appendix.) Particularly deserving of criticism, he writes, are 
those commentators who assume that systems which are similar in 
some way must be connected through some sort of historical 
influence, even when evidence for such is lacking and other 
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crucial aspects of the systems in question are fundamentally 
dissimilar. 
Insofar as Nietzsche is to be regarded as a visionary 
gnostic, this would add importance to Zarathustra as an 
ostensibly revealed work, and modify our understanding of the 
Nietzsche/Zarathustra relationship in the direction of 
Zarathustra 1 S relative autonomy. Jung uses "river" imagery to 
describe Nietzsche Is relationship to Zarathustra, who "flowed 
out of him, a river of psychical material personified" ( ZS: 
1486) . For Jung, the symbolic significance of the river is 
that it runs between two banks, representing nonduality. 
When pairs of opposites come together, when you have 
struck the main current again, there is a spring of 
enthusiasm and life within you. [ZS: 818] 
Continuing with the river symbol, "the farther the river flows 
the lower it goes, and finally it arrives at the bottom" (ZS: 
1492) . By this Jung means the muddy depths of the unconscious, 
as in the "eroticism" of Nietzsche 1 s Dionysian dithyrambs. 
(Recall that for Jung, "eros" like the libido is connected not 
only with sex but with life and activity 1n general.) 
Elsewhere he speaks of an internal river familiar from Indian 
tantric lore (the topic of another of Jung 1 S seminars), which 
consists of chakras ("wheels") , nadis ("channels") , bindus 
("drops" or "points") and pranha ("subtle breath" or "life-
force") . Following turn-of-the-century Theosophical and 
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Rosicrucian traditions, Jung conflates the Indian model into a 
Western esoteric one centered on the relationship between the 
cerebro-spinal and sympathetic nervous systems (ZS 1300). The 
implication is that Nietzsche's experiences and writings have 
the same status as those of "mystical" religious traditions of 
which Jung approves. 
A. The Zarathustra of Nietzsche's visions 
The fact that Zarathustra' s teachings were composed by 
Nietzsche and largely reflect his philosophy is by no means 
sufficient to relegate that character to the status of 
Nietzsche's spokesperson. To begin 
Zarathustra presents himself in a manner suggestive of __ !J?:?-t of 
a religious founder such as Jesus or Zoroaster, whereas 
Nietzsche seems to have been irreligious throughout his 
philosophical career. Furthermore, Zarathustra is at first an 
idealized figure, then gradually (culminating in Part Four) a 
comic one, but throughout the work displays a very different 
personality than what we know of his creator. Finally, 
Zarathustra operates within a certain context (i.e. the book's 
setting and plot) which is quite different from Nietzsche's own 
circumstances. Why, we may ask, did Nietzsche choose to 
express his philosophy in such a roundabout way? Was this 
purely a matter of literary aesthetics, or was Nietzsche trying 
to tell us something through the medium as well as the message 
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of Zarathustra? To Jung, Zarathustra is the product r1o't: __ 9_nly 
of Nietzsche's conscious creativity but also ~!?:~OrE<:?~~~-~§ __ _!:he 
/--
revelations of another contributor, Zarathustra, who is an 
§:rltity distinct from Nietzsche though originating from his 
unconscious.. 
Why should philosophers pay any attention to the 
psychological facts about how Zarathustra was produced? To 
begin with, those who wish to understand what Nietzsche meant 
by his various writings--especially Zarathustra--have no choice 
but to come to grips with this aspect of him. (This would be 
true regardless of whether Jung' s interpretation is right.) 
Beyond that, the capacity for such visions has a bearing on the 
unirrpeachably philosophical (and Nietzschean) question of the 
justification of ethics, as we shall see in the next chapter. 
-~~ analyzing Zarathustra we should distinguish ~~twE?en 
the figure who appeared to Nietzsche in dreams and visions, the 
-~~vealer of the speeches which Nietzsche attributes to him, and 
the character who experiences certain situations and performs 
··~----·--·~--- ·---···----·--------~~~ ·-----
certain actions as a part of Nietzsche's p~ot._ Jung discovers 
all three aspects reflected in the text of Zarathustra. For 
exarrple __!__h_E?_ describes Zarathustra' s speeches as 
... sort of sermons in verse, but they hs:l-Y~-~_QffisLiinalQQY 
w.it:h t_h~ - visions [of the American painter Cbript:Laua 
Morgan, the subject 6I Jung' s previous-- seminar] in as 
much as they are also evolutionary incidents. _T_h§Y_iQ.f!:!l 
a_s.tring of experiences and events, manife._§tat_ipns_of t.he 
unco!lsc:Joui?, oft:_§Lof 9-- ctf"i~t],y~~y],§:.£."9-.n~-ry cgara,ct~x; and 
therefore it is probably recommendable to follow the same 
technique in the analysis which we have applied to the 
visions. There are certain chapters which consist of or 
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start from visions, or are cornmen~ ... s on v~sions or dreams 
Nietzsche had had, and other chapters. are sermons spo~§n 
by Zarathustra. [ZS: 3-4] 
Fs:>~ Jung all three aspects contain authenti_g_gt~!_~i~! .... !ro~_J:he 
"~!!:C.?E.~_c_ious, often of an archetypal nature, and are analyzed 
using much the same methods. 
----·------... ·---~----·-"""·-· -··~---.....-.......~~---
It is exactly like a dream--a whole world of prospects--
so there are no cut-and-dried formulas. Whatever one 
says about Zarathustra must be contradicted, as he 
contradicts himself in every word, because he is an end 
and a beginning, an Untergang and an Aufgang. It is so 
paradoxical .... [ZS: 1132] 
We have already seen how Jung simultaneously affirms 
Zarathustra's psychic autonomy from Nietzsche (or his ego) and 
his dependence on him (or on his psyche as a whole). As an 
expression of Nietzsche's unconscious, Zarathustra exhibits 
those characteristics which Nietzsche was not conscious of 
possessing. Jung writes of Nietzsche that 
There was then little of what one would call positive in 
him; he could criticize with remarkable readiness, but he 
was not yet sympathetic or constructive, and he could not 
produce values. Then suddenly, like an extraordinary 
revelation, all which his former values omitted came upon 
him. [ZS: 9] 
Zarathustra (unlike his creator) is religious, and 
full of self-confidence. Like myths, dreams, and visions, the 
-'-------~-------·------· ····--~-·-·-··-----------·-·· ·--
im9-gery from Zarathustra has a compensatory healing function, 
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both for Nietzsche (insofar as the imagery comes from his 
personal unconscious) and for humanity in general (insofar as 
"'···-·· .. ~-· -··· --·~·-·---··-»·~~--~-----'-
it comes from the collective unconscious). The need for such 
arises from our respective spiritu9:~ _____ s:rises 
(Nietzsche's denial of God, the emerging materialism in 
nineteenth-century Western society) . Just as God is rejected 
or ignored, the need arises to smuggle him into our 
consciousness in some fashion: 
... we see that Zarathustra appears in the moment when 
something has happened which made his presence necessary, 
and Nietzsche calls that the death of God; when God dies, 
man needs a new orientation. In that moment the father 
of all prophets, the old wise man, ought to appear to 
give a new revelation, to give birth to a new truth. 
This is what Nietzsche meant Zarathustra to be. The 
whole book is an extraordinary experience of that 
phenomenon, a sort of enthusiastic experience surrounded 
by all the paraphernalia, one could say, of true 
revelation. It would be quite wrong to assume that 
Nietzsche invented such a particular artifice in order to 
make an impression, for the sake of aesthetic effect or 
anything like that_; __ i_t was an event which overcame him--
he was overwhelmed by that-arche~typal situation. 
- · ~- ··-----.. ·-~---- --·Tzs~"2"4J 
_t::J:<?!:.~-~!:!1:.~.1: since Nietzsche is ___ _t:~:I;?:pinq into the collecti ye 
u_r].corg~_g.J_<?\!.§LJ::.h~ _psxs:r10lo5Jical turmoil he is _exp§J;'i~nc::jm_ is 
n_?'t __ lE.E:!Eel__z_ the result of some personal anguish, but stems Jrom 
problems faced by civilization as a whole. As a consequence, 
. ····" .. ' '''""• ··- ...... ,,, .. ., ... ~---·-
his visions have a healing power not only for him personally, 
but for modern people in general. This assertion of Jung' s--
that Nietzsche's personal alienation somehow mirrored 
corresponding forces in his society, so that his own struggles 
177 
tap~s"LJnt<?_f<?E_Ce_§~~Eich tre1nscended his individual psyche--is 
one of his most striking observations: 
So, while he was speaking of the lightning or the 
madness, something in himself was reached: the 
unconscious was beginning to stir. It is also possible 
that in the collective man outside, the unconscious was 
stirred. That is true historically. One could not say 
that Nietzsche was completely understood--even those who 
made a great fuss about him did not understand what he 
really meant. But he created a stir, he' tickled 
something in the unconscious; for he tried to formulate 
what is actually happening in the collective unconscious 
of modern man, to give words to that disturbance. 
[ZS: 104] 
Nietzsche's pattern of rejecting God and going insane as 
a result is repeated in the materialism of his society leading 
to the wars of the twentieth century (which he predicted, says 
Jung; ZS: 1300). Similarly, his visions have the potential to 
heal us, just as they had the potential to heal him. At the 
same time they were more than a little dangerous. Nietzsche's 
experience, as Nietzsche himself says, was not voluntary. 
It took him, rather, by the neck: he was overcome by the 
process because the time was ripe and he was just the 
kind of man who was open to such a thing. It really 
began at the height of that period of bloaning 
materialism, and he, being an exceedingly sensitive 
individual, realized the need of the time, feeling that 
our traditional forms had becane more or less empty. He 
himself moved in those academic circles where spiritual 
life was utterly gone. He naturally felt the need of 
something--there was nothing for him to stand on--so he 
was forced to have individual experience, and this came 
about in the moment when he said to himself, "God is 
dead" as he says in Zarathustra. The spirit gripped him 
in that moment when it was completely denied. For it is 
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just then that the spirit cannot be hidden any longer. 
[ZS: 460-461] 
These unrecognized, unconscious aspects of Nietzsche 1 s :psyche 
power. The images from Zarathustra 
announced themselves to Nietzsche like a loud-speaker from the 
collective unconscious, 
,-'"''""~·-.... ,-~-.-·•·>~'<"•··~~~ .. _,. 
but through the speaking, it becanes collective 
consciousness. The transformation of the collective 
unconscious into t"li:·e·coilective conscTousness··-Is-what one 
caiTs···revei:aTfon·;·-·a:n.ct any revelation that rea:LIY..<:9m~s 
__ fi.2m.:.~the·:=:c-oil..§s:.!::LY§ .... 1ln_cog~s;.l'<?.U.~ .. 1§ .... If!<e .. ~_ .. l!l§£C1Pbs>ne 
because it is a message spoken to many; .. it reaches a 
·cro~because If-expresses a collective thought.······--~----­
. ·· ·· · · · ········~ ···· ·····-·· ····rzs·;---2 o 6] 
m~9_~!?--~a~_ prophet, in the sense of one who receives a 
-~~ .. -~<·--~~----~-- ~-- ··-- -~ "'~"'-•·>-··~-· ·-·-· ·~ ,-&c, •••w•-•~----~~"" 
religious revelation. The spiritual problems which the 
____ ..........._~-- , .. -~~..,..,,.. 
revelation addresses were to eventually culminate in the World 
Wars of the twentieth century (and in this light it is 
interesting to note Nietzsche Is special connection with Nazi 
Germany). 
Jung further identifies Nietzsche 1 s Zarathustra w:L.th .. the 
Zoroaster 
and __ !:-E~. ~haoshyants of Zoroastrian mythol9QY_ were expressj,_ons 
q:f this archetype as well, so Nietzsche Is Zarathustra is more 
~...:...':.·::;..~ ~''"''' """' ·"'"-'"""' "'"'""~~-'~-~--~~~--------.-- _,...__,~ ___ ,.,._,,...__,._._....._." _____ -
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closely n~la,ted to his namesake from Zoroastrian lore than he 
''"-~ 
might appear to be: 
'' .,,~,·-•·•~·~-•·a-' • "~'''''~··---~ 
We are concerned here with the archetype of the old man. 
Whenever he appears, he also refers to a certain 
situation: there is some disorientation, a certain 
unconsciousness, people are in a sort of confusion and 
don't know what to do. Therefore these Saoshyants, these 
wise men or prophets," appear in" tlmes"o:f-t-rouble, when 
minJ5Jnd . is "ln·-···a.-·--8-tate . of" _confus:Lon~~-·when ... an . old 
orientation has been los"t"""and a new "one is needed. ···""'80"1n 
the -~;~tinu~.t:~<:l5-·c)f _tJi~s. chaptei:·--~~: .. 8.§§_~-~~ti~~j:~--z~:r-~}:J:!l!f'_tra 
appears in the moment when something has happened which 
made his presence necessary, and Nietzsche calls that the 
death of· God: When God dies, man · ·needS a new 
orientation. In that moment the father of all prophets, 
the old wise man, ought to appear to give birth to a new 
truth. That whole book is an extraordinary experience of 
that phenomenon, of true revelation. It would be quite 
wrong to assume that Nietzsche invented such a particular 
artifice in order to make an impression, for the sake of 
aesthetic effect or anything like that; it was an event 
which overcame him--he was overcome by that archetypal 
situation. [ZS: 24] 
.1'h§ ... 1 ac:.:t __ t: hat .. }:J i ~-1:::.~ . .? c_!l_~.£<:l.~l:9: .. .E.<:lt: ..... ~.<?~1]-tr:<?.~ ... J?:.t~ ...§..l}.£Q11[1 t e r 
vy:i_tl:}__ __ t.he archetype represented by Zarathustra is at once an 
---~--~-----"·-~-------~~~~ ~-,~--~--"" . ----¥~----"-''"'~'"""~~~~.. "'• ---- ·~---·- --
irrd.i9aJ:.,iQ_J} __ gf the _ _genuineness of Nietzsche's revelatory 
§_}(Perienc:_§f and a _:p~_rtent of his eventual psyclw].qg_ical 
C<:l~~~P~~ A serious danger presented by non-egoic complexes 
and archetypes is their capacity to divert psychic energy away 
from the ego personality and frustrate its efforts. 
describes 
... --~~--~- ..... ,.,, ____ ,,_ 
it, to be "possessed" by one of these alternative 
loc:;i __ j,._§ .. ..P§Yfho):_gg-ically_disa?.t:E2Y:§l...:. Indeed, a central goal of 
Jungian therapy is to harmonize the activity of conscious and 
unconscious by encouraging the ego to recognize and provide a 
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means of safe expression for these hidden aspects of the 
psyche. Th~ .. <:J:?-n_9§E __ ~~-posse_s.sioi]_is _ _§!_~2~.-i§3:.dJZJJreat when the 
usurping locus is archetypal in nature, and therefore capable 
,~.!:~PJ?~.D.:?J into the vast psychic ene:r-gy of the collective 
u_::.consci_<:)l1~ in the course of its battle with -~!:e: ___ ~go. As one 
of these archetypal loci, Zarathustra is more than a vehicle 
for a series of teachings; he is a numinous figure in his own 
right, who is even capable of substituting for God himself: 
Nietzsche himself instantly reacts with an inflation and 
a dissociation, as we have seen. So he has to produce 
out of himself this one peculiar figure, Zarathustra, in 
order to have something in place of the fact, God. 
Zarathustra is the wise one, the great prophet, the 
founder of a religion, something like the messenger of 
God himself, as any great founder of a religion is 
considered to be. [ZS: 1531] 
The danger inherent in becaning the bearer of such a 
revelation is that it encourages one to take an inordinate 
pride in one's prophethood. Such pride is unwarranted, since 
revelation is not something which we do, but something which is 
done to us. Jung terms this kind of pride "inflation." 
But inasmuch as you say these creative powers are in 
Nietzsche or in me or anywhere else, you cause an 
inflation, because man does not possess creative powers, 
he is possessed by them. That is the truth. If he allows 
himself to be thoroughly possessed by them without 
questioning, without looking at them, there is no 
inflation, but the moment he splits off, when he thinks, 
"I am the fellow," an inflation follows. [ZS: 57] 
Nietzsche, he says, was at once inflated and yet deeply 
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awestruck by the true archetypal source of his revelation. 
Apparently these are not contradictory; on the contrary, his 
lack of awareness of unconscious forces not identical with his 
ego may have caused these forces to engulf him. 
But how could he help assuming such an identity in those 
days when there was no psychology? Nobody would have 
then dared to take the idea of a personification 
seriously, or even of an independent autonomous spiritual 
agency. Eighteen eighty-three was the time of the 
blooming of materialist philosophy. So he had to 
identify with Zarathustra in spite of the fact that he 
felt, as this verse proves, a definite difference between 
himself and the old wise man. Then his idea that 
Zarathustra had to come back and mend the faults of his 
former invention, is psychologically most characteristic; 
it shows that he had an absolutely historical feeling 
about it. He obviously felt quite clearly that the 
experience of that figure was archetypal. It brought 
something of the breadth of centuries with it, and filled 
him with a peculiar sense of destiny: he felt that he was 
called upon to mend a damage done in the remote past of 
mankind. [ZS: 10] 
From Jung one gathers that Nietzsche would have benefited 
from psychotherapy. According to Jung, Nietzsche succumbed to 
inflation in the course of channeling Zarathustra, an occurence 
which led to the madness of his later years: 
If anybody behaves like Zarathustra--if a man allows 
himself to be swallowed by an archetype--then he will be 
swallowed by the unconscious. In other words, he will be 
insane. [ZS: 163] 
Jung parts with the bulk of contemporary Nietzsche commentary 
in positing a connection between Nietzsche's eventual insanity 
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and the strident tone of his later works, and even finding his 
breakdown prophesied from time to time in Zarathustra--for 
example, in part six of the prologue. For Jung, the jester is 
a shadow figure, fool to Zarathustra's wise man. Zarathustra's 
words to him, "Deine Seele wird noch schneller tot sein als 
dein Leib" ("Your soul will be dead even before your body"; Z 
Vorrede, 6) are taken as a literal prediction of Nietzsche's 
ego with the Self, the Superman ( ZS: 3 91) . Elsewhere Jung 
complains that Nietzsche's dominant function (intuition) was 
too highly-developed with respect to the others, hurting the 
prospects for reconciliation with the sensation-orientation of 
his Shadow (ZS 1504). 
B. The teachings of Nietzsche's Zarathustra 
If Jung sees Zarathustra' s teachings as psychologically 
therapeutic for Nietzsche and his contemporaries, then what 
does he think the content of those teachings consists of? For 
of a set of hieratic symrols 
dramas of ancient ini t:ia,t:():t:'Y 
~i.J:;@:::§!:J_~~Ir\~--- or perhaps modern esoteric 
Freemasonry: .............. ______ _ 
as 
societies such as 
You see, each chapter of Zarathustra is a stage in the 
•-··---·~•·~"-'~''-"O-•-r"~"-lv'..,._~..........,-•"'·~~~--.-, .. ~ -·-·•-e••"•••w~--~ ___ ....,""''-·'~-"-·"'"' ·-'" " -··•·•-·. ·-~··-
process of 1n1t1at1on, for whenever a man takes that way 
or'''the 'immect1at€t" 'experience of his inner condition, he 
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gets more and more under its influence and thus he 
becomes initiated. [ ... ] But he did not seek that. It 
took him, rather, by the neck: he was overcome by the 
process because the time was ripe and he was just the 
kind of man who was open to such a thing. It really 
began at the height of that period of blooming 
materialism, and he, being an exceedingly sensitive 
individual, realized the need of the time, feeling that 
our traditional forms had became more or less empty. He 
himself moved in those academic circles where the 
spiritual life was utterly gone. He naturally felt the 
need of something--so he was forced to have individual 
experience, and this came about in the moment when he 
said to himself, "God is dead" as he says in Zarathustra. 
The spirit gripped him in that moment when it was 
completely denied. For it is just then that the spirit 
cannot be hidden any longer. [ZS: 459-461] 
The compensatory nature of the unconscious explains the 
religious flavor of Zarathustra. Like myths, dreams, and 
visions, the imagery from Zarathustra has a compensatory 
healing function, both for Nietzsche (insofar as the imagery 
comes from his personal unconscious) and for humanity in 
general (insofar as it comes from the collective unconscious). 
The need for such healing arises from our respective spiritual 
crises (Nietzsche's denial of God, the emerging materialism in 
nineteenth-century West.ern society) . _..r~~:t: __ as G()sl J:.i?. :r:~.i~t~_s:!_ __ _ 
or: ___ :Lgnor~ci,_ the need arises _____ J:() --~f!l~~<J~-~ him into our 
consciousness in some fashion: 
•• __ ,:W§ ..... §l.~~- that . Zarathustra appears in the moment whe_Q 
_§S)mething has made his presence. necessary, and Nie:t_~_~_g_he 
calls thaC"Efie-Cleaffi-or·-croaT-wnen···c;oa-·aies, -IDEm needs a 
-newor .. fenta tTon:----:rii- Enaf·--momerit~-tfi-e~- ·fatlier ---o.f-_:Ei1I 
_::pr::oP.li~~-the old wise-man, -cmghFFo ___ appear t·o-gi;:~ a n~w: 
revelation, to give- bfrth ____ fo-·a- new truth. This is what 
Nietzsche .meant Zarathustra to be. Tfie -wnoTe-book ls an 
extraordinary experience of that phenomenon, a sort of 
enthusiastic experience surrounded by all the 
184 
paraphernalia, one could say, of true revelation. It 
would be quite--wrong lo assume thaC-NTetzsclie--~fnvented 
such a particular artifice in order to make an 
impression, for the sake of aesthetic effect or anything 
like that; it was an event which overcame him--he was 
overwhelmed--by the- archetypal situatiori:-----Tzs·:- 24 T 
suggests the nondual totality of the Self. The whole of 
Zarathustra, as well as its most famous individual teachings, 
--~-- --~-~--~----
expresses some aspect of this nonduality.~te~~l recurrence, 
for example, stands for "the absolute completeness of the self" 
ZS: 1044). 
Then, if your extension of consciousness has forced you 
to accept your own contrast, you have thereby naturally 
overstepped the limit of a natural ego. That is what 
Zarathustra is trying to teach here and still more in 
subsequent chapters: namely, that we have not yet 
discovered man in his totality, despite the fact that we 
can see it externally .... Only ... when a part of formerly 
unconscious life is drawn into the plane of 
consciousness, is it at all subject to your choice. 
[ZS: 822-823] 
E~~pect to Nietzsche, since Jung blames that _p~~!?sopher' s 
eventual insanity on his inability to contain the:__Q~ful 
----~- ·--- - . --·---------~---------· 
____ a~c~~typal forces streaming through him. Zarathustra's 
teaching was not wrong, but it became distorted in the process 
-
of being "transmitted through a human brain. The man Nietzsche 
receives the message and lends it his own language, and then of 
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course it becanes something else" (ZS: 830). 
Zarathustra's declaration of the death of God is not so 
much a celebration of atheism as a diagr10sis g_f _h:~-_!!!ani!_:.y' s loss 
of .. fai tb-1 ... :w.btgh Jung regards as a SYir1Pt::.om of 9: ...... p:J::gJgund 
Such crises are an 
unavoidable aspect of the emerging 
_,.-~·-~---·-~·------~~ ,-~------·-.. --~·--
consciousness which recognizes that "all the gods" are 
projected, and thus in a certain sense unreal 
another sense no less real) (ZS 839). Zarathustra attempts to 
compensate for the lack created by the death of God, partly 
through the power of his own example and partly through his 
prophecies of the Uber.mensch. Jung_ asks, "if Zarathustra can 
come back to life again, why not God? Is Zarathustra in any 
~-9:·~-~J=erent ___ !~.9!rt .. ~<::.~E:C:(:?Ption of God? Not at all" ( ZS: 916). 
Af"ter: 9-Jl, ___ even __ 9-fter being pronounced (lead, G<:::>s:'!__!"eir1_9:~!!§_~ of 
the main characters of Zarathustra. This illustrates Jung's 
belief that since ideas are no less real in their own way than 
physical objects, then any statement about God--even a very 
disparaging or dismissive one--would serve to affirm or even 
sustain his reality. 
It is a funny thing, however, that throughout the whole 
of Zarathustra, you get a feeling as if this god whom he 
calls dead were not absolutely dead. He is somehow 
lurking in the background as the great unknowable one of 
whom you should not speak; you simply should not take him 
into consideration: he is too dangerous to be mentioned. 
So his peculiar expression that you should not be too 
interested in the bowels of the unknowable one means that 
there is somebody there, only he is utterly taboo. You 
see, that is explained psychologically by the fact that 
Nietzsche calls himself an atheist, for anybody who calls 
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himself an atheist is a negative theist; naturally he 
would not deny a thing if he did not think it was there 
to be denied. [ZS: 72] 
!~~~-Q.ee~~-~<:::.-?:.!. ___ it:: __ ~~~~~ is a poor substitute for God~ Noting 
that even atheists will utter blasphemous oaths, Jung q11ips 
that "no:tody w~-~~-~':'"~: ::'wear l?X the Sl.?J2ermai1~' (ZS: 9Q~). God, 
unlike the Superman, exists as an idea in our minds, of 
collec~_i v~ ____ <:.<?_r:sciousnesp. If we try to rid ourselves of the 
concept of God, we force it to manifest e){_~~I1<::J:.!!Y, as an 
archetype of the collective unconscious. This _proj~c~~~E _ _9_~ 
God occurs in Zarathustra, with the result that 
Like other_ unack!lowledged _ components o( c:>.~E:-~~--i:9~I1tity,_god 
when exiled to the Shadow becanes more .J?~W~Ef..ul and autonomo.:::s. 
Jung believes this to be potentially a very ____ qar1ge:rpus 
situation, as Nietzsche's subsequent experience demonstrates. 
The terrible nature of this repressed God is revealed in 
Zarathustra's disgust with ordinary humanity, as well as in the 
book's fascination with the coming wars. 
Jung' s placement of God in the Shadow raises a 
terminological problem of the "if evil is good, then what is 
good?" variety. That is.~ Jung sees t!:J:~ last man who is weak 
and contem.ptible) as Nietzsche's Shadow, but at the :::;am~ t_iJ:ne 
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sees God and the Superman (who are powerful and dangerous) as 
+~ ~ ' ~ - ,,_, __ ,_ •• __ ·~-··•-•w-u•• 
inhabiting another, more admirable kind of Shadow. 
Nietzsche reviles not only his own shadow but also the 
-shadow in masses, the collective man... .so-~~n- <:l.~l)Y~~r 
reviling the shadow he enters the house by the back door. 
For··· Instance, he says that collective man fs a' low 
:brute, and then he . slowly realizes 'the~-meriF-··-of 
brutalt_ty; he begins to reaifze that. the''ffio-tfve~--~~hJ~c:l1 
move the collective man are really virtues. So he takes 
.the."three .. ou.t'st::anding 'clemerTts· 'oE"tne ... Shadow man, his 
voluptuousness, his lust for power, and his lust in 
.. -.!'J:.i.~~~:r~-~ .. and'he makes them in_to virtues·:·· rz·:s·:--r:rs-sr-··· ~ 
The explanation appears to be that Jung does not approve of 
Nietzsche's expedient of identifying with the vices of 
humanity, with the result that Nietzsche has taken on an almost 
diabolical outlook that does not make for psychological 
stability. The Superman personifies this attitude of scorn for 
ordinary humanity, but more importantly represents a stage 
beyond ordinary humanity. Jung sees this represented by the 
tightrope from the prologue: 
It is the crossing from one condition to another, which 
is the symbol for the pairs of opposites, and the way by 
which one gets to the Superman. And the opposites are 
connected by the transcendent function; that is 
beautifully demonstrated by the rope stretched out 
between two towers. Of course, that the whole thing is 
in the air is characteristic too. [ZS: 117] 
In reality, the tightrope-walking scene from Zarathustra was in 
all prorebility inspired by a scene from Wagner's 
autobiography, Mein Leben, which Nietzsche edited (Santaniello 
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1994: 76). Again, Jung regards this scene as a warning of 
Nietzsche's insanity. The Uber.mensch is not the Sel 
--~-·----~---------
but "a 
s~p-~_ior man" (ZS: 925 the difference being that ev~FY<?~E:; .. }1as 
a Self, bu1: .. ?J:l.!~ .. ?: few are able to achieve awareness of it. 
For 0:~!}9.--~t!£.~§Ur~;!x took notice of i1:s wartir:ne __ er:n:elo~ent .. bY 
the Nazis--the Uber.mensch is an essentially negative symbol, 
full of the Luciferian hubris of those who wrongly SUJ2pc>~·~·--~_?ey 
have achieved human fulfillment. 
Uber.mensch as described as "a ... :eeople" as opposed to an 
,r--·---··-·----····-· . .. 
individual (ZS: 826). Jung means that Nietzsche h()pes "that 
a~.l those lonely people like himself will form a co~£~.1:y~nd 
out of them will come the future birth, thE:!.~..§~.P-~!11-~D.:~ ... -.1~ s : 
878). Faced with the decline in civilization, they would 
retreat to some sort of monastic-type environment, or so runs 
the aspiration that Jung ascribes to Nietzsche. Part of Jung's 
point is that Nietzsche unfortunately supposed people like 
himself to constitute the Uber.mensch. 
calls to mind Jung' s alchemistic 
psychology; and sure enough, Jung draws a connection--
synchronistic rather than causal--between Nietzsche and the 
medieval alchemists: 
So Superman is an exceedingly old, mystical idea which 
appears again and again in the course of the centuries. 
Of course Nietzsche was not aware of that, he knew almost 
nothing of the particular literature in antiquity which 
contains these symbols; it was not yet discovered... Yet 
these ideas keep on coming back again and again, and in 
that respect one could ask, "what is Nietzsche after 
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all?" He 1s simply a repetition of one 
alchemists. Nietzsche continues the 
philosophy of the Middle Ages. [ZS: 784-785] 
of the old 
alchemistic 
As mentioned before, Jung doubts that Nietzsche had ever 
actually read the medieval alchemists, so any alchemistic 
themes that may be found in his books would have to have been 
inspired by the unconscious--yet another instance of Jung 
finding his own philosophy reflected in Nietzsche's unconscious 
teachings. Richard Perkins ( "Analogistic strategies in 
Zarathustra," in Goicoechea 1983: 327-328) agrees with Jung, 
probably under his influence, in suggesting that "we can detect 
g~r-tqiJ:1~.2Y_~rt _9-llu~Jons to alchem:y in Also sprach Zarathustra 
with no trouble whatsoever." Aside from Nietzsche's general 
"analogic" style of symbolic writing, which he shares with the 
alchemists, Nietzsche describes a Hermetic-style staff with a 
serpent and sun on the handle in "Von den schenkenden Tugend" 
("On the gift-giving virtue"); has the dwarf refer to 
Zarathustra as the lapis philosophorum in "Vom Gesicht und 
Ratsel" ("The vision and the riddle"); and makes use of such 
quintessential alchemical symbols as gold, the serpent (serpens 
mercurialis or ouroboros), lion (leo veridis), child (rebis or 
filius philosophorum), Uber.mensch (homo maximus, although the 
term Uber.mensch is also used by that great alchemist, Goethe), 
and the invocation to the sun (opus solis) . Zarathustra's 
first discourse proper, "Von den drei Verwandlungen" ("On the 
three transformations" 1 . even describes in Symbolic form three 
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transformations corresponding to the albedo, nigredo, and 
rubedo of the medieval alchemists. Clearly Jung is on to 
something, although it would be difficult to argue as he does 
that the whole of Zarathustra follows an overarching pattern 
inspired by alchemy, or that Nietzsche could not have been 
consciously aware of his use of alchemical symbolism. 
C. The characters and plot of Zarathustra 
Jung's analysis of Zarathustra takes the same form as his 
analyses of dreams and visions, and often gives the impression 
of being somewhat arbitrary. For exarrple, in section one of 
the prologue, the thirty-year-old Zarathustra leaves his 
lakeside home to spend ten years in the mountains. Why thirty 
years old? Because that was the legendary age of Jesus when he 
began his mission, a student suggests to Jung's approval. Add 
ten years, says Jung, and the result is the approximate age of 
Nietzsche when he wrote Zarathustra. Here it is relevant that 
according to Zoroastrian tradition, Zarathustra received his 
first revelation at the age of thirty, continued to experience 
visions of Ahura Mazda and the Heptad for the next ten years, 
and then left home to seek converts (Boyce 1975, ch. 7). In 
this respect, Nietzsche's account resembles the Zoroastrian 
one. However, the geographical setting of the historical 
Zarathustra includes four rivers, not mountains and a lake, as 
given by Nietzsche. Nietzsche may well have had in mind the 
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image of Jesus fasting in the Judaean wilderness, and then 
preaching along the shores of the Sea of Galilee. (As it 
happens, Sils-Maria is located near a lake, Lake Silvaplana.) 
Before descending from the mountains, Zarathustra 
addresses the sun, praising it for its abundant nature which 
compels it to overflow with its gift of light, even "wenn du 
hinter das Meer gehst und noch der Unterwel t Licht bringst" 
("when you go behind the sea and still bring light to the 
underworld") . For Jung, water generally stands for 
consciousness; therefore, the sea would be the collective 
unconscious, ~~-9J?P.OS~d to "den See seiner Heimat" C''_th.e )_ake 
of his home") which represents Zarathustra's 
unconscious. '1'~-~--~~I?- __ _:p_ersonifies consciousness (in this case 
?_l:l:E~human consciousness 36 whereas the eagle and the serpent 
••~<- ··~· > ,.,n---·~~·· -- • •- h ·~··~~' 
(be~sts of the air and land, respectively) represent the 
Elsewhere 
Jung identifies the sun with a bindu which draws one toward 
36 Zarathustra' s addresses to the sun recalls a revival of 
popular interest in pagan or neo-pagan sun -worship in 
Nietzsche's day, which attracted such noteworthy supporters as 
Goethe and Renan (Noll:90). There is an Iranian connection in 
the sense that Nietzsche's generation had developed an interest 
in the Mithraic mysteries (in which Heliosis venerated), which 
at that time were assumed to have originated in Iran. The 
writings of the Bab constantly make use of solar imagery, with 
the sun usually standing for a prophet or the prophetic 
dispensation. For exarrple, in the Persian Bayan he states, 
"The process of the rise and setting of the Sun of Truth will 
thus indefinitely continue--a process that hath no beginning 
and will have no end ... " (IV, 12, in Bab:106). 
37 Note the similarity to the serpent of sexuality and the 
bird of spirituality in Sermo VI of Septum Sermones, and to the 
star in Sermo VII. Actually, in Zarathustra Nietzsche has the 
bird and serpent stand for pride and wisdom, respectively. 
192 
consciousness (ZS: 794). Several other commentators (e.g. 
Berkowitz 1995: 133; Higgens in "Reading Zarathustra", in 
Solomon 1988: 132 ff) have pointed out the similarity of the 
sun-and-cave pairing with Plato's allegory of the cave, 
although Jung could just as easily interpret both stories as 
reflective of the same symbolism. The mountains of the 
prologue stand for the same spiritual heights that they stand 
for in Nietzsche's breathtaking poem, "Sils-Maria, " which Jung 
cites in this context. Thus, Zarathustra's descent will lead 
him on one hand to unconsciousness (in order to counterbalance 
his superhuman consciousness), and on the other to the world of 
collectivity, of ordinary humanity. 
Well, it is quite certain that when he leaves the sun of 
consciousness, he will come to some form of the 
unconscious. The question is now, of course, will the 
unconscious then be projected, or will it be in forma 
pura? If in its pure form it will not be projected, he 
will then enter the unconscious. That would be the night 
sea journey. So as you say, it is the descent into the 
ordinary world in which unconsciousness is the ruling 
factor. [ZS: 19] 
As the revealer of a nondual psychic wholeness, Zarathustra is 
to serve as a counterpoint to that with which the world 
consciously identifies: 
He is going to produce the enantiodromia, he is 
going to supply mankind with what it is lacking, with 
that which they hate or dear or despise, with that which 
the wise ones have lost, their folly, and the poor their 
riches. In other words he is going to supply the 
compensation. [ZS: 20] 
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In answer to the question of what the various characters 
of Zarathustra represent, Jung proposes a "soreites 
syllogismos" ("multiple propositions leading to a conclusion") 
in which everyone and everything in that work is essentially 
declared to be interchangeable with everything else, on the 
basis of some unfathomable permutations of what is alleged to 
be a logical argument ( ZS: 129 ff.). In the context of the 
prologue Nietzsche is equated with the rope-dancer, Zarathustra 
with the Superman, the Superman with a "demon" (ZS: 130), and 
so on until we learn--apparently on the basis of the transitive 
principle--that Nietzsche "equals" Zarathustra. Elsewhere he 
seriously qualifies these equations in such a way as to suggest 
that the various characters are not perfectly interchangeable 
after all. Jung's point seems to be that all of these 
characters stem from Nietzsche's unconscious, and therefore 
carry the same message. A few years later in the seminar he 
summarizes the results of his syllogism by saying, "There I 
proved that every figure encountered in Zarathustra is 
Nietzsche himself" (ZS: 1505). 
Is there any reason why Nietzsche presents the various 
speeches and stories from Zarathustra in the order in which we 
find them? Jung claims that they are progressive stages of an 





when you go back through the chapters you find a 
of preparation, or a preparatory initiation, for 
idea [polypsychism] . For instance, begin with 
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chapter 15--though it would be possible to begin before--
"The Thousand and One Goals"; that is the idea of many 
goals with no certainty as to which is the right one. 
Then the sixteenth chapter is on neighbor love which 
means that something else must come in, a partner, a 
relationship. The seventeenth chapter is "The Way of the 
Creating One": something ought to be created. How can 
you create? Well, "Old and Young Women", chapter 18. 
Then if you have to do with women, there is chapter 19, 
"The Bite of the Adder": you will be bitten by the snake 
which is the reversed impregnation--poisoning. And what 
is the result? "Child and Marriage", chapter 20. That 
is voluntary death: namely you go in that relationship 
and you reappear as a child. [ZS: 787-788] 
While this refers only to Part One, elsewhere Jung says that 
each chapter of Zarathustra is a "stage in the process of 
initiation" (ZS: 459). Even so, the progression is more 
whimsical than systematic, in keeping with its dream-like 
status. 
The bulk of Jung' s Zarathustra seminar is devoted to 
analyses of this kind, interspersed with generic observations 
about the principles of analytical psychology. Since his 
interpretation of Nietzsche's symbolism is arguably the least 
successful aspect of Jung's commentary, and since the published 
version of Jung's lectures make it easy to look up his remarks 
on specific chapters from Nietzsche, I will only summarize his 
interpretation of a few key chapters. 
We have already encountered Jung' s allusion to "Auf den 
glucklichen Inseln" ("Upon the blessed isles") in his doctoral 
dissertation. Here as there Jung traces some of Nietzsche's 
imagery to a children's book, Blatter aus Prevost, which Jung 
confirms (via Elizabeth Forster-Nietzsche) that Nietzsche 
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possessed as a child (ZS: 1218). Curiously the camel, lion, 
and child from "Von den drei Verwandlungen" ("On the three 
metamorphoses") are said to be an example of mandala symbolism, 
like the animal symbols for the four evangelists ( ZS: 27) , 
rather than stages of the alchemical opus. Most other 
commentators follow Nietzsche in viewing them as diachronic 
stages rather than synchronic symbols. For Jung the "pale 
criminal" in "Vom bleichen Verbrecher" is pale with the 
recognition of his own evil (ZS: 469) 1 an unholy secret 
revealed to Nietzsche which should have been kept secret for 
the sake of his sanity (ZS: 482). Berkowitz suggest an 
alternative to the usual, quasi-Freudian reading stressing the 
criminal's guilt over his own "red-blooded desire", and 
suggests that the criminal is pale because of the 
inescapability of conflict between the needs of society (as 
represented by the judges) and those of the individual 
(Berkowitz 1995: 166). Jung' s reading of "Das Kind mit dem 
Spiegel" ("The child with the mirror") brings out essentially 
the same themes . 
The snake in "Vom BiJS der Natter" ("On the adder's bite") 
is said to be an Anima symbol ( ZS: 7 57) , perhaps because 
"kundalini" (fran kundala, meaning "serpent") has a feminine 
ending and is traditionally identified with Shakti. This idea 
is confirmed by Jung's further identification of the snake with 
"lower nervous centers" (ZS: 769) and the muladharachakra (ZS: 
794), which for Jung suggest chthonic forces. The fact that 
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the snake is black suggests to Jung a "poisoning" of 
Nietzsche's nervous system as another indication of his later 
madness. In the course of a discussion about a later chapter, 
"Vom Gesicht und Ratsel" ("On the Vision and the Riddle") , the 
shepherd and the snake are compared to the "good shepherd" and 
the devil. Jung makes an interesting comparison between the 
eternal return and the double-ouroboros image (i.e. two 
serpents swallowing one another, as the adder does the 
shepherd's tongue), which also suggests infinity or eternity 
(ZS: 1281 ff). The Eleusinian and Orphic mysteries are also 
mentioned in connection with serpent-worship. Most intriguing 
of all is Jung's citation of Genesis, where the serpent 
promises that Adam and Eve may "know good and evil" (ZS: 761). 
When Zarathustra throws a golden ball in "On Free Death", Jung 
says that the ball--being spherical, and thus a symbol of 
wholeness-- represents the Superman, and calls to mind a 
variety of other symbolic references (ZS: 781 ff). These 
include alchemical gold, Buddha's turning of the wheel of 
dharma, and again, the sun of consciousness (ZS: 796). 
More important 
co:r:!espondences is Jung' s more general theory 
characters and plot of -·~~E~~l:1l1~~!:~ resul_t::·~- ~E9.!!l. .... -ttt§._ .. E.9:me 
unconscious p~_ychic .J?:r,ocesses which hC!:ve inspired. ~ythol_<::J.9Acal 
and mystical lore since time immemorial. While the details of 
-·-~-----· ·-~·---···. --~-~~----... ------~-~--· '----"~----·· 
Jung's arguments to that effect are often dubious--and indeed, 
one receives the impression that he could usually just as 
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easily substituted some other interpretation for almost any 
particular incident 1n Zarathustra--_J~<;;r is much more. 
ir:t~~~-::>!:~9- in es~-~-~ .. ~-~92:n9 the struc:t:.~£~-<?~J?-J::s ~?.S!~!_ ___ ?,t, __ ~_lle 
psyche. It is ~h-~-~-~9~~~-~l"lich pr?.Y~.9~-~-t_!2~--~~.~~--.<?·~--~E.-~!:1:1:i~er 
/ 
to Nietzsche's challenge to ethics. 
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V. NONDUAL ETHICS 
In this postrnodern age the discussion of Nietzsche has 
been dominated by those whose interpretations emphasize aspects 
of his thought such as perspectivism or nihilism, which suggest 
that his project was primarily deconstructi ve or critical in 
nature. I propose that Nietzsche's mature atheism in fact 
amounts to a jury-rigged mystical path, and that these critical 
aspects of his work were in fact inspired by a positively-
formulated worldview which Nietzsche links with his visionary 
experiences. His autobiography is full of suggestive material. 
I have already alluded to the sections of Ecce Homo ( "Warum ich 
so klug bin," sec. 4; also the Zarathustra chapter) in which 
Nietzsche 
ultimately 
describes certain emotionally wrenching 
incommunicable experiences connected with 
yet 
the 
"inspiration" process, using such words as "lightning" and 
"tears." In section 3 of "Warum ich so klug bin" Nietzsche 
indicates his great love for Pascal--not for his famous wager, 
presumably, but for his private memorial in which he laid bare 
his enigmatic mystical experience. In the chapter on 
Morgenrote he connects the title of that book with the "great 
noon" which led him out of the "shadows" of his previous work 
to the philosophy of Zarathustra. This marks the approximate 
point at which Nietzsche began calling into question such 
things as morality or truth as a means of attacking certain 
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elements of his society. Throughout Ecce Homo Nietzsche speaks 
in terms of duality or opposition, ascent and decline, and at 
one point ( "Warum ich so weise bin," sec. 3) accordingly calls 
himself a "Doppelganger" with two sides--and possibly three! 
This "dithyrambic" style leads him to a view of consciousness 
in which "opposites" are not reconciled so much as ordered 
according to rank ( "Warum ich so klug bin," sec. 9) . Nietzsche 
associates this with the transvaluation, and traces 
Zarathustra' s appearance to it--indeed, much of Ecce Homo is 
given over to praise of and quotations from the book 
Zarathustra. In passing I would also point to Nietzsche's · 
curious identification of God and with the serpent (or the 
devil) in the chapter on Jenseits von Gut und Bose as evidence 
of his nondualistic orientation. 
The question 
religious systems) 
of how Jung (like many "nondualistic" 
can nevertheless advocate conventional 
ethics as a practical matter, is roughly parallel to the 
question of how Nietzsche can seek to transcend morality while 
in effect advocating a certain type of morality. I propose 
that this similarity is not coincidental, although I am not 
sure exactly how these ideological structures came to resemble 
one another. Jung (along with other members of the 
"nondualistic" school of Nietzsche interpretation) is therefore 
more reliable than other competing "deeper" readings of 
Zarathustra, or Nietzsche generally. Interpreted negatively, 
Nietzsche's writings represent an attempt (perhaps successful) 
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to undermine the possibility of justifying ethics. However, 
o12c::e V:~---~C::_<::~-~- that Nietzsche _1:1~-~-Cl:_cataphatic as well as an 
ap?_ph,at:,_ic ___ side, the outline of a system capable of answeri_ng 
his objections to ethics begins to reveal itself. This _is 
~--- -------
every bit as impressive an accanplishment as his critical 
..----~--~-"~-"' -~ - -----·--·--~--
----~:§P~_t . 
I have divided this chapter into three parts which 
respectively discuss the history of skeptical challenges to 
ethics; an account of the basic subjective/objective dilemma 
which I suggest has prevented any proposed ethical system from 
avoiding skeptical challenges; and a description ___ ':>_~_ a 
metaphysical system which if true would be capable of answering 
_____ ,._.,.,___ .. ~-·-··· ,. ----·-·-····---·-.. - '"""'·---~~~ 
_.!.b~J?~---~jl.al,J._~n_g_~~----1::-~--- ~t:h~cs. This s.ys!:em is implicit in 
Ei-_§!tzsch~.!_ _____ !:l:l?_ugh explicit in. Jung, while its ethical 
conseq':J.ence~ are ~~E-~~cit in Nietzsche but implicit in Jung. 
A. Challenges to conventional ethics 
The concept of going "beyond good and evil" is intimately 
related to a genre of wholesale challenges to ethics, which in 
turn is intimately related to the popularity (indeed, near-
universality) of positive formulations of ethics. That is, at 
~S.g!!l_~ )::_§!vel there seems to be substant~Cl:l_S.I2~~~~~~wide_9-greeii1§nt 
am~~g_l).umans as to the praiseworthiness of certain _..§.:thJ_cal 
attitudes. While any attempt to provide details of this 
supposed agreement is likely to be hazardous in view of our 
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enormous cross-cultural differences, if pressed I would name 
such attitudes as our propensity to care about others, delight 
in their fulfillment, and sympathize with their suffering. 
Kant's reference to a good heart as the central element of an 
ethical orientation captures well what I take to be the same 
insight, as does Mencius' views on the inherent goodness of 
human nature (without considering whether he is right in that 
all of us have this) . I will not go so far as to say that this 
orientation is universal, since it seems equally clear that 
some people never develop a normal conscience. Nor do I 
q:tJ.Qt29E3.~ _tf1C11:: Jnos:t. of us actually live up to such lofty ideals, 
only that most of us cannot help but hold. t!lem as .~§_eals , __ _§nd 
feel guilty when we fall considerably short of them. Also, I 
make no claims as to which if any of the various social, 
biological, psychological, or theological explanations for the 
existence of this intuitive ethical orientation are true. (My 
suspicion is that our potential for "evil" actions or attitudes 
is a beneficial adaptive trait which is designed to lie dormant 
in situations where human cooperation is possible and 
advantageous, and manifest during conditions of extreme 
conflict or competition.) I only want to claim that most of us 
do have it; and. that this has been a central though often 
implicit concern in the field of ethics, since the most 
important philosophers in the field of ethics generally turn 
out to be those who either cleverly challenge or cleverly 
defend what we already intuitively believe. 
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Challenges to this "intuitive" type of ethics include on 
one hand theories of ethical skepticism which deny that there 
is such a thing as right or wrong, and on the other hand 
counter-intuitive theories which agree that there really is a 
right and wrong, but that our intuitive notions are 
fundamentally incorrect. For example, if the maxim "Don't kill 
people just to watch them die" is accepted as being definitely 
included within the range of intuitive ethical views, then the 
most challenging strain of ethical skepticism might hold that 
even such seerrUngly uncontroversial moral rules (like chimeras 
and hippogryphs) have no existence apart from our beliefs about 
them. Meanwhile, an example of a counter-intuitive view would 
be the theory that killing people just to watch them die is at 
least sometimes good. (As a handy mnemonic, if ethical 
skepticism is to the field of ethics as atheism is to religion, 
then holders of counter-intuitive views about ethics could be 
likened to devil-worshippers!) 
Ethical skepticism (also known as ethical nihilism or as 
a special type of ethical relativism, or conflated with ethical 
subjectivism or Moore's "naturalistic fallacy") has seldom 
lacked for champions. If Plato is to be trusted then many of 
the Sophists should be numbered among them, allowing for a 
certain amount of difficulty on their part in articulating 
their positions. In the Republic, Trasymac~"'!~.--.X~ously 
declares that "justice is nothing else than the interes.to~ the 
---~'!::.!:<?I1Sfer" (338c). However mangled his theory becomes over the 
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course of the debate with Socrates, it is . clearly meant a~. _a 
challenge to conventional ethics. In the Gorgias, Callicles 
laments that 
we take the best and strongest of our fellows from their 
youth upwards, and tame them like young lions--enslaving 
them with spells and incantations, and saying to them 
that with equality they must be content, and that the 
equal is the honourable and the just. But if there were 
a man born with enough ability he would shake off and 
break through and escape all this ... 
[483e-484a, Jowett translation] 
His point is not only that conventional ethical standards are 
reducible to custom and politics, but that these standards are 
to be bemoaned. As a classical philologist Nietzsche certainly 
would have read and been inspired by these and other similar 
passages. 
While the surviving writings of classical skepticism 
appear to take the desirability of morality for granted, the 
likelihood that at least some of them turned their sk~pt~~ism 
on ethics is confirmed by Justin Martyr, who complains of 
< ···-~~-~-~,.. ~.,.. -· --~~~-----·~·· < •• •< ·-- ·-· ·-· ···--.. ~"-------"-
Apology, 28) . A number of gnostic movements taught or were 
-->•~>'-----·--·-" '"'"M-•·-----
accused of teaching a kind of antinomianism, in which ethical 
or religious rules are held to have been superseded so that 
what would otherwise have been considered lawless conduct is 
now permissible. However, these views were said to have been 
inspired by divine revelation rather than skepticism, so they 
would be more appropriately classified as counter-intuitive 
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views. Sir Francis Dashwood 1 s Hellfire Club (an eighteenth-
century society devoted to debauchery) might be a closer 
exarrple, to the extent that its mission could be articulated 
philosophically. 
The most philosophically influential expression of 
ethical skepticism has been "Hume Is Law" (also referred to as 
the "naturalistic fallacy" or the "is/ought" question) to the 
effect that one cannot derive an "ought" statement from an "is" 
statement. The principle (or something like it) is articulated 
in Appendix I of Hume 1 s Enquiry Concerning the Principles of 
Morals, as well as in book III, part iii of his Treatise of 
Human Nature. In the passage which inspired this influential 
principle, Hume merely intends to criticize what he sees as a 
conunon fallacy rather than deny the possibility of defending 
ethics altogether. In fact Humel s beliefs about ethics are 
quite complex--sometimes he is an emotivist, while at other 
times he proposes a theory of ethics which is surprisingly 
consistent with ordinary, intuitive views. The latter mode of 
Humean ethics is based on the principle that a certain virtue 
is moral insofar as virtually everybody would approve of it, 
and would approve of its manifestation in anybody. 
Nevertheless, "Hume 1 S Law" has taken on a life of its own--and 
with good reason, since it is so much more interesting and 
insightful than any of Hume 1 S positive ethical ideas. 38 
38 For a discussion of Humel s ethics, see chapter 
"Morality and Justice," in Penelhum 1992: 124-159. 
five, 
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Turning to the twentieth century, Logical Positivists 
variously (a) reject ethical statements as a subclass of 
metaphysical ones, which are said to be meaningless since they 
are neither analytic nor empirical (Carnap); (b) follow emotive 
interpretations viewing ethical statements as mere expressions 
of sentiment rather than genuine assertions (Ayer); or (c) 
argue that they are assertions, but which somehow avoid Logical 
Positivist criticisms of metaphysics (Schlick) . 39 Wittgenstein 
writes in the Tractatus that "Ethics and aesthetics are one and 
the same" ( 6 . 421) . While this suggests the common view that 
ethics, like aesthetics, is solely a matter of opinion, from· 
the context it appears that Wittgenstein wants to place ethics 
in the category of something which cannot be described, but 
which is nevertheless real and important. Wittgenstein also 
seeks to convert categorical imperatives into hypothetical ones 
by asking, "And what if I do not do it?" (6.422). However, his 
point is not to dismiss ethical exhortations altogether, but to 
show that they are not reducible to meaningful logical 
expressions. Kai Nielson (1989) summarizes the present status 
of emotivism as well as a number of more recent analytical 
controversies within the subculture of journal-article writers 
which, however erudite they may be, do not really impinge upon 
this fundamental ethical question. 
The most coherent and persuasive articulatigQ __ .Qf __ §th_i_cal 
' >~~ ...... ..w.t.~'"''''"'"""·' ' ·~ . ""'"'"-'·"-·""'"""' ............ ~ .,,_., ~,,. "'"'""' _. .•.. ~ "••'• 
39 For a readable summary of various Logical Positivist 
positions on ethics, see chapter eight, "The Accanrnodation of 
Ethics," in Hanfling 1981: 149-170. 
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and wrong ( 1977J . Mackie interprets ethical statements as 
sentiments which are 
psychologi:::~~~E~Cl:~ _onto __ f:>?mething bey~:md th~t. George Moore Is 
Principia ethica (1993, originally 1903) coins the term 
"naturalistic fallacy" for what I take to be a confused 
articulation of essentially the same skeptical objection to 
ethics. Moore conflates the problem of defining "good" (which 
the emotivists emphasize) with that of justifying whatever 
values are thereby invoked; and in any case he should have 
called the resulting ethical stance an "assumption" rather than 
a " fallacy. " 
field of meta-ethics with Moore, and I will make much use of 
it. Iris Murdoch (1992) has written on ethical s~~pticism from 
a _ mysti~.~-~, pers:p_ecti ve,. and her proposed solution has some 
affinities with Moore 1 s Platonism-inspired one which assumes 
(p~-~~~.PS. unjustifiably) some things to be intrinsically good. 
A comrron Existentialist assumption is that each 
i!2.c:J:~vid1Jal 1 s inter..pretation of the meanin~ ___ of our existence 
over any abstract, faux-universal 
g~::_~~-lizations about it. This appears ~o imply an extreme form 
of norrnati ve ethical relativism in which the correct set of 
moral values varies according to the individual moral agent 
(rather than according to the agent 1 s culture or society, as 
another popular version of ethical 
view I enjoy an absolute freedom of actic:>n!.__ .. with n,o higher 
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authority able to pass judgement on my_ ~~e~. While not all 
Existentialists agree with this view (Sartre, for exarrple, 
eventually modified his radical individualist ethics in favor 
of a Marxist approach which he felt was more successful in 
confronting real-world problems as opposed to academic, ivory-
tower ones) 40 , it appears to be the standard point of departure 
for the various existentialist authors. 
Nietzsche, who is often grouped with the Existentialists, 
sometimes sounds like an ethical skeptic, as in the following 
passage: 
In aller bisherigen »Wissenschaft der Moral« fehlte, so 
wunderlich es klingen mag, noch das Problem der Moral 
selbst: es fehlte der Argwohn daflir, daJS es hier etwas 
Problematisches gebe. Was die Philosophen »Begrundung 
der Moral« nannten und von sich forderten, war, im 
rechten Lichte gesehen, nur eine gelehrte Form des 
Glaubens an die herrschende Moral [ ... ] [JGB sec. 186.] 
[In all "science of morals" so far one thing was lacking, 
strange as it may sound: the problem of morality itself; 
what was lacking was any suspicion that there was 
something problematic here. What the philosophers called 
"a rational foundation for morality" and tried to supply 
was, seen in .the right light, merely a scholarly 
variation of the corrunon faith in the prevalent 
morality ... ] 
At other times, however, Nietzsche appears to propose ethical 
values of his own, which to a skeptic would be just as 
indefensible. Reconciling the tension between these two 
aspects is one of the biggest challenges in interpreting 
40 Thomas Anderson has 
subject of Sartrean ethics. 
article by Risieri Frondizi. 
written several 







While theories of ethical skepticism must by their very 
nature resemble one another, the same is not true of counter-
intuitive theories, whose variety could theoretically range 
from the belief that actions are moral insofar as they are in 
accordance with the example of Elvis Presley, to some new kind 
of moral calculus based on horary astrology. For practical 
purposes however human creativity quickly outstrips the 
attention span of ethicists who, as I have stated earlier, are 
mainly interested in theories which cleverly attack or cleverly 
defend our ordinary, intuitive views about ethics. As a result 
the type of counter-intuitive theory which is most likely to 
attract scholarly attention, is a theory which directly 
reverses some intuitive assumption about ethics. Hitler and 
the Nazis have thereby won an enduring place in postwar ethical 
discussions, however perverse it may be to put it this way. 
Few ideologies can match Nazism's utility as a sort of devil's 
advocate in the field of ethics, although devil-worship per se 
may sometimes enter into discussions of religious ethics. One 
popular type of usage for such counter-intuitive ethical 
theories is in reductio ad absurdum arguments against more 
conventional theories. (For example, if ethical relativism 
would give the stamp of morality to Hitler's actions, this 
would be generally taken as a serious criticism of ethical 
relativism.) Another type of usage is to call into question 
conventional moral beliefs, by showing the admirable qualities 
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of something which is usually assumed to be immoral. Apart 
from Nietzsche's writings on the subject, for other examples we 
might point to the misadventures of Aleister Crowley or the 
Marquis de Sade, whom some have admired for having the courage 
to indulge their respective lusts in the face of strong 
societal disapproval. A third type of usage is as an extreme 
illustration of the diversity of opinions about morality. 
The basic ethical issue which such challenges bring to 
ltght. is .... this: 
~~ate':'~E- t:E:.o~:: might be, if indeed there are such things--that 
obligates us to accept them? From whence do they derive their 
moral "force, " as it were? By this I do not mean to ask why it 
might be in my interest to behave ethically, as it is easy to 
imagine situations in which the moral action would go against 
my interests. Nor am I asking for information about what 
causes us to have ethical views (be it society, biology, or 
whatnot) but on what basis such views might acquire legitimate 
moral authority transcending the mere fact of their influence. 
Nor do I have in mind such small-scale moral problems as 
abortion or euthanasia, or even larger-scale ones like the 
truth of Utilitarianism or Kant, which I see as disputes over 
tactics rather than goals. 41 Instead, I want to know what it 
41 While I realize that Utilitarian and Kantian theory 
ostensibly disagree about goals (the maximization of happiness 
versus the categorical imperative), I see these stated "goals" 
merely as a higher level of tactics, with the true, unstated 
goal situated even higher on the ethical hierarchy. Such moral 
theories are not invented in a vacuum, but are carefully 
designed to yield a certain set of preconceived values. The 
field of ethics has encouraged this tendency by judging such 
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is about even the most basic, seemingly uncontroversial moral 
rules that supposedly demands our recognition. 
Let me pause for a moment to give names to some of these 
distinctions. By "first-order" ethical statements I mean those 
dealing with the morality of specific actions or classes of 
actions within the framework of a given ethical system. By 
"second-order" questions I mean those relating to the truth of 
whole ethical systems (e.g. Utilitarianism or Kant). Finally, 
I~!!t: to identify a class of "third order" g':J:e~~?:9_I1_5. ____ 9:~-~Jing 
w~!J} ___ tJ~:~ ___ eveJ] __ I!l_<?E~_basiE_ issue o~--~~:y we, ___ ~~-g_ht to choose 9ood 
over evil, or whether is true. While 
strictly speaking, "Don't kill people just to watch them die" 
o~gl:!: __ _!o _ _!:?_~ a first-order issue, we can use it to r~pre~ent 
third-order questions on the assumption that if there is any 
'"-'''-'"O»<•-··-~~~""""'""' MOd,h'~o 0 ,, "'- ,, 0 M~~----~-·--·""""•---~~---
tr~_t:? .. _!_~ __ ::::~·li<:~ .. ---~!:. all, this maxim would surelY. "~~----w~_::cl1!_<:Jed. 
Nietzsche's ethical _skepticism is usual!:y ___ ~-12!:§:~]2E~.t:--~9 .. -~.§ __ a 
but becomes a second-order 
c:ritig~e __ !:<?. __ ~he ~~~-~t:_!:~~t h~--~an be shown t::=:_R~~-~e::;s et:h~cal 
values of his own. Intriguingly, Jung's commentary restores an 
-- ••--·-- -··· ----~-·•••"' • oo •' 0 o"F-"" ""'"""'_.,_'L~''-'"'--'¥>-~·'«~=,~----·~··-_.....,...-----
a~P-~.t ... . o :f. _ Ni etz s ch~~-~-t::J]Jc a! _ y~-~~- Y.-?bi"s:g __ l}Qt ___ QgJ_y ____ s:.Q..IJ:t~.i}:::t_s 
positive values, but is even capable of rescuing the whole 
< ,. • - --~- ~~""---" ~-~· ·-" _,___,_ -~-~Y. • ..,.>~-~·---~ . ...__..,.......,_,_..,W"""" -·" •-" ·' •~ ·'-',.."•''-"""*•~-~·•·~.......-··" ., - ••·• • -~=·-•>•-""'- ~--""""'"~'-""'··· ·~ " •· ~- ,......,-.,~ 
_§!_hic_~~--:er_oject from the challenge of ethical skeptici§m. 
B. Objective and subjective justifications of ethics 
theories chiefly on how well they mesh with our intuitive 
views. 
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Let us group the various attempts to justify ethics into 
three categories based on whether they utilize objective, 
subjective, or blurred justifications. Of course, the terms 
"subjective" and "objective" are problematic enough to blur by 
themselves without any special effort on our part. For 
example, we cannot simply regard the human skin as the dividing 
line, since various details about the inside of our bodies may 
be confirmed by lovers or X-ray technicians. If we call mental 
events "subjective" and physical ones "objective," this fails 
to distinguish between those aspects of our minds which we 
choose or control, and those which we do not (e.g. temptations, 
guilt-pangs, multiple personalities). Furthermore, there are 
serious problems of personal identity to consider. For my 
purposes, a 
"subjective" or "objective" based on whether the ultimate 
said to be identical with or different from the locus or loci 
of ethically relevant decision-making. 
"'-·--~~·-·---~·---~-". "~~-~ -~" . . ~ 
So why should I avoid killing people just to watch them 
die? If the answer is based on an objective justification, 
then this is intuitively unsatisfactory. For example, the mere 
fact that Hitler held power between 1933 and 1945 does not 
persuade us that Nazism was the truth about morality for 
Germany during that time. While the existence of the Nazi 
regime undoubtedly had all sorts of practical consequences for 
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those who still wanted to behave morally, none of this would be 
sufficient to abrogate Hume's Law. That is, no set of "is's", 
however complicated, can give rise to an ethical "ought" 
without that "ought" having already been assumed somehow. Now 
consider the now generally-discredited divine command theory of 
ethics. We do not necessarily accept the standards imposed 
upon us by terrestrial lawgivers (e.g., Hitler) as legitimate. 
Why, then, should we regard an extra-terrestrial lawgiver (i.e. 
God) any differently? (Of course this assumes that the 
existence of God is solely an objective consideration, but bear 
with me--I will address other theological possibilities later 
on. ) From the mere fact of God's power, we cannot conclude 
that his commandments are just. This idea of the 
irreducability of ethics to theology is found in sources 
ranging from Plato's EutJwphro (lOd-lla, which is the part 
about whether the gods love some action because it is pious, or 
whether it is pious because the gods love it) to Kierkegaard's 
Fear and Trerribling (which ponders "the teleological suspension 
of the ethical" ) . Nietzsche proclaims the death of God not 
because a theology-based justification of ethics was once 
legitimate and now is not, but because humanity has lost its 
faith in the premises of an argument that was fallacious to 
begin with. 
Unfortunately, other objective ethical theories suffer 
from much the same flaws as the divine command theory. If it 
is suggested that morality is not laid down by any lawmaker but 
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exists as a kind of universal law, this similarly begs the 
question of why we should take this moral law to heart and 
accept its standards as legitimate. The fact that morality is 
a necessary law like economic scarcity (necessary, that is, if 
we assume that resources must always be finite) or a natural 
law like gravity, would be no reason for regarding the 
existence of this law as a good thing, any more than we do with 
gravity or economic scarcity. Wouldn't it be great if economic 
scarcity could be regularly suspended so that we could have 
everything we wanted, or if the law of gravity had some 
loophole in it that would prevent airplanes from crashing? 
It may be objected that ethical standards do not have to 
be accepted in order to be true. If moral facts are like 
mathematical facts, then to refuse to accept them would simply 
be a mistake. However, I submit that this confuses two senses 
of the word "wrong." For exa.rrple, certain shady accounting 
practices may result in bookkeeping which is technically 
"wrong, " but to call it "wrong" in the moral sense begs the 
question of whether the subterfuge might not be justified. 
Maybe the accountant is stealing from the mafia in order to 
support famine relief. Depending on how it is interpreted, to 
say that we ought to do the right thing simply because it is 
the right thing, is either self-referential or an appeal to 
some sort of ineffable, intuitive acceptance of morality. In 
either case, the answer is a philosophical dead end--no 
substantial arguments can be offered, and nothing more can be 
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said. 
If objective reasons are incapable of justifying ethics, 
what about subjective reasons? Ethical standards cannot be 
solely the result of :::;~bjectiy.§__ considera_!::AS?n~'-·· or else 
mo~ality de~~-~Eates into an extreme relativism which defeats 
our intuitive views about morality. If I ought to do good 
because I want to do good (or because I decide to do good) , 
then I could just as easily have wanted (or decided) to do 
evil. Ethical standards would then fluctuate wildly from 
person to person, since there is no guarantee that people will 
agree, and quite a good chance that some of us will actively 
choose activities which would normally be considered evil. 
Furthermore, Hume's Law would come into effect. The mere fact 
that I have a certain desire, or that I have made a certain 
decision, need not imply that I have an ethical obligation to 
act upon this desire, or that I necessarily have a duty to do 
whatever it is that I decided to do. 
Whq,t if it be pro:e<?sed that it is not our desires or 
choices which determine the morality of an actic::>_n, but some 
other subjective element which is less likely t<? fluctua.t~~ to 
these extremes--for exarrple, some sort of hypothetical species-
wide conscience? This retur_ns_11s _to the preyiQ1lS disCU$Sj..Q:Q_Ql 
objec::_tive justifications, since conscience would be separate 
from our loci of decision-making, and would therefore becane 
vulnerable to similar criticisms ..... .:!'~~! .. i...::>~'--~y~~---~-~¥:~~--Eould 
name something specific to me which might be cap~le of 
215 
justifying ethics (reason for Kant, human nature for Aristotle, 
maximized pleasure _for Utilitariani_~_!tl.) , there would still be 
the further question of why I should be obligated to accept 
that something as the legitimate basis of morality. Within us 
are many voices, of widely varying degrees of nobility. On 
what basis should any of them be preferred over the others? 
That is, do I have the privilege of choosing whether to accept 
a certain criterion, or must I submit to having a certain 
standard forced upon me? Since neither answer is intuitively 
satisfactory, the problem is not avoided, but merely given new 
clothes: Why follow the promptings of one's conscience? Why 
~ ' _,, <··-~-•• ' ._.,., '•c-- ·~'--"' 
be reasonable? Why act in accordance with human nature? Why 
se~kJ?_~_E;!asure? If the true ethical standard is somethi~~ which 
i~ _fo~c:E:!d _ _upon us, t:!l~~-~t iE>_':l:§._~~~_t;(itor_ial as GC?~.'- Hitler, or 
-~c~.<?Pomic:: scarcity. If it is valA<:l.2E:ll-Y i.J::l~-2~:1:'-~.§--~~-cl}_Q.<?_se to 
accept it, then it would be no less moral for me to choose the 
contrary values. 
~_y __ success~~l ustification of ethics will have to take 
their attendant drawbacks. T_"Qus, __ in ~rder to salvage ethics, 
we have to deny or blur the dichotomy between subjectivity and 
objectivity. Note that this is a metap~yE)~C::<:t_L claim _;r.:a.tb:§r 
t~c:_~_a -~t_:::ictlY- ethical on~. Interestingly, the idea of using 
metaphysical claims as the basis of ethics is characteristic of 
religious thought. In their most familiar form--in which God, 
karma, or their functional equivalent becomes the enforcer of a 
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certain set of moral standards--religious justifications of 
ethics are essentially a special form of objective 
justification, i.e. the divine cormnand theory and its ilk. 
However, _§!._. n':!_rn~J:"' of reliQ"ious philosophies make the boundary 
between subj~ctivity and qbjectivity_ more ... .2C?.I91::.te ... _tl!9:D .it is 
normal These have the potential to salvage the 
basic .ethical project from the criticisms levelled at both 
objective and subjective justifications. · §ucJ:l .. !h~o~i§.§l~ §:.!=-!.§IllPt. 
to blur the subjectiy.g:yj<:)}:)ject_i_:y_~ty cl~_e._tincJJqp }:)y OY~:I:'_tQusly 
qenying:. or cl2.~1--~¥t.!l~L-1::he existence of the self, which th~y 
claim_~-~ false~x. ~~PI.J<?.~ed to b~ th~ __ }?S?~~9-~~-E~1::we_eg__1::.h~.!!!_ (e.g. 
reflexive theories in which 
intern~! .... ~yents somehow reflect externcaJ, universal ones such 
as the mot ions of the heavenly bodies (e.g. the Hermetic 
~onc~P!: ... of the reflexivity of microcosm and macrocosm);_ or 
hgJ~ng __ t:g.El:_t the t:.J:"'u~_.§_elf i~ nq~ ~_9;entical with the sel.~-~'ltVJ:ljch 
might be inclined to violate ordinary ethical standards, but 
..... ---""·--~- _____ _.,.._,..,,.~"~·~--- .. -· ···- -· '. '"'""'""""'"~"-"'""¥~-----~·-"---~~- ··-~-~---·---~-~~-~~-
·also includes a more universal level where moral standards have 
_,.. ~- ... 
_thet! ___ ~~i.stence, .ii!?:c:l~~LC:h. is ___ shared by all humans if not all 
of existence (e.g. Advaita Vedanta). 
While each of these attempt to blur the distinction 
between an internal, human side and an external, universal one, 
recall that this is a rather naive view of subjectivity and 
objectivity, and that for ethical purposes it would be more 
---"·" ...... ~._._·~--.--~ "'""-··«·-·-~----'·~-~-----......... ------~----·~---~-~------~-- --~'"""" ___ ...__ 
he;Lpf~~ __ t_~---~~~:t'ltify subjectivity with t:he locus of decision-
Thus, the early Buddhist metaphysical method of 
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blurring, in which nothing that is "inside" me can be clearly 
separated from the "outside" world, is interesting but fails to 
offer any solution to the problem of justifying ethics. (In 
fact, although Buddhism certainly urges the practice of various 
ethical principles, these tend to resemble what Kant would call 
hypothetical rather than categorical imperatives, since they 
are valid only insofar as they serve to reduce suffering.) 
Something similar is true of theories in the second group--
after all, the fact that I am somehow capable of acting in 
imitation of, or in harrrony with, the universe cannot imply 
that I am obligated to do so. Once again we run into Hume's 
Law. Theories from the third group tend to suffer from 
vagueness. While it is easy to say that every individual is 
really identical with Brahman or God, it is more difficult to 
find some way of avoiding the dra-wbacks associated with this 
theory. For example, is it correct to say that God--in the 
form of Hitler--corrmitted genocide? To the extent that we 
refuse to attribute our evil actions to God, this calls into 
~~,-~,-~-~- ., 
so, these theories capture an important insight into the 
possibility of blurring subjectivity and objectivity. If we 
keep the ancient sources at arm's length, resorting to them for 
inspiration rather than clarity, this essential insight can be 
salvaged. 
Suppgse that our locus of decision-making is not unitary 
···-<-~--~~~,~----- ·-·----- ' ---·---· 
but includes different levels, including a level which all of 
--• -·~•- _>-.',-~~------ ~--·-·•·~--··•~·-••·•---~~-"""""'~--~-·~·...-~.,.,.--_,..,_~.,_,,_.,""''''""" ''-'' ·~· 
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us share and which is the source of our ordinary, intuitive 
.~_............_......,,c,_,~ ~~-.,..._., •~-- ---, " ~- - ""-' •·--.,.,~- ~..-.-.......... _....,...,,, 
eth:h_c~l or enlightened decision_-making. (We need not def~J:l~ 
what precisely is meant by_ "levels," or where and how such 
might exist, in order to suggest a possible structure which if 
t~_l1_~-~<?.uld al~?W __ ~or.:__ the justification of ethics, L _ Sup:p()_~_§ 
further that these levels are not discrete and separate, but 
blur together over a range like the_ chann~ls on a radio dieil. 
In that case, :r: __ g_()_~lq not complain t:hat et~l,lic;?-} __ standarg§ __ _h?:ve 
b_§en imposed on "me" bz some external ___ force, since it is really 
"I" \',ThO am __ d_()~n~ the imp_<:)sing. At the same time, the same 
t~p into this same universal decision-maki:Qg locus. 
-·---A--·~---
Thus, _____ __........ __
e~~jcal principles could partake simultaneously of the benefits 
Much of nonduality~s 
ap_p~~ comes from}ts status as a "}ligher" level of this sort, 
i.e. a realm which transcends individual minds. For exarrple, 
if my (conscious) mind contains discursive thoughts x,y, and z, 
then any realm which contains all these plus their opposites 
would have to transcend my (conscious) mind. Such a realm 
which contained all O.P£~l:)ites of all discurl:)ive th~~2.~t::-~- would 
be identical across differen!: .... J.J:ldividuals, and so begin to 
" "''" ,....,.,..._~~-----·-
resemble some sort of group mind. 
As it happenE;_, ___ ~ung __ ~_s quite tak~ ____ w~.!:_!: __ ~h~s P~t:.t::~~rn. 
Not only does he frequ~ntly allude to its classical sources in 
Eastern :r.~.:!:.ill_:igJ:).§_ al:l.<:l_XJ.~stern eso_!:~l::'2:~.-~:L.~<J.itions, but his own 
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vision of the collective consciousness is often interp:r:eted 
along the lines of the:_~!ela.:t::._i:cmsf1_~E. _just sketched between the 
While Jung is teasingly 
ambiguous as to what ~ind of existence he· is actl1C1~_ly_cla¥:ning 
for the collective unconscious, this need not affect its 
utility as a means of blurring the boundary between 
subjectivity and objectivity. His interpretation of Nietzsche 
emphasizes those aspects of him which seem to reflect a similar 
structure, such as his visionary experiences. While Jung 1 s 
discussion of Nietzsche does not usually discuss ethics per se, 
his somewhat uncharacteristic focus on the nineteenth-century 
socio-political milieu brings out--under the label of 
psychology--those subjects which seem to have inspired 
Nietzsche Is crypto-ethical wrath against Wagner and so on. A 
Babi connection would reinforce Jung 1 s interpretation, since 
the Babis would have been regarded as social reformers with 
certain peculiar metaphysical beliefs. That Nietzsche based 
his ethics on certain metaphysical ideas about human 
fulfillment is suggested by his subtitling of his autobiography 
(after Pindar) , Wie man wird, was man ist (How One Becomes 
What One Is) . 
The blurred met::_~p~ysical model I have been explicat~Qg __ :l:§ 
9_nl¥:. a model, and need not correspond to the actual state of 
the universe. Its virtue lies in its ability, if it turns out 
"< __ ,...,., ... .._ ...... ""'~''" 
to _be __ true, to overcome Humel s Law and successfully justify 
ethics. Such a move would be ineffective if either the 
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metaphysical system turned out to be untrue (so that 
_,.--·- -
subjectivity and objectivity do not in fact blur), or if the 
ethical principles revealed by a blurred system turned out to 
be counterintuitive. Jung believes that a blurred metaphysical 
---·-- -~· -. -·---- --~~.~---··-·-·'"'·"''"'''~-~·~-. '··- -· __ .,_ 
system is ob~"~YC:.~~~-"empiric::_~lly, e.g. through our dreams when 
they turn out to reflect mythological themes with which we 
could not have been consciously familiar. His interpretation 
of Nietzsche stresses that philosopher's encounter with these 
archetypal forces, although Jung wonders about their ethical 
content. Whether they, or we, may actually have experienced an 
ethical interactivity on the part of the universe is an 
empirical matter which cannot be answered without recourse to 
knowledge not everyone will regard as admissible. 
C. The role of a (hypothetical) transcendent conscience 
It may be objected that none of Jung's assumptions about 
metaphysics or psychology would really be capable of justifying 
ethics. After all, since the unconscious is not the locus of 
our conscious decision-making, any values which it might harbor 
would have to be considered objective justifications of ethics. 
Why should "I" (i.e. the part of me that is conscious, the part 
of me that makes decisions) accept the moral authority of the 
unconscious, collective or not? Do I have a choice about 
whether to accept its values, or must I submit to having them 
imposed on me? How can one transform the "is" into an "ought"? 
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Are the existentialists wrong in supposing that human 
fulfillment is not something already prescribed, but is subject 
to our own choices? I discern a solution from Jung's 
interpretation of Nietzsche, although it is never explicitly 
stated. Suppose that the universe _i._~ __ ethicall:( int~~-<::-~ive, in 
the sense of possessing some Irl.eg_l1anism_ capap_t~--- gf _ _g1.1i<;ling 
individuals to an awareness of where our fulfillment lies. 
Suppose further that the nature of this fulfillment somehow 
encan:passes those ideals and attitudes which are consistent 
with a conventional ethical orientation. The res~l tAn_g 
structure might resemble some sort of species-wide conscience; 
._ .. , .. -·· .. ,.,, .... ··"··-~ .. ~... ,,_·-·-'"'--··--- ~ -~··~ - ... ····- -·---
or it migl:lt take le~s exclusively psychglogicCl,l fg:r:ItiS, such as 
those metaphysical systems in which karma is thought to guide 
us by showing us the true consequences of our choices. Either 
way the crucial element which would enable such a system to 
qerive ethical principles from metaphysical ones without 
falling prey to the draVJbacks of the divine command --~D.~?ry_L is 
that the interactive system would be informational rather _than 
__ cq_~i~e.· The underlying asstrrnption is that a profound factual 
understanding (let us call it gnosis) of the nature of one's 
fulfillment and the significance of one's choices would be 
sufficient to persuade most people undergoing the experience of 
the intrinsic value of such an ethical orientation. Those who 
(perhaps under the influence of Hume or Existentialism) doubt 
the legitimacy of any identified basis for human fulfillment-~ 
gnostic experience or no--could nevertheless be personally 
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persuaded of the aesthetic superiority of good over evil. Even 
if some holdouts refuse to be persuaded, this need not affect 
the ethical legitimacy of the system. 
command tl!e()ry, the locus of this ethicalJ~:no~~i __ s ______ _;,__ ___ _ 
it a "conscience"} could be conceived as intimately interwoven 
with the locus of ethical decision-making so that the 
promptings of one's conscience stem are essentially a hidden 
_(;i_~pect inherent in each ethical choice. 
consciences to be individualized in that they take into account 
our particular situations and perspectives; yet universal in 
the sense that their instruction is designed to point the way 
t?~~"~- i~e~~-~-which at some level conver~e and becane united. 
The idea would be not so much to ensure perfect behavior as to 
nurture a certain kind of awareness in stages as we evolve. 
Again, the content of this gnosis would be factual, and not 
consist purely of moral imperatives or the like. I propose 
that certain attitudes and choices consistent with conventional 
ethics would be suggested by such an awareness, thereby 
bridging the "is/ought" problem. For example, someone who 
enjoys killing people just to watch them die may imagine 
additional factual knowledge about the universe to have no 
bearing on this particular aesthetic taste. ( Perhaps our 
murderer is fully aware of the suffering involved and 
nevertheless exults in it, like the "heroes" of the movie 
Natural born killers.) Yet I imagine there to be some factual 
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knowledge which is capable of transforming even the most 
hardened attitudes--if not "enforced empathy" clarifying the 
pain of others, then some sort of inner understanding as to why 
the murderer feels such compulsions, or of what an alternative 
path would be like. I venture to speculate tl1at ~~E_yarious 
"evil" inclinations are the result of a felt sense of lack 
which might be corrected . through a truer factual awareness of 
our situation. 
I have been assuming the role of the conscience to be 
ultimately one of instilling a certain metaphysical 
understanding rather than specific ethical behavior. This 
brings me to another drawback to the attempt to derive ethics 
from metaphysics, namely that the metaphysical facts or beliefs 
invoked seem to transcend the realm of ordinary experience 
where ethical principles are usually held to apply. As a 
result, metaphysical principles which are intended to justify 
ethics may instead have the effect of rendering them 
inconsequential, since the sphere of ethical action is thereby 
relegated to. something less than ultimate reality. A related 
problem i~ .th.c:tt of how apparent_~Y.-~:~.9:~alistic_·~----~-~-~- the ___ ~~n~~- of 
conc:~ptual) ethical :P.Ei-_r::tc:~ples_ .. <:::.£1.:!-19_ .. e~ .. ~true in a universe 
whose. g~ghest J:!letaphysical "ley~~" was nondual. This raises 
the frightening possibility that a person with an accurate 
understanding of the metaphysical foundations of the universe 
might nevertheless choose to kill people just to watch them 
die, and not be any less enlightened for it. Clearly, any 
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ethical system that allows this kind of behavior is going to be 
intuitively unsatisfactory, which is what makes this such a 
formidable challenge to ethical systems claiming metaphysical 
justifications. Yet just because an action lacks at the 
transcendent level consequences which it seems to possess at 
the ordinary level, does not make it unirrportant. While a 
pilot-in-training may not actually cause any genuine damage by 
crashing a virtual plane in flight-simulation, such practice 
clearly has consequences which reach beyond flight school. 
Similarly, just because our primary existence is not physical 
does not mean that our physical existence is worthless or 
insignificant. In fact, just as the virtual simulation does 
from a certain point of view exist in the same reality as a 
physical airplane, so might this world be considered contiguous 
with whatever deeper levels it possesses. 
Neither Nietzsche nor Jung denigrates physical existence 
in this world, nor do they teach the existence of another one 
independent of this one. Nietzsche admires those who embrace 
the world rather than pine after another one; his teachings on 
the Ubermensch and eternal recurrence are meant to encourage 
this kind of attitude. Jung limits his discussion to what he 
regards as matters touching the real world, mainly in the realm 
of human psychology, introducing more rarefied concepts only as 
they have a bearing on human affairs. Both favor a certain 
kind of life which is roughly consistent with ordinary ethics, 
but based on internally-generated attitudes rather than values 
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imposed from the outside. If our true fulfillment consists of 
such neo-Platonic ideals as caring, inner strength, and other 
positive virtues, it is easy to see how the limitations of this 
world would be necessary to inculcate them. After all, what 
would it mean to partake of the ideal of "caring," in a world 
in which there exist no real causes for concern? Why would the 
concept of "inner strength" matter to beings who are no longer 
subject to earthly limitations? At the higher level the 
distinction between good and evil may no longer be 1 an issue, 
like lovers forgetting their past quarrels in the course of 
reconciliation. At the same time I imagine Nietzsche and Jung 
to hold our nature to consist of, rather than blank 
namelessness, a certain benevolent luminosity. That is, such 
attributes as caring or inner strength, though inspired by the 
challenges of this world, nevertheless characterize the values 
of a transcendent conscience in a way that their opposites do 
not. 
What if I am wrong in _9-ssuming that conver1:t::,ional ethical 
attitudes are somehow implied by the nature of human 
fulfillment. Intriguingly, both Nietzsche and Jung are famous 
for denying the identification of conventional ethics with 
human fulfillment--Nietzsche through his discussions of master 
morality and so on, Jung through his theories of nonduality in 
general and the Shadow in particular. While I interpret them 
both as implicitly favoring something like conventional ethics 
in spite of all that, the challenge does not thereby lose any 
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of its potency. After all, the very word "evil" is often 
enough to excite "black metal" fans with the anticipation of 
dark pleasures--of sex, drugs, rock-n-roll, devil-worship, and 
the thrill of callously hurling one's bubble-gum to the ground 
in utter disregard of societal disapproval. Is it not 
reasonable to suppose that this aspect of us is at least as 
integral to our nature, and crucial to our fulfillment, as love 
and light? I see a fundamental confusion here between two 
senses of the word "evil." On one hand, there is "evil" in the 
sense of wickedness or the gleeful abandonment of inhibitions--
the same benign devilry that leads choirgirls to experiment 
with leather handcuffs. It is easy to see how this kind of 
"evil" could actually turn out to be a facet of fulfillment. 
For exarrples of a different kind of "evil," think of those who 
are prevented from thriving by war, economic dislocation, 
prejudice, or whatnot. Those for whom the reality of this kind 
of evil has sunk in are unlikely to see it as sexy or conducive 
to human fulfillment. 42 
While Jung is on record as opposing this type of evil, 
would not such a refusal to accept the goals of the Shadow be 
one-sided and subversive of his admonition to identify with the 
dark side as well as the light? On what grounds would someone 
42 Evil in this sense may still aid human fulfillment, as 
suggested by Irenaeus, but only as something to overcome and 
not as something which is intrinsically good. For example, in 
a world without scarcity, risk, or injustice, our souls might 
grow up spoiled, as it were. The existence of evil allows us 
the opportunity to evolve out of shallowness. Of course, any 
world in which infants are tortured and starved ·-would seem to 
be Em extremeiy ineffe.cEive""systein·£"or soul -=-btii lding. . -
-- - .,.,-_,_-_,-,~""""'-C4-d< .-. • .:: ----
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who has transcended~-!:.~~----?ual~_ty _'2!-~SJOd_~:r:!~~L~vil nevertheless 
continue to clinq to __ t:.he9:_<?9<::!?_ Jung frankly admits that this 
is a staggering moral problem, and while it is vital to our 
psychological growth for us to became conscious of the Shadow, 
it may be better for us not to think about its implications for 
morality: 
The shadow is indispensable for making the whole of a 
personality; nobody is whole without negative qualities. 
This is lightly said, but in reality it is an enormous 
problem, looked at from an ethical point of view. It is 
so difficult that one knows no other solution practically 
than to shut one's eyes; if one doesn't look at it, one 
can live. But the moment one sees it, it is almost 
impossible, an insupportable conflict. If one takes the 
moral conflict seriously, it becomes insoluble. 
[ZS: 123] 
And again he writes in connection with the "river" analogy for 
psychological processes mentioned in the previous chapter: 
Is it good to be in the current of life, or is it bad? I 
mean morally. And that is difficult to say. As a rule, 
it is good for others when I am not in the river of life 
because then I do nothing .... But for myself that is not 
good. In order to prosper it is perhaps better to be in 
life .... [ZS: 818-819] 
fulfillment--would it then contain within it the seeds of its 
own using the same argument that I have been 
making on the opposite assumption, or would it be no more 
ethically compelling than the evil God who gives us the 
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and human is to yieJ.,c1. a 
It may be difficult to imagine a consistent negative 
version. For example, if a part of my fulfillment is based on 
denying fulfillment to others, then how could the universe 
arrange to lead all human beings toward this type of 
fulfillment? Perhaps God is like a dog-breeder intent on 
producing a very mean dog, by placing us in the dogfight-arena 
of the universe and waiting to see which of us prevails. The 
ideal characteristics of such ·a dog would correspond to the 
concept of human fulfillment, and the dog's understanding of 
his master's commands would correspond the the experience of 
ethical gnosis. Even if the training process caused us to 
internalize the values of our handlers, this would not make 
those values ethically legitimate--how, then, can the positive 
version of the same argument be taken seriously? In this case 
the dog and handler are separate beings, whereas a blurred 
metaphysical system would serve to unify human beings and God 
(or his functional equivalent). If it were possible for human 
beings to be led to a genuine internal sense of rightness about 
killing people just to watch them die, in harmony with some 
objective truth about ethics, then I would be willing to bite 
the bullet and accept this consequence. Again, this is a 
factual matter which cannot be answered in the abstract. 
229 
EPILOGUE 
A basic problem facing the task of justifying ethics is 
that of the gulf between the shared physical world in which 
ethical decisions are generally held to apply, and the abstract 
intellectual realm 1n which ethical principles are usually 
formulated and debated. This is not merely a replay of the old 
"ivory tower" criticism of academia (in fact, academics as a 
group seem more than sufficiently interested in real-world 
political issues), but rather an observation about the nature 
of ethical inquiry itself. It would be out of place, for 
example, for an ethicist to formulate an ethical theory based 
purely on personal feelings derived from concrete situations, 
with no attEmpt to situate the discussion in a more cerebral 
plane. As JFM Hunter writes, 
If someone said, "Come now, you claim to know something 
about ethics. Show me whether it would be wrong of me to 
make love to my friend's wife." . I would have an opinion 
all right, especially if he provided me with more of the 
supposed facts of the case, but nothing I would care to 
represent as a philosophical answer to his question. 
[Hunter 1980: viii] 
On the other hand, less agent-specific types of 
experiential appeals are often quite admissible (though still 
controversial) among ethicists: the pangs of conscience or 
empathy (considered in the abstract), the ability to feel pain 
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or pleasure, the feelings aroused in us by nature (cited by the 
Norwegian "ecosophist" Arne Naess as a justification for the 
ethical principle of caring for the environment) . However much 
skeptics might complain about methodology, ultimately all of us 
are forced to take ethical stances when faced with real-world 
problems, and (to put the matter more positively) are drawn to 
act in certain ways by feelings we cannot always defend 
intellectually. Of course it is entirely possible that such 
feelings can be explained solely in terms of standard human 
biology, sociology, and psychology, but it is also possible 
that this line of inquiry is capable of leading us to the 
apprehension of a type of (nondualistic) metaphysical system 
which would be capable of justifying ethics. 
The idea that ethical intuition might be progressive, and 
turn out to be as valid an empirical field of inquiry as other 
forms of psychology, is capable of bridging the gulf between 
real-world choices and ethical theory to the extent that these 
notions can be demonstrated to be true. Developmental 
psychology has had much to say about the formation of ethical 
attitudes, but I am referring to a further evolution--not 
necessarily a typical one--in the ethical experience of adults. 
Note that the apprehension of certain ethical values is 
distinct from the apprehension of the underlying metaphysical 
system. For exarrple, it is conceivable that even if such a 
system were true, one might be guided to adopt a certain 
ethical attitude but not to appreciate exactly why this 
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attitude is ethically justified. Of course the practical 
obstacles are enormous, since people experience a variety of 
conflicting ethical insights, and it is difficult to imagine 
how even in principle one might attempt to distinguish genuine 
ones from the less-reliable (assuming there is anything at all 
to the distinction to begin with) to the satisfaction of 
skeptics. Worse yet, the sphere in which I imagine such 
insights to be honed and corrected is the practical one of our 
ordinary attitudes and decisions. While this sphere is clearly 
basic and important; it does not readily lend itself to any 
sort of systematic study or comparison from one person to 
another. I note however that instances of empathy or 
recognition do occur, and enable us to some extent to identify 
such insights in ourselves. 
Suggestions to the effect that some sort of 11 ethical 
gnosis 11 is possible are even more out of place in scholarly 
discussions than appeals to personal feelings--after all, it 
would be arbitrary if not rude for me to imply that others 
would see things as I do if only they were as enlightened as I 
am. Yet it would be worse to ignore a phenomenon which seems 
to be widely experienced, and which would if true have such 
enormous consequences for the discussion of et:hics. Perhaps 
the situation could be usefully compared with 'the 
perennialist/constructivist debate in the study of comparative 
mysticism. 
some people 
Just as most scholars are prepared to admit that 
have some unusual experiences of a religious 
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nature, but disagree as to whether such experiences lend 
themselves to an inherent ranking (let alone constitute genuine 
evidence of any religious principle), so with ethical insights. 
As mentioned before, I see an ethical 9nosis _9-s_ !:_h_e 
driving force behind most of Nietzsche's philosophical career. 
A spark of insi9.h!: seems to l1:9Y.~_}?~§Q_~g_gited whe:r1_ _W?-gner 
refused to meet with his Jewish friend P~ul Ree. Following the 
promptings of his conscience, Nietzsche broke with Wagner and 
thereby embarked on a course which would lead to further 
insights -(and new targets for his criticism). Far from a man 
without beliefs or morals, Nietzsche writes in }1is frenzied 
final works like a man fighting tooth and claw on behalf of 
something he fervently believes in, perhaps even to the point 
of contemplating violent revolution. This fiery sense of 
purpose·may be mysterious, but perceptive readers of Nietzsche 
will find it an unavoidable reality underlying Zarathustra and 
his later writings. 
intensity of Nietzsche's ethical commitment, he did see in 
Nietzsche what others did not--the inner struggles and 
visionary experiences which Jung recognized from his own life. 
If Nietzsche aimed at toEP]_~~--tl112 .. ~~gn~E ____ ~_l1_l_t_, ___ 9erman 
nationalism, and state Christianity, he obviously failed. Not 
--·<·-···-~,.~-·~·-·-"·~·-- _,,,, ···--"'""''"'" ... -
only did his efforts have no discernible impact on the broad 
outlines of European politics, but his own writings were even 
conscripted into the service of Nazi Germany. Yet the blaze of 
ethical gnosis which he represented has endured, recalling 
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Gandhi's belief in the ultimate invulnerability of satyagraha 
("truth-fastness"). Nietzsche's voice is not only remembered, 
but recognized as belonging to that group of people whose ideas 
and personal example are capable of lighting sparks of ethical 
recognition within us. Thus Nietzsche now belongs to that 
elusive yet vital realm of consciousness through which he 
experienced Zarathustra, and which Jung devoted his life to 
describing. 
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APPENDIX: VARIETIES OF NONDUALITY 
Throughout this thesis I have been using the terms 
"dualism" and "nonduality" as if everybody knew what they 
meant. However, these notions have a long and illustrious 
history which intertwines with the teachings of most of the 
major world religions, as well as some secular sources. The 
concepts come down to us in so many forms that it remains an 
open question whether they are variations of a single idea, or 
unrelated ideas which have unfortunately became confused. The 
sheer variety of ideas which have been subsumed under these 
labels should caution us against assuming a single definitive 
meaning of "nonduality" which can be applied to both Nietzsche 
and Jung, let alone other systems. The same is true of 
"opposites" and "the unity of opposites," which are often 
wrongly assumed to be interchangeable with duali1::y/nondua~ity. 
What I would like to do in this chapter is come up with a 
serviceable typology of nonduality capable of distinguishing 
between the different types of dualism on one hand, and the 
various ways of transcending duality on the other. 
When I was in the third grade or thereabouts, our teacher 
challenged the class to write down as many pairs of "opposites" 
(or "antonyms") as we could think of. Although I eventually 
came up with a long list, many of my entries were disallowed. 
I still remember some of the questionable items: Dog and cat. 
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Knife and fork. Knife and sword. Baseball and football. To 
this day I cannot say exactly why these answers were wrong. 
The term "opJ;XJsites" sounds precise, but on closer inspection 
it turns out to be more of a folk category than a useful 
logical concept. 
Consider just a few of the generally accepted 
applications of the term "opJ;XJsites": 
(1) Mutual negations following the pattern x and not-x. 
(2) Polarities, i.e. the extreme ends of a scale, which 
may be further divided into 
(a) absolute polarities (black and white, yes and 
no), and 
(b) relative or vectoral polarities 
short). 
(tall and 
(3) Some socially-recognized complementary pairs, such as 
the "opJ;XJsite" sexes. 
(4) Mutually-incompatible contraries, within which a 
distinction may be made between 
(a) absolute contraries (single and married), and 
(b) relative contraries (left and right). 
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Note that these categories are by no means mutually exclusive--
for exa.rrple, "up and down" might be classified either as a 
relative polarity or as a relative contrary, while "male and 
female" might qualify either as an absolute contrary or as a 
complementary pair. Although the first and second categories 
are sensible enough, the third and fourth are vulnerable to the 
criticism that the choice of what pairs are to be included 
under them is rather arbitrary, being subject more to social 
custom than to any compelling logic. The more I succeed in 
clarifying the implicit criteria according to which the social 
category of "opposites" is applied, the more haphazard these 
criteria will inevitably appear. 
For example, not all complementary pairs qualify as 
opposites. What accounts for our gut feeling that "male and 
female" are true opposites, but "ice cream and hot fudge" are 
not? I imagine the category of complementary pairs to include 
any two things which together form a complete set of something, 
and which are capable of working in harmony with one another by 
virtue of being those things. The "opposite" designation may 
be undermined by criticism to the effect that the perceived 
harmony actually conceals genuine conflict, or that there are 
more than two things in the set. In the case of male and 
female, for exa.rrple, feminists will question whether the 
relationship is really one of exploitation rather than 
complementariness, while others will point to difficulties with 
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the common assumption that there are only two sexes. 43 
In the case of contraries, what inspires us to accept 
"left and right", but not "petunias and pickle-peelers" as 
opposites? Both sets of terms are mutually exclusive, but the 
first pair enjoys an elusive intuitive link that the second 
pair does not . In order to account for this, I imagine 
contraries to consist of two terms which are mutually 
incompatible and for which the thought of one calls to mind the 
other. While this transforms their existence from the realm of 
logic to that of human psychology, such a move is probably 
inescapable. Note that contraries need not exhaust all 
possibilities even in a given category, unless these other 
possibilities became socially prominent enough for the set of 
two to no longer seem complete. (For instance, there are other 
marital statuses besides single and married, and other 
directions besides up and down.) 
"Universal opposites," or two divisions of something 
regarded as fundamental, which between them account for that 
43 The popular concept of gender lumps together such 
diverse criteria as (a) possession of ovaries and/or testes 
(one of each for hermaphrodites); (b) the configuration of 
one's external genitalia; (c) presence of secondary sexual 
characteristics such as breasts or facial hair; (d) the types 
of hormones present in one's body; (e) characteristic male and 
female mindsets, e.g. how and under what circumstances one 
resorts to aggression; (f) self-identification; and (g) 
recognition by others within one's society, these last two 
being expressed through an elaborate system of social roles 
involving clothing, mannerisms, occupations, sexual and 
familial behavior, and choice of public restrooms. As any San 
Francisco resident could assure you, not everyone possesses a 
perfectly consistent male/female gender identity across all of 
these criteria. 
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entire thing. Matter is the 11 0p!;X)site 11 of energy in the sense 
that everything in the universe is either matter or energy (if 
this is in fact true) . Something similar could be said of 
matter and spirit in a system where these two forces are said 
to account for everything. Male and female may be said to be 
11 0p!;X)sites 11 in this sense insofar as these two categories are 
popularly sup!;X)sed to account for the entire human race (as 
well as other animal species). These expressions of 
11 0p!;X)siteness II are vulnerable to criticisms to the effect that 
(a) the two categories are not really exhaustive, or (b) they 
are not really fundamental. (The meaning of 11 fundamental II here 
is unavoidably vague since it has no reality apart from the 
minds of the individuals making this judgement.) Note that it 
is possible for something to have more than one 11 0p!;X)site 11 in 
this sense (e.g. men and women, girls and women) so long as one 
term participates in more than one fundamental sphere which may 
be divided. Also some, but not all, of these sets of 
11 0p!;X)sites 11 are incanpatible in the sense that nothing can be 
both one and the other at the same time (e.g. dead things and 
living things) without subtly changing the meaning of one term. 
Under which category of 11 0p:fX)siteS 11 do good and evil, or 
good and bad, belong? If the terms are taken as adjectives, 
they fit in very well as relative polarities. As nouns, they 
may be true opposites (if the universe is sufficiently 
Manichaean), complementaries (if the universe is sufficiently 
harmonious), or failing that, absolute contraries. 
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So much for different kinds of relationships which are 
popularly lumped together as "opposites." Now, let us consider 
the various ways in which "nonduality," including the "unity of 
opposites, " has been asserted. The closest scholarly precedent 
for a typology of nonduality is David Loy's Nonduality (1988), 
which identifies five types of nonduality as they are proposed 
in various Eastern philosophies (mainly Advaita Vedanta, 
philosophical Taoism, and Mahayana Buddhism). Loy 
distinguishes between five different kinds of nonduality, but 
limits his discussion mainly to the first three: 
(1) Nondualistic thinking. 
(2) Oneness as opposed to plurality. 
(3) The unity of subject and object. 
(4) The identity of appearance and the Absolute (or, 
after Nagarjuna, samsara 
this the "nonduality of 
1988: 11). 
and nirvana) . 
duality and 
Loy also calls 
nonduality" (Loy 
(5) The unity of individuals with an overarching 
ultimate reality (God and the soul, Brahman and atman) . 
Loy thinks his five types of nonduality are related, in the 
sense that nondualistic thinking implies all of the other 
nondualities (Loy 1988: 178). To me this is a bit like saying 
that the laws of physics are implied by the rules of grammar, 
since (disregarding the possibility of choosing between 
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different languages) it is impossible to discuss the former 
without making use of the latter. Just because our thinking 
dualistic in one sense does not imply that the universe is 
nondualistic in the other senses. 
When some idea is said to be dualistic or nondualistic, 
what is it that is being divided, or not divided? Again, the 
answer varies from system to system. For exarrple, 
cosmological and Zoroastrianism's famous dualism conjoins 
ethical dualisms of good versus 
system has been called "dualistic" 
evil. Meanwhile, 
for dividing the 
Plato's 
universe 
into the pure world of the Forms and the ordinary material 
world. Although it resembles Zoroastrian-style dualism in the 
sense that one side is better or holier than the other, Plato 
does not think the material world is actively evil--at worst, 
it is less real; at best, it partakes of and gives expression 
to patterns in the world of the forms. Like Zoroastrian-style 
dualism, the Platonic type of likewise found its way into 
Ch:~::Jsti_anity, where it took the form of the ~piritual and 
material worlds. A similar type of dualism may be observed in 
Descartes' bifurcation of the universe into spheres of res 
cogitans and res extensa, which in humans somehow connect with 
one another at the pineal gland. Relevant differences include 
the fact that for Descartes one's own mental events are 
immediately apprehended and cannot be doubted, whereas Plato's 
Forms can only be discerned by those fortunate souls who can 
rise above material concerns and acquire knowledge of their 
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existence through philosophy. Also, the Forms are typically 
shared, while mental events are not. In Zoroastrian, Platonic, 
and Cartesian dualism, the entire cosmos is said to be divided. 
The main structural difference is that Zoroastrian-style 
dualism is more symmetrical than the others, since good and 
evil interact on more or less equal terms until the day of 
judgement. Plato and Descartes, by contrast, divide the 
universe into two entirely different spheres whose interaction 
is highly problematic. 
A nondual counterpart of the various cosmic dualisms 
exemplified by the Zoroastrian, Platonic, and Cartesian systems 
may be identified in the traditional Chinese cosmology based on 
~~.-the interplay of yin ~~~ and yang , as depicted in 
that most familiar symbol of nonduality, the t'ai ch'i ~ ~~~ 
symbol. 44 Yin in Chinese suggests femininity, shadow, and 
receptivity. Yang, meanwhile, suggests masculinity, brightness 
44 T_'a:j, __ <;h'.LJ.~ the Mandarin .. pronounciation . of two 
Chine.se .c::ha:r-acters mearl.igg ~·_g~~at iiitlffiate I ,, aricf "refer~~~tQ "the 
<;::_~lest,i_Cl.l pQ],e around which the universe revolves. The goal of 
t'ai-ch'i ch'iian exercises is to bring the practitioner into 
harmony with these universal forces. The symbol itself looks 
like a circle with an S-shaped line drawn through it, dividing 
it into two halves (although a three-spoked version may be 
encountered from time to time) . Sometimes the two halves are 
colored black and white; sometimes black and red; occasionally, 
as on the Mongolian flag, they are the same color. They may be 
drawn with or without dots. Frequently they are surrounded by 
the eight I Ching trigrams, as on the flag of South Korea, or 
by the Chinese characters for the five elements. It is unclear 
whether the symrol was ever supposed to be a picture of 
anything. It may have been inspired by the light and shaded 
sides of a hill, or by the path of stars around the North Star. 
The Mongolians for their part see it as two fishes. (Jung 
somehow overlooks this tradition in Aion, when he discusses the 
symbolism of the two fishes--one pointed up, the other pointed 
down--in the symbol for Pisces). 
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(the word for sun is t'ai yang -L D}L ~- JJ·~ ), and outgoingness. 
The system is clearly vulnerable to a certain amount of 
criticism, especially from feminists, to the effect that pairs 
of concepts in essentially unrelated categories ranging from 
sex to cooking to medicine to military strategy have been 
lumped together as if they shared some essential attribute. 
Neither yin nor yang stands for good or evil; instead, good 
comes from maintaining harmony between the two sides. Perhaps 
it is this emphasis on harmony over conflict which allows this 
system to be considered "nondualistic" despite the fact that it 
revolves around the interplay of two universal forces. The use 
of male and female imagery to symbolize other supposedly 
harmonious pairs of concepts is also characteristic of Hindu 
and Buddhist tantra, where the image of a couple in sexual 
union may symbolize the union of emptiness and bliss, nature 
and wisdom, or purusa and prakrti (roughly, "consciousness" and 
"matter"). Vestiges of similar divine pairs survive within 
Judaism and Christianity. 45 
45 The Canaanite religion appears to have featured a more 
or less typical ancient Near Eastern divine couple, Baal and 
Astarte, whose union was associated with agricultural 
fertility. Dim memories of this mythology survive in the 
Hebrew Bible either as twisted ve.rsions of the original myth 
(e.g. the union of Adam and Eve results in death rather than 
life) , or as complaints by various prophets about the cult's 
continuing survival. The effective eradication of the 
Canaanite religion did not bring about the suppression of this 
imagery, however. For example, the beginning of the Book of 
Proverbs depicts Chokmah (or "Wisdom, " a feminine noun) as a 
consort of YHVH. The Gnostic redeemer Sophia represents a 
further elaboration of the same mythic themes. Even today 
Christians speak of the church as the bride of Christ, and Jews 
welcome the Sabbath as a bride and queen. 
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Perhaps the most philosophically interesting source of 
nondualistic ideas is Sankara. Sankara's teaching is known as 
Advaita ( "Nondualism") for his assertion that Brahman (the 
·~'"' ·-·~··<·••'"""--··""·"'-·~..-~,~-· 
unitary ul t: inlc:t.t:-.~ __ _:1:'_~~-~i:~Y under lying all thin9s) and a tman (the 
~----------
fundamental, immutable "self") are identical. Advaita actually 
combines two different notions of nonduality. The first is the 
idea that the .. locus --~~ _hu._~~~-?enti~_x (as well as that of 
animals, and possibly everything in the universe) is identical 
with Brahman, so that in effect, we are all one entity. (The. 
idea raises obvious problems, among them that of why when one 
person attains Brahman, the rest of us remain as we are.) The 
second notion of nonduality involved here is that of the 
worshipper with the ultimate reality. This aspect was 
particularly controversial among Vedantins, since almost every 
noteworthy Vedantin philosopher except Sankara wanted to 
maintain the traditional superior/subordinate relationship 
between the deity (usually Vishnu, although Sankara was a 
follower of Shiva) and the worshipper. In fact, Madhva' s 
system was even called "Dualism" (Dvaita), presumably as a 
rebuke to Sankara. Analogous controversies can be identified 
among the "absorptive" and "non-absorptive" mystics of the 
Western religions, based on whether the religious practitioner 
strives to realize actual unity with God, or merely establish 
some sort of close relationship with God (such as that of lover 
and beloved). 
Already Sankara's system has contributed several 
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different notions of nonduality--namely the nonduality of 
Brahman and a tman on one hand, and a nondual i ty (or 
"nonplurality") of selves in the universe on the other. To 
further complicate matters, some of Sankara's opponents accuse 
him of being in fact a crypto-dualist because of his 
distinction between the illusory world of maya, in which 
qualities (gunas) exist and phenomena are perceived to be many; 
and the non-illusory level of Brahman, which is without 
qualities (nirguna) and in which all is seen to be one. 
Defenders of Sankara would argue that this teaching of the Two 
Truths (conventional truth and ultimate truth) is not really 
dualistic, since he is not proposing the existence of two 
different worlds but a double-aspectarian system in which the 
Two Truths are two different ways of looking at the same world. 
A stock analogy would be a rope which is mistaken for a snake--
here, there is only one entity (the rope), not two (rope and 
snake). 
Dualism sometimes refers to a psychological tendency 
rather than a cosmological belief. While Ioan Couliano in The 
Tree of Gnosis ( 1990) focuses on the recurrence of dualistic 
patterns within Christian Christological and Trinitarian 
controversies (in which exactly two competing beliefs typically 
vie to be considered orthodox at any given juncture), the 
intent of his work is nondualistic since it likens these 
various choices to mere gamesmanship. "A game fascinates the 
human mind because the mind recognizes in it its own 
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functioning," Couliano writes ( 1990: 24 7), and the same applies 
to religious doctrines such as the Trinity. Such beliefs do 
not reflect the physical universe but are "ideal objects" which 
exist in their own "logical space" (Couliano 1990: 250) and 
reflect the hidden structures and processes (or 
"morphodynamics") of the human mind. Couliano like many other 
Structuralists (notably Levi-Strauss) views the human mind as 
essentially dualistic: 
Christology, if interpreted as a viable whole, is not a 
succession of anarchic, unrelated events in time but a 
system made up of binary switches that ... crosses time in 
an unpredictable sequence. [Couliano 1990: 16] 
His analysis of the Christian creedal controversies rings true, 
and would be easy enough to apply to similar debates in other 
religions which also produced flow-chart "trees" consisting of 
several successive binary divisions, though not always of a 
creedal nature. The implication is that the dualistic 
tendencies inherent in the human mind lead to divisive, 
meaningless conflict when we fail to realize their nature. In 
this light, the dualistic status of good and evil may lie in 
our tendency to conceptually distinguish between them, identify 
with them, or otherwise cling to them psychologically. 
Now we are ready to organize these various nondualities 
into a tentative typology. One kind of nonduality is based on 
relativism. For example, Heraclitus: 
246 
52. The sea is the purest and the foulest water; 
drinkable and healthful for fishes; but for men 
unfit to drink and hurtful. [Nahm 1947: 89-97] 
it is 
it is 
Sea-water may sometimes be healthful and sometimes hurtful--but 
this does not mean that everything that hurts is sometimes 
healthful. 
Next, there is the idea that some things which seem to 
oppose one another actually cooperate in a higher harmony. 
Heraclitus uses the example of a drawn bow, whose ends move in 
opposite directions: 
45. Men do not understand how that which draws back 
agrees with itself; harmony lies in the bending 
back, as for instance of the bow and the lyre. 
[ibid.] 
Now how far, we may ask, is this analogy meant to extend? Do 
all, or only some, pairs of enemies or opposing forces serve a 
higher harmony? And is it important that there be precisely 
two opposing forces? {Imagine something like a three-pronged 
bow.) 
Some versions of nonduality are similar to the above, 
except that this higher harmony encanpasses not only those 
forces which seem to oppose one another, but everything in the 
universe. This "harmony" may consist merely of mutual 
influence in a common coherent reality--for example, the 
observation that everything in the universe is gravitationally 
affected by everything else {or everything that possesses mass, 
anyway) . Another kind of harmony that is sometimes proposed in 
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New Age circles is that of a holographic view of reality, in 
which each part (subatomic particles, souls) somehow contains 
an image of the whole (the universe, God). Another possibility 
is the traditional theological view that everything in the 
universe participates in a divine plan, and that God can bring 
good even out of evil. 
These ideas in turn blur into the set of views known as 
monism--not the attributive monism which holds that everything 
in the universe is made of different combinations of the same 
kind of entity (e.g., Greek atomism, if we exclude from 
consideration the void), but the substantival monism in which 
the apparant multiplicity of the universe belies an underlying 
unity (e.g., Parmenides, Sankara). Since distinctions between 
named characteristics ultimately make sense only in a 
pluralistic universe, this leads quite naturally to the view 
that the ultimate reality is ineffable. A related type of 
nondual ineffability is that, for exarrple, the idea of 
"justice" is inconceivable without the corresponding concept of 
"injustice," so that those who perpetuate the former are iri 
effect supporting the latter as well: 
When the people of the world all know beauty as 
beauty, 
There arises the recognition of ugliness. 
When they all know the good as good, 
There arises the recognition of evil. 
Therefore: Being and nonbeing produce each other; 
Difficult and easy complete each other; 
Long and short contrast each other; 
High and low distinguish each other; 
Sound and voice harmonize each other; 
Front and back accompany each other. 
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[Tao Te Ching ch. 2, in Chan 1963: 140) 
This is a critique not only of paired opposites, or even of 
duality in general, but of any named term whatsoever. Why? 
Because any concept implies the existence of its negation. 
This is the form of nonduality known as nonconceptuality. 
Besides the Tao Te Ching, it is also found in the doctrine of 
nirguna Brahman from Advai ta Vedanta, and in the Mahayana 
conception of ultimate truth. 
Another form of non~ality which one sometimes encounters 
_i~~Ci.!:_..?.~~- .l?_~E~~!::._ i-~~nti_t:y__:_ Again, Heraclitus: 
69. Upward, downward, the way is one and the same. 
[Nahm 1947: 89-97] 
This kind of nonduality would cover Superman and Clark Kent, 
the butler and the murderer, things of that nature. (I note 
however that transpersonal author Ken Wilber has a very 
different interpretation of this saying, in which "the way up" 
corresponds to the soul' s ascent to the divine, and "the way 
down" to the divine descent into the soul.) A related form is 
nonduality as the unity of two things that regularly change 
into each other, in the sense that "caterpillars are 
butterflies," or "matter and energy are one": 
78. Life and death, and waking and sleeping, and 
youth and old age, are the same; for the latter 
change and are the former, and the former change 
back to the latter. [ibid.] 
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I surmise from this and other passages that Heraclitus has in 
mind some sort of system of reincarnation. Even if he is right 
about this, though, there would still be good reasons for 
distinguishing between, for example, the living and the dead. 
Finally, nondual expressions conunonly take the form of 
what we might call literary irony: War is peace. Freedom is 
slavery. While we may be tempted to dismiss this as a flagrant 
abuse of the copula, on the order of a joke, this kind of 
nonduality is conunon enough in otherwise philosophical texts. 
For example, Heraclitus: 
62. Men should know that war is general and that 
justice is strife .... [ibid.] 
Or the Nag Hammadi text entitled The Thunder, Perfect Mind: 
For I am the first and the last. 
I am the honored one and the scorned one. 
I am the whore and the holy one. 
I am the wife and the virgin. 
I am the mother and the daughter. 
I am the members of my mother. 
I am the barren one 
and many are her sons ... 
[Barnstone 1984: 595] 
Bentley Layton (1986) has argued that this text actually 
presents a sacred riddle, for which the answer is "Eve." 
Many other dualistic or nondualistic theories might be 
identified, but this is enough to point out their essential 
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diversity. If we expand the list to encompass secular 
nondualities, we might add such items as matter and energy, or 
inflation and unemployment. Furthermore, some ideas which are 
labeled "nondualistic" are actually "nonpluralistic" in the 
sense that they deny sets of many rather than pairs only. Is 
there some good reason for lumping together some or all of 
these ideas under the name of "nonduality"? Jung would say 
that the same psychological impulse which leads us to divide 
one leads us to divide others, but of course this is 
controversial. 
So when Nietzsche and Jung urge us to transcend the 
duality of good and evil, which kind of nonduality are they 
proposing? In the "naive" reading of Nietzsche (i.e. master 
morality good, slave morality bad), this would not be 
nonduality at all, but a substitution of one structurally 
equivalent set of contraries (good and bad) for another (good 
and evil) . A deeper reading of Nietzsche might yield any of 
the nondualistic possibilities listed here. In the case of 
Jung, we may further exclude relativism and literary irony, but 
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